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Resumo
A ideia de objectos matemáticos que estão em permanente desenvolvimento
no tempo foi pela primeira vez avançada por L.E.J. Brouwer. Na matemática
intuicionista estes objectos são concebidos como sequência infinitas de números
naturais que em qualquer estágio do seu crescimento têm apenas um número
finito de valores, além disso, tais valores podem ser livremente escolhidos, no
sentido em que a sua produção não necessita de ser determinada por nenhuma
regra matemática definida. Tais objectos são denominados de sequências de
escolha. O presente trabalho tem como objectivo fornecer uma resposta à se-
quinte questão: são as sequências de escolha legítimos objectos matemáticos?
A resposta que iremos propor e à qual iremos argumentar favoravelmente é
a seguinte: tais objectos não podem ser considerados objectos matemáticos
legítimos. Com esta tese em vista, iremos discutir as propriedades intrínsecas
das sequências de escolha relativamente à maneira como são incorporadas no
contexto matemático e as suas implicações. Seguindo esta metodologia pre-
tendemos atingir um cabal entendimento filosófico das consequências em que
incorremos ao aceitarmos sequências de escolha como objectos da ontologia
matemática e das razões que temos para não as aceitarmos como tal.
Abstract
The idea of mathematical objects which are in a permanent state of growth in
time was by the first time defended by L.E.J. Brouwer. In intuitionistic mathe-
matics these objects are conceived as infinite sequences of natural numbers that
at any stage of growth have only finitely many values defined. Additionally,
these values may be freely chosen, in the sense that their generation has not
to follow any determinate mathematical rule. These objects are called choice
sequences. The present work aims at providing the answer to the following
question: are choice sequences legitimate mathematical objects? The answer
that we will propose and argue for is a negative one: that they cannot be con-
sidered legitimate mathematical objects. In order to do this we will discuss
the intrinsic features of choice sequences concerning the way they are incor-
porated into a mathematical framework and their implications. Following this
methodology we expect to achieve a good philosophical understanding of the
consequences of accepting choice sequences into our mathematical ontology
and of the reasons that we have not to accept them as such.
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Introduction
In the beginning of the 20th century three main schools in the Philosophy of
Mathematics emerged to deal with the recent discovered paradoxes into the
foundations os mathematics at the time. Hilbert’s Formalism, Frege and Rus-
sell’s Logicism and Brouwer’s Intuitionism. Hilbert’s formalistic programme,
whose objective was to prove that all of mathematics was a conservative exten-
tion of consistent axiomatic theories, was refuted by the inconsistency theorems
due to Kurt Gödel. Frege’s Logicism, whose objective was to show that the con-
cept of natural number was founded on logical concepts, was also refuted by
Russell’s paradox due to Bertrand Russell. And Russell’s Logicism, whose
objective was the same as Frege’s, proved incapable of justifying the axioms
of mathematics only through logical principles. From the three philosophical
schools enunciated above only Brouwer’s Intuitionism remained practically
intact untill nowadays.
One of the main reasons that established Intuitionism as a valid account
for mathematics untill nowadays is that Intuitionism is not concerned with the
foundations of classical mathematics. Intuitionistic mathematics was devel-
oped without the concern whether its results happen to coincide to classical
mathematical ones and, more important, it was not developed to stand as a
suitable foundation for classical mathematics. The main concern of intuition-
istic mathematics was that the resultant mathematics was to be viewed as the
right mathematics. For this reason, many of the principles and methods of
classical mathematics proved to be intuitionistically invalid. The principle of
excluded middle is the most proeminent classical principle that is not valid on
intuitionistic grounds. But there are many other classical facts of mathematics
that also proved to be intuitionistically false or just untenable.
It is widely accepted by philosophers of mathematics that the fundamental
reason that led intuitionistic mathematics to be inconsistent with classical math-
ematics is due to its particular ontology. Like classical mathematics, intuition-
ism deals with infinite collections. But the kind of infinite objects that pertain to
intuitionism do not fit classical theories. When Brouwer started (around 1913)
with his intuitionistic reconstruction of the theory of the continuum, he found
that the notion of choice sequence could be regarded as a legitimate intuitionistic
notion, and as a means of retaining the advantages of an arithmetic theory of
the continuum. However, the notion of choice sequence is not a simple one. It
has particularities that lead some mathematicians and philosophers to regard
it as a dubious mathematical notion.
A choice sequence α of natural numbers may be viewed as an unfinished,
ongoing process of choosing values α(0), α(1), α(2), ... by an ideal mathemati-
cian. At any stage of his activity the ideal mathematician has determined only
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finitely many values, plus, possibly, some restrictions on future choices. Choice
sequences are unfinished objects in the sense that they are permanently growing
thus being potential infinite objects. This feature of choice sequences is persis-
tently pointed as one of the reasons to reject choice sequences as legitimate
mathematical objects. But there are other properties of choice sequences that
motivate the same conclusion. Choice sequences are time-dependent objects
since they are at permanent state of growth and hence they cannot be seen as
finished objects like classical mathematical objects. But despite the fact that
choice sequences are obbjects of a peculiar sort, their use in mathematics have
advantages over the classical ones. In particular, they allow us to mathemat-
ically model the continuum and its properties in a more natural and intuitive
way than the way it is conceived in classical mathematics. In fact, say the
proponent of choice sequences as mathematical objects, this is the main reason
to introduce choice sequences into our mathematical ontology. In what follows
we will discuss all these (and more) properties of choice sequences. We will
try to provide a detailed discussion of the pros and cons of accepting choice
sequences as legitimate objects of mathematical theories.
In first chapter we provide a detailed characterization of choice sequences
and of the way how they can be incorporated into a mathematical framework.
We also discuss the motivation for introducing them into our mathematical
ontology. Some major results of intuitionistic real analysis are presented to
illustrate how the continuum can be intuitively built using choice sequences. At
this point a fundamental principle governing choice sequences is presented and
the relation between it and the previous results is established. This principle
is the Weak Continuity Principle. We also present a very important consequence
of this principle in which a direct consequences of the law of excluded middle
is refuted by it. After this is done we turn to the logical aspects of choice
sequences. A particular emphasis is given to that fact that this principle makes
impossible to use classical Logic to deal with choice sequences because it refutes
some classical principles. Therefore, a new logic is needed. This new logic is
the intuitionistic Logic, which does not have Double Negation as a universally
valid law. The reason lies in the interpretation of the meaning of intuitionistic
logical operators, which have a non-classical or contructive meaning. After all,
choice sequences are meant to be contructive, non-classical objects. Due to the
constructive character of choice sequences we find important to establish the
link between choice sequences and the notion of a constructive proof. We will
find that this relation is not unproblematic. Then we reach the high point of the
first chapter: the problems of identity and individuation for choice sequence.
Contrary to classical objects, it is problematic to serch for individuation criteria
for choice sequences. And this happens because it is not also clear how do we
establish identity for them (in particular for a specific class of choice sequences,
the lawless sequences). We conclude this paragraph discussing whether the use
of choice sequences allow us to conclude that a new paradigm of mathematical
reasoning is found, a paradigm dealing with potential infinite objects that do
not exist in the classical ontology of mathematics.
In second chapter our aim is to present three major accounts of choice
sequences. Brouwer’s philosophical context in which he introduces them into
mathematical reasoning, Troelstra’s axiomatic treatment of lawless sequences
and Weyl’s quasi-eliminativist account of quantification over choice sequences.
We start by presenting the original setting were choice sequences, for the first
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time, were introduced as possible mathematical objects: the semi-intuitionistic
conception of Borel (who rejected them as legitimate mathematical objects).
Then it is shown how Brouwer, contrary to Borel and despite his criticism,
reintroduces choice sequences as legitimate objects of intuitionistic mathematics
(and not as classically definable objects, as Borel had thinked of). Brouwer’s
philosophy of mathematics has two distinctive (chronological) moments, which
are called the Two acts of intuitionism. We discuss his conception of mathematics,
whose principles, concepts and methods arise as consequences of the mind free
creating activity. A special emphasis is given to the second act, where he
recognizes choice sequences as mathematical objects and proposes the weak
continuity principle as the fundamental principle governing them. After this
is done we turn to the axiomatic account of choice sequences where the axioms
for lawless sequences are formulated and motivated by Troelstra (and Kreisel).
The theory buitl is called LS. We present and discuss individually in some
detail the four axioms of LS. We also discuss the possible interpretations of the
interesting Elimination theorem proved within LS. Finally, and motivated by the
general case of the eliminativist interpretation of the Elimination theorem, we
present Weyl’s account of choice sequences and discuss some of his claims about
how we should deal with individual choice sequences. This chapter is completed
with a critical discussion of the weak continuity principle, whose philosophical
justification is not clear. We also show that none of the three acconts presented
constitute a completely satisfactorily account for choice sequences.
Due to the incomplete character of the previous accounts for choice se-
quences we turn to the recent developed phenomenology of choice sequences.
The phenomenological setting of choice sequences is chiefly proposed and de-
veloped by Mark van Atten. And the third chapter is totally devoted to present
it in some detail. We start by establishing the connection between Intuitionism
and Phenomenology. The main purpose of van Atten is to show that Intuition-
ism and Phenomenology are convergent in the sense that Brouwer’s theses
concerning the ontology of mathematics (which are philosophically deficient)
have sufficient aspects in commom such that Brouwer’s intuitionism can be in-
corporated into and justified by Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. In
particular, van Atten argues that choice sequences can be phenomenologically
constituted as individual mathematical objects. And that this fact justifies the
introduction of choice sequences into our mathematical ontology. There are,
however, aspects of Husserl’s personal view on the foundations of mathematics
that do not agree with Brouwer’s philosophy. Van Atten’s try to surpass such
problems showing that some of Husserl’s claims are not phenomenologically
grounded as they were supposed to be. We finish this chapter by presenting
van Atten’s phenomenologically-based argument in favour of weak continuity
principle for choice sequences.
The last two chapters are devoted to present our arguments against the claim
that choice sequences are legitimate mathematical objects. In fourth chapter
we develop a critical discussion of van Atten’s phenomenology of choice se-
quences. In particular we develop a set of arguments whose objective is to
show that the class of lawless (choice) sequences cannot be constituted as in-
dividual mathematical objects. In the last chapter we start by discussing some
aspects of the non-eliminativist interpretation of the elimination theroem, with
emphasis on van Atten’s arguments. Then, we advance our ouw view on
choice sequences as mathematical objects. Our view is close to Weyl’s quasi-
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eliminativist interpretation, in which existential quantification over lawless
sequences is to paraphrased into quantification over unproblematic individ-
ual mathematical objects and universal quantification is interpreted as a way
of referring to choice sequences as a notion. For this, we start by discussing
Weyl’s own account of choice sequences in some detail, establishing an impor-
tant parallelism concening the way Weyl and Husserl conceive mathematical
existence. Then, we discuss a technical result that, we think, represents the
thesis we advocate.
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Chapter 1
Choice sequences and their
implications
1.1 What are choice sequences?
Choice sequences are potentially infinite sequences of mathematical objects, cho-
sen one after the other; in the process of choosing, free choices may play a part.1
Imagine that we have at our disposal a collection of mathematical objects, e.g.
the collection of natural numbers. Make a choice, pick a number, any one, and
see the result. Put it back into the collection. Choose a number again, see the
result and put it back into the collection. Now let’s see the resulting sequence
of these two choices. Maybe the result has been 〈5, 12〉. Making further choices,
we can arrive at 〈5, 12, 45, 2, 32〉 and we can continue from here. A choice sequence
is what we get if we think this process of choosing as never ending, or, as potentially
infinite. The potential infinity of this sequence is indicated by the three dots,
〈5, 12, 45, 2, 32, ...〉. The first two sequences given above are initial segments of the
choice sequence and they are always finite sequences. In fact, we cannot make
an actually infinite number of choices, i.e., at any stage of growth of a choice
sequence we just have a finite sequence. However, we can always extend an
initial segment by making a further choice. (OnB, p. 30.)
Information about a particular choice sequence is divided into extensional
information and intensional information. When a choice sequence is given to
us we have access to an initial segment of the sequence this is the extensional
information about the choice sequence; but we also have access, for example,
to the process by which it is generated and to possible restrictions it is subjected
to in each stage, this is the intensional information of the choice sequence.
(OnB, pp. 33-34) Let’s take into consideration the following choice sequence,
α = 〈0, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, ...〉. As extensional information of α we have the initial
segment 〈0, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10〉 given to us; as intensional information of α we have
the law or rule ‘2n’ that generates it and the possible restriction that after the
100th choice, all choices has the result 1, i.e. that for any n > 100, it is the case
that α(n) = 1.
The collection of all choice sequences is constitued by different kinds of
1Mark van Atten, On Brouwer, Wadsworth, Belmont, 2004, p. 6. From now on quoted as ‘OnB’.
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choice sequences. There is a spectrum in which the extremes are constitued
by choices sequences called lawlike and the ones called lawless. And between
the oposite sides there are many possible combinations of choice sequences.
(OnB, p. 33) Lawlike sequences are those whose process of generation is totally
determined in advance by a finite law or rule. Given this law, it is always
possible to calculate the next element of the sequence in question. Consider
the choice sequence given by the process n + 1. Given any initial segment
of the resulting sequence, say, 〈1, 2, 3, 4, 5, ...〉 we can make a calculation that
presents to us the next element of the sequence, 〈1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, ...〉. The idea of
a lawlike sequence is that of a choice sequence restricted to a law at any stage
of the process, i.e., generated by a process of choosing elements of a domain
in a way that does not involve any kind of arbitrariness from one stage of the
process to the next one. Lawlike sequences are analogous (and to some extend,
equivalent2) to recursive functions in classical mathematics, with the aditional
clause that they are not finished objects like in classical mathematics.
Lawless sequences are those choice sequences for which no definable law or
restriction (in a strong sense) is present in the basis of their process of generation,
i.e., sequences for which we don’t have any specific law to calculate the next
element of a given initial segment. About lawless sequences it is often said
that they are freely generated sequences. Lawless (choice) sequences are also
known as ‘free choice sequences’, since they are generated by the free will of the
individual subject who generates them. The choice sequence given above is an
example of a lawless sequence, since it has no law assigned to it and there is no
restriction to follow from one stage of generation to the next; we have choosen
the elements of it in a random or arbitrary way. Contrary to lawlike, lawless
sequences don’t have an analogous notion in classical mathematics nor does
any clasical concept remotely resemble it.
Between lawlike and lawless sequences there exists a myriad of possible
combinations. For example, the sequence given by the following process: if the
input is an even natural number, then the sequence is totaly free and if the input
is an odd number, then the sequence is determined by a law. This sequence
is neither lawlike nor lawless. The most proeminent combination, however, is
the type of choice sequences known as hesitant sequences. A hesitant sequence
is a process of choosing elements of a domain such that at any stage we either
decide to conform to a law in determining future values, or, if we have not
already decided to conform to a law at any earlier stage, we freely choose a
new element of the domain.3 Thus at any stage of the process of generation of
a hesitant sequence we can decide to transform it into a lawlike sequence or into
a lawless sequence. But there are other possible combinations; the number of
possible combinations is endless.
Let’s make a distinction between first-order rules and second-order rules (or
equivalently, first-order and second-order restrictions). The first-order rules
are applied directly upon the generation of the elements of the sequence
and the second-order rules are applied to the first-order rules. A first-order
2An intuitionist might object to this claim: it would possibly say that the only prescription for
a sequence to be lawlike is that its values are generated by a law in a broad sense, leaving open the
precise sense or definition of ‘lawlikeness’, thus leaving open also the hypothesis that lawlikeness
would concide with recursiveness.
3Troelstra & van Dalen, Constructivism in Mathematics: an Introduction, vol. I, North-Holland,
Amsterdam, 1988, p. 208. From now on quoted as ‘CinM I’.
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rule/restriction on a choice sequence α is, for example, to determine that after
the kth choice the elements of α are always 0. But we may constrain the genera-
tion of a choice sequence α by not allowing any restrictions on the choices of its
values; this is a second-order restriction: ‘no first-order restrictions are allowed
upon α’. Notice that this second-order restriction defines precisely the lawless
sequences. So even a lawless sequence is subjected to a restriction, but one of
second order, not first. (OnB, p. 34)
However, if we accept general second-order restrictions upon choice se-
quences, a possible tension is raised. If we accept (second-order) restrictions
like the above mentioned one, how can we say that some choice sequences
(the lawless ones) are totally free generated? After all, the restriction that no
first-order restrictions are to be allowed is a restriction.
1.2 The distinctive features of choice sequences
The first main feature of choice sequences, as seen above, is that they are
potentially infinite objects. The potential infinity of choice sequences indicates
that the process of choosing the next element of the sequence never ends, i.e.,
that the sequence is in a state of permanent growth. This is how the concept
of ‘choice sequence’ encapsulates the notion of potential infinite as oposed to
the classical notion of completed or actual infinite. The ‘potentiality’ of choice
sequences is a consequence of a more general property that choice sequences
possess: they are dynamic objects, i.e., objects that at some moment have parts
added on them. Classic mathematical objects are then considered as being
static objects.4 The potentiality of choice sequences is the property that at some
moment of their growth, in fact constantly, they have parts added to them
(but not removed). Often, in philosophical literature, the term ‘potential’ has
different meanings attributed to it. In particular, there is an interpretation
(the more common) that equates the term ‘potential’ with ‘possible’; under this
interpretation, potential objects are objects whose existence is possible, opposed
to those objects whose existence is a comprovated fact. Notice, however, that
in discussing the properties of choice sequences, we are here using the term
‘potential’ in a specific sense. By saying that choice sequences are potential
objects we do not mean to say that they are mere possible objects. What
is intended to say is that they are unfinished objects. Choice sequences are
potential in the sense that they are in a permanent state of growth, and they
cannot be considered completed objects.
Another main feature of choice sequences is their intensional character. What
is it that we have in mind when talking about the intensional character of choice
sequences? What we do have in mind is how choice sequences are given to us,
how a choice sequence comes to existence. In classical mathematics an object
is defined by its extensional properties: a set is determined by the totality of
its elements (Axiom of extensionality). So, in classical mathematics, the way
an object is determined is always by extensional identity. Choice sequences
however are determined by intensional identity, i.e., a choice sequence is given
to us by specifying a construction process for it, a process that produces (in a
strong sense) its elements. The primary notion of identity for choice sequences
4Mark van Atten, Brouwer meets Husserl: The Phenomenology of Choice Sequences, Springer, Dor-
drecht, 2007, p. 16. From now on quoted as ‘BmH’.
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is that of intensional identity: if two choice sequences are given by the same
construction they are intensionally identical, otherwise different, even though
in some relevant ways they may still be the same (e.g., they may have the
same outputs). (OnB, p. 2) Thus, the specific intensional character of choice
sequences refers to the fact that they are objects whose identity is determined by,
or depends on, the way they are given. Choice sequences are highly intensional
objects in the sense just explained: their identity is determined through their
mode of presentation, not through their ‘elements’.
When we say that choice sequences are given by specifying a construction
for them, we have to ask who specifies such a construction. According to the
choice sequence proponent, choice sequences depend on individual choices
upon the mathematical domain we have in advance, normally the domain
of natural numbers which is viewed as primitive. A choice sequence is con-
structed by picking out elements of the the domain of natural numbers; we can
decide to pick them in a determined and mechanical way (the case of lawlike
sequences) or we can decide to pick them in a somehow arbitrary way (the
case of lawless sequences). When this second situation happens, we say that
we freely choose the elements of the domain. But who make the choices? The
choices, says the proponent choice sequences, are always made by a virtual
subject, an idealization of real subjects; it is he who carries the construction of a
particular choice sequence. In other words, an individual choice sequence has
all of its properties solely in virtue of a particular subject’s decision to construct
it in a certain way. (OnB, p. 34) This subject is an idealization of real mathe-
maticians and was called by Brouwer the creating subject (‘scheppend subject’ in
the original ducth). There are costs, however. The alleged introduction of a
subjective character in Mathematics that is absent from classical mathematics.
Classically, subjective choices in constructing mathematical objects do not play
any role, because in classical mathematics objects are not constructed by any
subject, even an idealized one. In classical mathematics the particular subjects,
the real mathematicians, just grasp or discover the objects that are already ex-
istent in the mathematical world. These objects are not constructed in the sense
that they come into existence by a mental operation carried and started by the
idealized mathematician, as choice sequences are.
This leads us to the most intrincated feature of choice sequences, their
temporality. Choice sequences are not objects that exists irrespectively of time.
They start to exist at the moment the process that generates them starts to
operate; they have a beginning in time. But they also evolve through time.
Since the moment they start to exist, choice sequences do not remain the same,
they growth with time: at each moment (or stage) a new choice plays a part and
this process does not have an end. So, choice sequences are temporal objects
in two different ways: they have a beginning at a specific moment of time and
they evolve (grow) through time. These temporal aspects of choice sequences
makes them the dynamic objects they are.
1.3 Motivation for choice sequences
At the beginning of the 20th century the notion of continuum infinite, after
several centuries of obscurity, achieved finally its state of conceptual clarity
within Mathematics. For instance, the continuum can be defined as an infinite
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collection whose elements are so-called Dedekind cuts.5 Note that Dedekind
cuts are infinite sets (i.e., each real is an infinite set). Cantor’s Set Theory made
all these notions mathematically rigorous. For example, it made more clear the
distinction beetwen the set of rationals and the set of reals: the rationals are
countable (they are in a one-one relation with the natural numbers), the reals
are not (the reals are more in number then the natural numbers); the set of real
numbers is closed under convergence (any Cauchy sequence6 of real numbers
converges to a real number), the set of rational numbers is not (there are Cauchy
sequences of rational numbers that do not converge to any rational number,
e.g., the rational sequences that converge to pi or
√
2). But more important of
all, it established the property that essentially distinguishes between the reals
and the rationals: the set of real numbers respects the least upper bound principle.
Further, Cantor’s set theory with its theory of transfinite cardinality established
that the set of real numbers has a cardinality that surpasses the cardinality of
the set of natural numbers.7
Though Brouwer, the father of Intuitionism both as a philosophy and as
mathematics, had embraced the drift to a higher abstractionism performed
in the beginning of the 20th century, he did not agree however with Cantor’s
analysis of the continuum. The problem was not in Cantor’s use of notions
like infinite sets or sequences, but in the fact that they could be considered as
actual or finished infinite sets or sequences. For Brouwer, the notion of an actual
infinite totality makes no sense at all. Actual totalities can only be of a finite
character. For him, infinite totalities are always potential or unfinished. In the
notion of an actual infinite totality lies the intrinsic platonist character of classical
mathematics.
Brouwer, because of his repudiation of the platonist character of classical
mathematics, was the first to show how to rectify this situation. A legitimate
infinite object had to be given by a process (law or rule). But this process had
not to be entirely deterministic, i.e., in such a way that, for instance, only objects
determinated by computable functions were to be allowed. If this were the
case, Brouwer would be stuck to the reduced continuum, i.e., the continuum
made only of lawlike sequences which is only countable (and hence of measure
zero). Brouwer realized that such process had to accommodate some freedom or
flexibility. He allows some flexibility on the process of choosing the elements of
infinite sequences because he wanted to retain both fundamental ideas which
go to form the classical conception of the continuum, admitting not only infinite
sequences determined in advance by an effective rule for computing their terms
(lawlike sequences), but also sequences which admit free selection of their
elements (lawless sequences).8 Choice sequences are the prototype and the
paradigm of such infinite objects. In intuitionist mathematics, as advanced
by the first time by Brouwer, the continuum is constructed on the basis of
such objects: certain choice sequences of nested intervals of rational numbers.9
5A Dedekind cut is an initial segment from the set of rationals such that: it is not empty, it has
an upper bound and it has not a maximal element.
6A sequence (xn)n of real numbers is a Cauchy seqquence iff ∀ > 0∃r∀n,m > r |xn − xm| < .
7See Carl Posy, ‘Intuitionism and Philosophy’ in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics
and Logic, Oxford University Press, New York, 2005, p. 321.
8Michael Dummett, Elements of Intutionism, 2nd edition, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2000, p. 45.
From now on quoted as ‘EI’.
9See OnB, pp. 1-2; Carl Posy, ‘Intuitionism and Philosophy’, in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy
11
For Brouwer, choice sequences are the paradigmatic objects for constructing
the continuum because they have the unfinished or potential character of any
legitimate infinite magnitude.
1.4 Some logico-mathematical consequences of choice
sequences
Intuitionist mathematics contains a series of interesting as unusual results (the-
orems). All the results presented in this section are directly or indirectly conse-
quences of the introduction of choice sequences into Mathematical reasoning
and of the principles that rule them, most notably the Weak Continuity Principle.
Some of these results have a more mathematical character and others a more
logical one, but all of them are corollaries of the use of choice sequences as, for
example, the basis by which the real numbers are defined or simply by being a
logical domain of quantification.10
Definition: A function f : A ⊂ R 7−→ R is continuous at a point a ∈ A iff
limx−→a f (x) = f (a), i.e., iff
∀δ > 0∃ > 0∀x ∈ A(|x − a| < →
∣∣∣ f (x) − f (a)∣∣∣ < δ);
f is uniformly continuous on A iff
∀δ > 0∃ > 0∀x, y ∈ A(
∣∣∣x − y∣∣∣ < → ∣∣∣ f (x) − f (y)∣∣∣ < δ).
In other words, a function f from a set A to a set B is continuous at a point
a ∈ A iff, for every sequence αn ∈ A converging to a, f (αn) converges to f (a);
and f is uniformly continuos when its continuity is registered by a rule that
calculates uniformly from an open interval i around f (a), an interval j around a
that f maps into i. From these definitions applied to intuitionistic real analysis
we get the following results:
Proposition 1 (Brouwer’s Theorem). Every function mapping of the closed unit
interval [0, 1] into R is uniformly continuous.
From the truth of Brouwer’s Theorem, one can infer the following:
Proposition 2 (Continuity Theorem). Every total function from R to R is contin-
uous.11
Another quite interesting result of the intuitionist theory of real numbers
that follows from the Continuity Theorem is the following one:
of Mathematics and Logic, pp. 321-322; A. S. Troelstra & D. Van Dalen, CinM II, pp. 639-641. For
a detailed exposition of the construction of the reals by choice sequences see A. S. Troelstra & D.
Van Dalen, CinM I, ch.5; see also M. Dummett, EI, ch.2 and D. Vellemman & A. George, Blackwell
Publishers, Massachusetts, 2002, ch. 5.
10For a sinoptic and non-technical presentation of these results see D.C. McCarty, ‘Intuitionism
in Mathematics’ in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic, pp.365-369.
11In Brouwer’s exposition he presents Proposition 2 as a corollary of Proposition 1. In fact
Proposition 2 is a consequence of Proposition 1, but it can be derived without reference to it. The
proof for Proposition 1 uses two important principles of intuitionistic mathematics: WC-N and
Fan Theorem, while for the proof of Proposition 2 we only need WC-N (show by Wim Veldman).
(We will explore the implications of WC-N at the next chapter; Fan Theorem will not be discussed
by us in this essay.)
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Proposition 3 (Unsplitability of the continuum). The continuum cannot be di-
vided into two non-trivial subsets, i.e. if R = A ∪ B and A ∩ B = ∅, then A = R or
B = R.
This property of the intuitionist continuum is called ‘viscosity’ of the con-
tinuum. This terminology is inspired in Aristotle’s analysis of the continuum,
who initiated an image of fluid motion that remainded the hallmark of all
continuous magnitudes for millennia. Aristotle’s conceptual analysis of the
continuum and his accompanying image of viscosity (we can’t cut the contin-
uous medium) gained precision in the topological notion of ‘unsplitability’ or
connectivity. It is a property that characterizes the intuitionistic continuum but
that, according to intuitionists, is lost in the classical version of the continuum.12
Of course, this fact is an important (not mentioned before) motivation for the
introduction of choice sequences into mathematical ontology, precisely because
they reintroduce into real analysis the non-discreteness of reals that is lost in
classical analysis of the reals.
These theorems of the intuitionistic real analysis are false in the classical real
analysis. In classical mathematics a function whose domain is R is not always
continuous in R, it can be discontinuous. For the same reason, in classical
mathematics, the continuum is separable in two (or more) non-trivial subsets.
Still in the domain of the real numbers, we have the following property of
the continuum, which follows from the unsplitability of the continuum:
Proposition 4 (Equality is indecidable on R). It is not the case that for all a, b ∈ R,
either a = b or a , b.
These results illustrate the radical consequences of the introduction of choice
sequences into mathematical ontology. All these results are possible due to the
so called Weak Continuity Principle (WC-N). The Weak Continuity Principle is
the most proeminent principle that rules the behavior of choice sequences and
one of the main axioms of the Axiomatic Theory of Choice Sequences. Without
WC-N, the notion of choice sequence would be just an intelectual curiosity,
without any mathematical interest. WC-N is what makes possible to talk about
choice sequences in a mathematical context. Consider a two-place predicate
A(α, x), where α ranges over choice sequences and x over natural numbers; let’s
also assume that A is an extensional property.13 Then the formulation of WC-N
runs as follows:
WC-N: ∀α∃xA(α, x)→ ∀α∃n∃x∀β(β¯n = α¯n→ A(β, x)),
where α and β range over choice sequences, n and x over natural numbers
and α¯n, β¯n stand for the initial segments of α and β, respectively, with length
n. The principle says that if we have a construction (rule or law) that assigns a
number to each choice sequence, all the information it needs to do so is an initial
segment of that sequence. More information (intensional properties) may be
given, but is not required. (OnB, p. 103) Notwithstanding the fact that choice
sequences are highly intensional objects, WC-N makes possible, according to
intuitionism, to use just extensional information about choice sequences (initial
12See D.C. McCarty, ‘Intuitionism in Mathematics’ in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathe-
matics and Logic, pp.345-347.
13The rigorous definition is: ∀α, β(∀n(αn = βn) ∧ A(β,n)→ A(α,n)) (see EI, p. 46).
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segments) to talk about them, in particular, to establish when two choice se-
quences have the same extensional property or not. (We will talk more closely
of WC-N later in a section devoted to it.)
WC-N does not allows us to prove just the results presented above, it allows
to prove something much more drastic: WC-N allows us to refute a direct con-
sequence of the Principle of the Excluded Middle (PEM). PEM is the logical law
that asserts the following:
PEM: For any (mathematical) proposition P, P∨¬P; i.e., for any proposition P,
P is true or the negation of P is true.
This principle is the cornerstone of classical mathematics and, according to
intuitionists, the full manifestation of the platonistic character of classical math-
ematics that they repudiate. The direct consequence of PEM that WC-N refutes
is ∀-PEM, which says the following:
∀-PEM: ∀α(∀n(αn = 0) ∨ ¬∀n(αn = 0)),
where α is ranging over choice sequences and n over natural numbers. ∀-
PEM is a direct consequence of PEM in the following way: we just have to put
∀n(αn = 0) in place of P, for P stands for any mathematical proposition, and
quantify over α, a trivial logical operation. This principle states that for any
choice sequence α, we can decide either for all n αn = 0 or not. In other words,
∀-PEM states that the property ‘to be the null sequence’ (=having all values
equal to 0) is generally decidable in the domain of choice sequences.
Given the explanation above of the concepts in question we can now express
the following result:
Proposition 5 (WC-N refutes ∀-PEM). WC-N⇒ ¬∀-PEM.
This theorem states that, assuming WC-N as being true, we can prove that
∀-PEM is false. That is, if we accept the introduction of choice sequences in
our mathematical ontology and, along with them, WC-N as a principle that
rules their behavior, then we cannot accept general decidability for sentences
about choice sequences as being valid in all cases. So, in the domain of choice
sequences, tertium non datur (PEM) has not the universal validity that charac-
terizes its presence in classical mathematics.
1.5 The proper logic for choice sequences
As we have seen above, the law of excluded middle does not hold for the
domain of choice sequences. It is not generally true that for every property A
of an arbitrary choice sequence α, Aα or ¬Aα. In particular, if we define Aα as
∀n(αn = 0), we cannot prove the disjunct ∀n(αn = 0)∨¬∀n(αn = 0). This result
shows that an essential law of classical logic is inadequate to deal with objects
like choice sequences and their properties. Let’s see why this happens.
When we are dealing with classical objects like sets, for example, we are
dealing with a sort of objects whose behavior is rather different from choice
sequences. Sets are finished objects. All properties that a particular set has
are established once and for all, that is, sets are not objects that can gain new
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properties through time like choice sequences. So, in principle, all we need to
settle for a particular set x to have a property A is to show that the proposition
Ax is true. Bivalent truth is the key semantic notion in classical logic. In classical
logic, to have a proof of a proposition P consists of having a succession of
chained (true) statements or formulas by which the truth of P is established,
being P the last element of the succession. And, generally, to establish the truth
of a proposition P is equivalent to prove that the supposed falsity of P originates
an absurdity and to settle this is logically equivalent to prove that ¬P entails a
proposition of the form A ∧ ¬A, a logical contradiction. This kind of proof is
called reductio ad absurdum, for it settles the truth of a proposition by showing
that its falsity leads to a contradiction. This kind of logical reasoning is said to
be an indirect kind of proof, for it doesn’t prove the truth of P by means of an
argument showing directly that P holds. For the same reason this kind of proof
is also called a non-constructive proof: we don’t prove P by an explicitation of a
concrete way of showing that P holds but by showing that ¬P cannot hold.
The explanation given above of what generally counts as a proof for a
proposition on the basis of the semantic notion of truth motivates the classi-
cal interpretation of the logical constants, also called the platonistic or bivalent
interpretation of the logical constants.
1. ¬A is true iff A is false;
2. A ∧ B is true iff both A and B are true;
3. A ∨ B is true iff A is true or B is true;
4. A→ B is true iff whenever A is true, then B is also true;
5. ∀xAx is true iff for all x in the domain D (D is the intended range of the
variable x), Ax is true;
6. ∃xAx is true iff there exists (at least one) x in D (D is the intended range
of the variable x) such that Ax is true.
In classical logic, every proposition is seen as a description of (a physical
or abstract) reality. The truth or falsity of propositions are determined by
the correspondence of the propositions with reality14: a proposition A is true
iff there is the state of things described by A; if such a state of things does
not exist, then A is false. In classical logic all entities are seen as complete,
somehow finished, and so is the reality whose correspondence with turns the
propositions into true or false ones. The correspondence with a reality makes
A∨¬A a universally valid law. There is not a third hypothesis; in the sense that
a proposition cannot be neither non-true nor non-false simultaneously, i.e., any
proposition is either true or false15.
14There is a sense in which an intuitionist would accept too that every proposition is a description
of reality, namely in the exact extent that such a reality is to be interpreted as a mental reality, not
as an extra-mental (physical or abstract) reality. Another way of putting the same issue, assuming
that a physical or abstract reality is a static reality, consists in saying that for an intuitionist too it is
through a description of reality that propositions are true or false, but in his case such a reality is
dynamic and not static.
15As we will see below, in intutionistic logic not all propositions are either true or false: there are
cases where it is not possible to prove that a given proposition is determinately true or determinately
false.
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Because of the meanings of logical operators, the notion of an indirect or non-
constructive proof gains its full expression within classical reasoning. Suppose
we want to prove a statement of the form ¬∀x¬Ax → ∃xAx. The natural way
to prove statements of this form is to suppose the falsehood of the implication,
i.e, to suppose that ¬(¬∀x¬Ax → ∃xAx). But to suppose the falsehood of the
implication is to suppose that ¬∀x¬Ax is true but ∃xAx false. This step of the
proof is legitimated by the meaning of the logical operator ‘→’. The falsity of
∃xAx is equivalent to assert ¬∃xAx, allowed by the meaning of ‘¬’. If ¬∃xAx
holds, then there is not any x belonging to some domain D for which Ax is the
case. But, by the meaning of ‘∃’, this is equivalent to say that for any x belonging
to D, it is not the case that Ax, i.e., ∀x¬Ax. This, however, contradicts ¬∀x¬Ax
whose truth was assumed at the beginning of the proof. So, by achieving a
contradiction, we can now state that ¬(¬∀x¬Ax → ∃xAx) is false, leading to
the desired result.
Notice that the proof of the claim ¬∀x¬Ax→ ∃xAx does not guarantee that
we can find a particular a such that Aa. In fact, we may be unable to find
any particular object x in the domain that satisfies the property Ax. This fact,
however, does not forces the truth of such a claim to loose its strenght, since truth
or falsity is established by the (classical) meaning of the logical connectives and
quantifiers, not by the fact that we are able or not to find a particular element of
the domain that possesses the desired property. Let’s define Aα as ∀n(αn = 0),
with n ranging over natural numbers and α over choice sequences. Then we
have the following claim: ¬∀α¬∀n(αn = 0) → ∃α∀n(αn = 0). This claim
states the following: if it is false that for all choice sequence α, α is not the null
sequence, then there is an α such that α is the null sequence. For a classical proof
of this statement it suffices to show that assuming the truth of ¬∀α¬∀n(αn = 0)
and the falsity of ∃α∀n(αn = 0) we get a contradiction. But from the fact that
the negation of the implication leads to a contradiction, it does not follow that
we can find an α such that for all n ∈ N, αn = 0. Since, in the case of lawless
sequences, we may be unable to find a particular α that is the null sequence, by
the same reason given above: there is no general method that, for a particular
choice sequence α, warrants that αn = 0 for all n. The only cases where we
are able to give a method for finding a particular α in that condition are the
lawlike sequences. But the domain of choice sequences contains both lawlike
and lawless sequences and, in the case of lawless sequences it can happens that
we are unable to find a particular α in such conditions.
The argument presented above belong to what are called counterexamples
and they were introduced by Brouwer for the purpose of showing that certain
classicaly acceptable statements are constructively unacceptable. The coun-
terexamples are divided into weak and strong counterexamples. The weak
counterexamples were introduced (at least implicitly) in the so called first act
of intuitionism, whose aim was to justify why he (Brouwer) had abstained from
using PEM and related principles as logical laws. (CinM I, pp.8-9) Instances of
weak counterexamples are cases where generally we are unable to provide a
construction method for a sentence like ∃xAx or where we are unable to decide
between A or B in a statement like A ∨ B, even although they are classically
seen as being true. The strong counterexamples were introduced in the second
act of intuitionism, where Brouwer does not just abstains from using principles
as PEM but, in fact, proved that using such principles would produce false
statements. An instance of a strong couterexample is ¬∀-PEM.
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These couterexamples lead to the rejection of the notion of ‘bivalent truth’ as
the key semantic notion for objects like choice sequences and consequently to
reject the classical interpretation of the logical constants. So, a new interpreta-
tion for the logical constants is needed if we want to deal with choice sequences.
This new interpretation of the logical constants is called the BHK-interpretation
(Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov interpretation) for intuitionist logic:
1. A proof of ¬A is a construction which transforms any hypothetical proof
of A into a proof of a contradiction (⊥);
2. A proof of A ∧ B is a construction that presents a proof of A and a proof
of B;
3. A proof of A ∨ B is a construction that presents a proof of A or a proof of
B (and the proof has to be explicitly a proof of A or a proof of B);
4. A proof of A → B is a construction that transforms any proof of A into a
proof of B;
5. A proof of ∀xAx is a construction that assigns to every a ∈ D (D is the
intended range of the variable x) a proof of Aa;
6. A proof of ∃xAx is a construction that selects an a ∈ D and that presents
a proof of Aa.
The key semantic notion for intuitionist logic is that of a ‘construction’. The
truth of a proposition P is no more than a construction method that evidently
shows that P. One may have noticed that negation is defined as implication of
falsehhod: ¬P := P→ ⊥. Thus, intuitionistic negation is not merely a reversal
of truth values, but involves the possession of a certain construction method.
This fact justifies the rejection of some classical rules of deduction as Double
Negation (DN), the rule that states the equivalence between A and ¬¬A, i.e.,
that A ↔ ¬¬A (from A we can infer ¬¬A and from ¬¬A we can infer A).
Suppose we want to prove A, then an obvious classical way to do that is to
show that ¬A leads to a contradiction, inferring from that the conclusion ¬¬A.
DN allows to infer A from ¬¬A, establishing the desired result. In fact, DN
is the formal deductive step that allows to conclude all the results discussed
above that are not acceptable intuitionisticaly. In intuitionist logic the step from
¬¬A to A is not allowed, for the fact that ¬A leads to a contradiction doesn’t
necessarily provides a construction method to prove A; the reverse step is,
however, intuitionistically valid. Intuitionisticaly we can have a construction
method to prove ¬¬A but fail to find a construction that proves A. But if we
have construction method that proves A, then we have a construction method
that shows the absurdity of ¬A, leading us to be justified, by the definiton of
intuitionistic negation, to assert ¬¬A.
We have seen that intuitionist logic is needed when we are talking of choice
sequences. But we can argue for the correctness of the intuitionistic interpreta-
tion of the logical constants over classical interpretation without even talking
about choice sequences. That is, we can argue for the correctness of intuitionis-
tic logic irrespectively of accepting choice sequences as legitimate mathematical
objects or not. From a neutral standpoint over the introduction of choice se-
quences into mathematical reasoning, we can choose to argue for or against the
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correctness of intuitionistic claims. In fact, this is the path choosen by Michael
Dummett for instance. He argues for intuitionistic logic on the basis of semanti-
cal arguments only, not on the basis of ontological ones like we are doing here.16
When, however, we start talking about things like choice sequences, i.e., when
we start to discuss about the legitimacy of the introduction of unfinished objects
into mathematical theories, to argue for intuitionist logic is not a question of
choice, it is a necessity because classical logic would render the theory of choice
sequences contradictory.
1.6 Choice sequences and constructivity
We have seen that to deal with choice sequences we have to reject the classical
concept of proof based on the notion of truth. This notion is substituted by
the more acceptable, according to the intuitionist, notion of constructive proof.
But in fact, the concept of constructive proof constitutes a philosophical (and
rather technical) problem that intuitionists have to deal with. The notion of
a constructive proof is not, however, restricted solely to intuitionistic or other
forms of constructivist mathematics. The distinction between constructive and
non-constructive proofs arises in classical logic and mathematics in an entirely
intelligible way. This distinction arises mainly for proofs of existential and
disjunctive statements. A proof of a statement P provides always something
more than the truth of the conclusion P, it provides additional information
about how we came to the truth of P. A proof of a closed statement of the form
∃xAx, x ranging over N for example, is classically constructive just in case it
either proves that, for a specific n ∈ N An holds, or at least it yields an effective
mean, even though in principle, for finding a proof of An. Likewise, a proof of a
closed statement of the form A∨B is constructive if it is either a proof of A or of
B, or at least if it gives origin to a effective method for obtaining a proof of one or
another disjunct. For a ∀∃-statement, i.e., a statement of the form ∀x∃yA(x, y),
with no free variables and x, y rangin over N, then its proof is constructive if
it yields an effectively calculable function f (given by an algorithm) such that
A(n, f (n)) holds for each n. A proof of a statement of the form ∀x(Ax ∨ Bx)
(with no free variables) is classically constructive if it yields an effective way
for finding, for each n, a proof either of An or of Bn. (EI, pp. 6-7.)
A non-constructive proof of any of the statements above is a proof of the
falsity of its negation. And in classical logic and mathematics both kinds of
proofs are acceptable. But the intuitionist is not in this position; the BHK-
interpretation of the logical constants entails that he must have a constructive
proof because the intuitionistic interpretation of the conclusion is always such
that no non-constructive proof could count as a proof of it. In classical logic
and mathematics both methods of proof are acceptable because the truth of a
proposition is independant of the fact that we have a proof for it or not. The
truth or falsity of a proposition is something pre-established once and for all (the
platonistic character of classical mathematics), a proof just makes known which
of the two are the case for that proposition. In the intuitionistic case, it is quite
the different. A proposition is considered to be true if we have a (constructive)
proof of it. So, the primitive notion to be argued for is that of ‘proof’; a much
16See EI, ch. 1 or ‘The Philosophical Basis of Intuitionistic Logic’ in Truth and Other Enigmas,
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1978, pp. 215-247.
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more harder task than to argue for the legitimacy of the primitive notion of
‘truth’, we think.
When we are dealing with lawlike sequences the notion of constructive proof
is quite intuitive because of their determinacy, viz. the law that generates their
values. Notwihstanding the fact that not always the existence of such a law
provides the correspondent constructive proof (e.g., ¬∀-PEM goes the same
for lawlike sequences, or the Halting problem in classic theory of recursive
functions), a constructive proof for a proposition involving lawlike sequences
is relatively easy to describe. A proof of a disjunctive proposition Aα ∨ ¬Aα,
where α is a lawlike sequence, is to show that we have a method to decide that
for a particular α, Aα hold or that ¬Aα hold. By the fact that α is lawlike, i.e.,
given by a finite law or rule that computes all the elements of the sequence,
the existence of such a method is not ruled out. Because we can calculate all the
elements of α via the law that generates its values in a completely determined
way, it is not ruled out that we can decide if all the elements of the sequence have
the property A or not. So, it possible in principle to have a method that warrants
one of the disjuncts. And it turns out to be the same for the existencial claim,
for an existence claim of the form ∃αAα or for an ∀∃-statement. If we have
an existencial proposition ∀α∃xA(α, x) in which α is a lawlike sequence and x
ranges over N, then we may have in advance a method that makes possible in
principle to show if for an arbitrary α there exists a value x such that A(α, x).
For lawless sequences, however, the notion of a constructive method is not
as clear as for lawlike ones. For lawless sequences there is not any law or rule
given in advance that generates their values since they are freely generated by
the subject who starts them. Generally, we cannot have a method that computes
whether for a lawless sequence α, Aα or ¬Aα. The only way we have to decide
this is to successively pick initial segments of α (finite parts of α) and look
whether they agree with A or not. (This situation is reducible to decidability
method for lawlike sequences.) Suppose this (quasi-empirical) ‘method’ allows
to decide affirmatively that, for some initial segment α¯n of α, α¯n is according
to A, then can we infer that Aα? This ‘method’ does not allow to infer that Aα;
since, for some initial segment α¯m bigger than α¯n it may happen that α¯m does
not agree with A. For this reson, for lawless sequences, contrary to lawlike
sequences, the idea of a contructive method to prove Aα ∨ ¬Aα does not make
sense at all, even if in principle. Such ‘method’ is simply impossible to exist.
So, we can ask, which notion of constructivity the class of lawless sequences
entails, given that they are meant to be constructive objects?
1.7 Identity for choice sequences
An immediate consequence of the last paragraph of the previous section is that,
in general, we cannot know whether two lawless sequences are the same or
are different ones. For any two lawless sequences α and β, the proposition
α = β, defined as ∀n(αn = βn), is not provable in constructive grounds. For
lawlike sequences we can prove that α = β by proving that the laws fα and
fβ that generates their elements respectively, give raise to the same outputs.
For lawless sequences, however, this method does not work since for lawless
sequences their outputs are freely chosen by the subjects who generates them.
In the case of lawless sequences, once more, what we have is a method to decide
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whether two initial segments α¯n and β¯n of α and β, respectively, are identical
or not. But, once more, when α¯n = β¯n, for some n, this does not guarantee
that α = β; if we choose initial segments α¯m and β¯m bigger than α¯n and β¯n,
respectively, we cannot guarantee that α¯m and β¯m will continue to be equal;
they may diverge in some point, establishing that α , β after all.
The discussion above motivates the following distinction for choice se-
quences. Let’s denote the property of two choice sequences α and β be ex-
tensionally equal, i.e., ∀n(αn = βn), as ‘=’ and the property of α and β being
intensionaly identical, i.e., α and β refer to the same (identical) process of gen-
eration, as ‘≡’. For lawlike sequences, if α ≡ β, then α = β. For, if α and β
are given by the same process, then all the values of α will coincide with the
values of β because they are generated in the same way. For lawlike sequences,
extensional equality is implied by intensional identity. Inversely, if two lawlike
sequences are equal, i.e., α = β, it can be assumed that the laws generating
them are equivalent in the sense that they give raise to the same outputs. For
lawless sequences, however, the second case is a little different. We cannot
assume without good arguments that equal lawless sequences are given by
the same process of generation, since the distinction between extensional and
intensional properties will vanish. With respect to this, in the next chapter we
will present two arguments trying to establish that α = β → α ≡ β, advanced
by Troelstra and Dummett respectively, in the context of a particular formal
theory for lawless sequences (LS).
Lawless sequences, because of their sui generis nature, creates an unsur-
passable gap between extensional and intensional properties about them. In
particular, and at first sight, extensional and intensional identity do not coin-
cide for lawless sequences. Suppose we have two lawless sequences α and
β, and that α = β, i.e., they are extentionally equal. Can we infer that α ≡ β,
i.e., can we infer that they are intensionally identical sequences? Intuitively,
the answer is negative. From the fact that ∀n(αn = βn) nothing is said about
how α and β are generated, nothing is said about the processes that generates
them. In particular, no information is given that allows us to tell whether the
processes that generates both α and β are the same process or different ones.
Suppose now, we have that α ≡ β, i.e., the elements of α and β, respectively,
are generated by the same intensional process. Can we infer that α = β? This
inference seems to be more likely, for an individual choice sequence has all of its
properties solely in virtue of the subject’s decision to construct it in a particular
way. But let’s see closer. Suppose a particular mathematician (the real world
constructors of choice sequences) starts two choice sequences α and β at a given
moment of time but chooses their elements (through undeterminate processes,
respectively) such that αn = βn indefinitely. Are we justified to infer from this
that for all the values of α and β, they will coincide up to the infinite with no
further clauses? The natural answer is no. Since, choice sequences are potential
objects, growing freely through time, and at any stage of growth we have access
only to a (sufficiently long, pehaps, but) finite initial segment. So, we cannot, in
general, know whether α and β will mantain the coincidence of their elements
or, at some stage of growth of α and β, they will diverge. The only thing we
can know is that, if at some stage of growth of α and β they produced different
outputs, then they are different choice sequences; but their identity generally
stays an open question.
Due to the problem in finding a criterion for the identity of choice sequences,
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we can ask if such a criterion is really needed at all. Notice that choice sequences
are essentially intensional objects and, as such, a criterion of identity cannot be
an extensional one, but intensional. This same problem is faced by the second
order logic„ where quantification over predicates is allowed. Predicates are
also intensional objects and there is not an identity criterion for them too.
What we can show is that two different predicates have the same extension: the
predicates ‘to possess a heart’ and ‘to possess a kidney’ have the same extension
(all the animals that possesses a heart possesses also a kidney). But they are
obviously different predicates. This fact, however, need not limit in any way
the consistent development of theories that uses second order logic„ i.e., does
not limits the way we talk about predicates. The proponent of choice sequence
may ask: are not the theories that allow quantification over choice sequences
at the same level?
1.8 Individuation for choice sequences
Until now we have talked about the (identity of) processes that generates choice
sequences, when two choice sequences are generated by the same process or
not. We have seen that for two (or more) choice sequences identity is not
in general easy to settle. But individuation is a much more difficult fact to
settle. Suppose we have an individual lawless sequence α, how do we come
to know that α is the particular choice sequence it is? How do we distinguish
α from all the other possible choice sequences? For a classical object like a set
individuation is settled by its extensional character: the self-identity of a set
(finite or infinite) is given by its elements, i.e., a particular set is the set it is
because of the totality of its elements, that are given in advance once and for all.
(Mutatis mutandis, it goes the same for lawlike sequences.) A lawless sequence,
however, is an unfinished object, the totality of its elements are never given to
us. At each stage of growth of a choice sequence we only have access to an
initial segment of it, an incomplete (finite) part of the totality of its elements.
So, extentional information about a particular choice sequence is not sufficient
to function as a basis for its individuation.
How about intensional information? Think about the subject(s) who gen-
erates choice sequences, about the precise moment in time which a particular
choice sequence is started or about the restrictions imposed on choice sequences;
all these are also possible intensional information about choice sequences. We
have told that all properties an individual choice sequence has is due to the
particular way the subject decides to construct it. So, it is natural to think that
the precise moment in time an individual choice sequence is started by a sub-
ject warrants its individuality. Or that the simple fact that an individual choice
sequence is started by one particular subject, says A, instead of another, says B,
warrants its individuality.
Consider two choice sequences α and β such that all their elements coincide
indefinitely and they were started by the subject A, possibly constructed by
the same process. Suppose now that the only explicit difference between α
and β is that α was started at a moment tn and β was started at a subsequent
moment tn+1; for all the other properties α and β are indistinguishable from
each other. Does the fact that α and βwere started at different moments, tn and
tn+1 respectively, establish a sufficient condition to individualize each of them?
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In fact, it seems to work, since if all the properties a choice sequence has is due
to the particular way the subject decides to construct it, then the fact that he has
choosen to start α and β at different moments in time shows that α and β have
at least one intentional property that does not coincide. But think now if α and
βwere started at the same moment tn. Notice that α and βmay come to diverge
at some stage but this information is not available to us. How to procede in this
situation? How do we individualize α and β when both come into existence
at the same moment in time and are indistinguishable with respect to other
intensional (and extentional) properties? It is also reasonable to think that α,
the same choice sequences started at tn, could have been started at different
moment, tm. Should this contingent fact have as consequence that α started at
tn is different from α started at tm? This seems hardly sustainable.
Suppose now α and β such that all their elements coincide indefinitely.
Suppose the only intensional information that distinguishes from α and β is
the fact that α was started by the subject A and β was started by the subject B.
The fact that α and β have different subjects, A and B respectively, constitutes
sufficient condition for the individuation both of α and β? Does subjective
aspects of choice sequences makes α and β the choice sequences they are,
each of them individually distinguishable? This state of affairs is sustained by
the own nature of the notion of choice sequence; but it naturally seems that
something is wrong. In fact it is hard to see how the fact that α and β have
different bearers, ceteris paribus, can individuate them.
Consider this last argument against the subjective character of choice se-
quences. Suppose a subject A starts a lawless sequence α at some moment.
Suppose, in addition, A wants to share information about α with another sub-
ject B. How should this be done? How should A talk about α with B since B
has not access to any information about α except, possibly, to an initial segment
of α, reported to him by A? Lawlike sequences can always be shared by two
or more subjects since their process of construction is describable in a (finite)
mathematical code. A lawless sequence, however, does not possess such a
process of construction and is not describable in a mathematical code. How the
proponent of choice sequences should deal with this issue?
Lastly, consider a pragmatic counter-argument against both the temporal
and subjective aspects of choice sequences. Is it reasonable, for mathematical
purposes, to consider that the different moments they were started or the fact
they have different bearers makes α and β distinct choice sequences? After all,
it seems natural to think that temporal and subjective aspects of mathematical
objects are mathematically irrelevant. For mathematical purposes all we need to
know are the mathematical conditions that make two objects be the same or not,
distinguishable or not. Temporality and subjectivism are extra-mathematical
properties that do not influence the truth conditions or the (constructive) proof
conditions for a mathematical theorem. How to reconcile choice sequences’s
extra-mathematical features as temporality and subjectivism with an acceptable
mathematical theory about them or just involving them? This is a real problem
which the proponent of choice sequences as legitimous mathematical objects
has to deal with.
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1.9 A new paradigm of mathematical reasoning?
Notwithstanding the fact that the notion of choice sequence is a very intuitive
one (we can imagine the series of natural numbers as a choice sequence given
by the iteration of the process n + 1, for example), some mathematicians and
philosophers refuse to accept choice sequences as legitimate mathematical ob-
jects. Because of their dependence on the subject’s mental processes and on
time, some have considered choice sequences to be empirical objects, and hence
as having no place in pure mathematics (Wittgenstein and Gödel, for example).
Another cause for this refusal to accept choice sequences as mathematical ob-
jects is motivated by the fact that the behavior of choice sequences does not
respect a well established property of the (classical) mathematical universe of
objects, the law of excluded middle. In the first place, choice sequences are de-
pendent on the subjects’s particular way of construction for them, which turns
the notion of choice sequence into a subjective notion. In the second place,
choice sequences are potential or dynamic objects, they evolve through time;
that makes them temporal and unfinished objects. Traditionally, none of these
properties are attributed of mathematical objects. In the third place, with the
introduction of choice sequences into our mathematical ontology comes WC-N,
a principle that allows the proof of several new results as the unsplitability of
the continuum or the fact that any total funcion from R to R is continuous, or
the more drastic result that decidability, in general, is not granted; putting PEM
and the classical notion of mathematical proof under suspicion. Why should
we accept any mathematical objects for which the identity and indivuation
conditions are unclear? In one word, choice sequences are too much exotic to
be considered as mathematical objects. This is why the opponent of choice
sequences does not consider choice sequences as mathematical objects.
With the mentioned results of intuitionitic logic and mathematics, it be-
comes obvious that the introduction of choice sequences into mathematical
ontology is not innocuous. The introduction of choice sequences into mathe-
matical ontology gives rise to an unsurpassable exclusive disjunction, at least
from the philosophical standpoint: either we accept the law of the excluded
middle as universally valid, and with it classical mathematics, or we accept the
introduction of choice sequences into our mathematical universe, which forces
us to accept WC-N and intuitionistic mathematics.
In reply to the last consideration, the proponent of choice sequences says
that, in fact, intuitionistic and classical mathematics are not in equal positions.
They are not talking about the same things, they do not employ the same con-
cepts or methods. So, in some sense, they are not comparable. (The classical
mathematician also may say the same thing.) It is true that intuitionistic and
classical mathematics attribute different meanings, for example, to the logi-
cal constants or to the notion of truth. In fact, the ontologies of classical and
intuitionistic mathematics are different: classical mathematics deals with sets
(finished objects) and intuitionistic mathematics deals with choice sequences
(unfinished objects). On the other hand, however, we can say that both intu-
itionistic and classical mathematics have as primary task to present a mathe-
matical model of infinite magnitudes, like the continuum or the collection of
natural numbers. And for this reason they are not so incomparable as the pro-
ponent of choice sequences says. But the proponent of choice sequences will
insist that his notion of infinite magnitudes is different, since in intuitionistic
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mathematics, all infinity is potential infinity: there is no completed infinite, as
in classical mathematics. Contrary to classical mathematics, for an intuitionist
to grasp an infinite structure is to grasp the process which generates it, to refer
to such a structure is to refer to that process, and to recognize such structure as
being infinite is to recognize that the process will not come to an end. In intu-
itionistic mathematics, there is no sense in which we can have any conception of
an infinite magnitude as a totality except by the process of generation. For this
reason, the proponent of choice sequences can state that classical and intuition-
istic mathematics are not comparable, since the concepts involved in classical
mathematics are simply unintelligible for him. So, he can say that intuitionistic
mathematics and logic, both justified by the introduction of choice sequences
into mathematical ontology, constitutes a wholly new paradigm of mathematical
reasoning, since the concepts, the methods and, especially, the mathematical
objects are entirely new ones. (Though wholly new, it should have sufficiently
much in common with classical mathematics if both are to be called mathemat-
ics.) This statement constitutes, we think, the only really indisputable thesis
advanced by the proponent of choice sequences as mathematical objects. Ir-
respectively whether classic mathematics or intuitionistic mathematics is the
right way to do mathematics, it is unquestionable true that intuitionistic math-
ematics and logic, with their new and exotic concepts, methods, and objects
constitute a new and attractive form of mathematical reasoning.
If it is true that the new paradigm introduced by choice sequences is inno-
vative and interesting, it is also true that this new paradigm of mathematical
reasoning gives rise to new and difficult epistemological issues. How do we
philosophically solve the problems raised by the introduction of choice se-
quences? How do we justify the introduction of dynamic objects into the
mathematical universe? How do we deal with the problem of identity or with
the problem of individuation for choice sequences? What should count as a
constructive proof for propositions involving lawless (choice) sequences? How
should we deal with the unnatural hypothesis that assigns temporal and sub-
jective aspects to putative mathematical objects? All these are philosophical
problems that the proponent of choice sequences has to face if he wants to
guarantee the introduction of choice sequences into mathematical ontology. In
the continuation of this essay, we will see how these problems are faced by
several proponents of the introduction of choice sequences into mathematical
reasoning.
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Chapter 2
Three accounts of choice
sequences
2.1 The origin of the concept of choice sequence
Troelstra (following Heyting) calls any mathematician an intuitionist who sub-
scribes the following two claims: (a) mathematics is not only formal, but also
has content; (b) mathematical objects are grasped directly by the thinking mind,
hence mathematical knowledge does not depend on (an outside world) experi-
ence. Then he observes that the second claim may be interpreted in at least two
different ways: (b1) one thinks of a mathematical object as having an existence
independent of our thinking, but we can only conclude its existence and inves-
tigate it by means of a mental activity reconstructing the mathematical object in
our mind; and (b2) mathematical objects exist only as mental constructions, at
least we cannot base a mathematical argument on their existence independent
of our knowledge. Heyting calls the point of view represented by (a)+(b1)
semi-intuitionism; the point of view represented by (a)+(b2) corresponds to
Brouwerian intuitionism.1
Around the beginning of the 20th century a group of (mostly French) math-
ematicians held views wich might be described as semi-intuitionistic in the
above sense: E. Borel, H. Lebesgue, R. Baire, N. Lusin. H. Poincaré is often
referred as a precursor of the semi-intuitionist school. Borel is considered the
most proeminent of the semi-intuitionists and it is claimed that Brouwer learnt
of the views of the semi-intuitionists through his writings. (Ibidem.)
Every form of constructive mathematics has to cope with the continuum,
withR. The standard treatments of the continuum proceed by ‘arithmetization’:
the collection of reals is described via sequences or sets of rationals, or sequences
of rational intervals. From a constructivist point of view, there is a conceptual
difficulty here, which led the semi-intuitionists, and in particular Borel, to
adopt the continuum as a primitive notion, to be understood as a whole (i.e.,
1A.S. Troelstra, ‘On the origin and development of Brouwer’s concept of choice sequence’, in
The L.E.J. Brouwer Centenary Symposium, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1982, p. 466. Unfortunately
we did not have access to Arend Heyting’s book Les fondements des mathématiques. Intuitionisme,
Théorie de la démonstration, quoted by Troelstra and in which this schematic division is originally
made.
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the continuum is more than the collection of its elements). This holistic view
of the continuum is referred to as the “geometric continuum”, whereas the
continuum as made up of reals given by fundamental (Cauchy) sequences is
called the “arithmetical continuum”. (CinM II, pp. 639-640.)
The conceptual difficulty is the following one. For the semi-intuitionists,
any specific real number should be given by a complete definition of (say) a rep-
resenting fundamental sequence; and since the linguistic means at our disposal
permit only countably many descriptions, there would exist only countably
many reals. Cantor’s diagonal argument shows that these cannot exhaust the
continuum. Notice that the semi-intuitionists, while accepting classical logic
(by (b1)), had to accept this argument. Thus one could not very well conceive
the continuum as being made up of its definable elements (the ‘practical con-
tinuum’, or ‘reduced continuum’ when these elements are lawlike sequences).
(CinM II, p. 640.)
The concept of a choice sequence was however already known to the semi-
intuitionists. In Borel’s thinking the adoption of the arithmetical continuum was
directly connected with the acceptation of countable sequences of arbitrarily
chosen objects as legitimate objects of mathematics, which was to him ‘highly
debatable’. The notion, however, of an uncountable infinity of choices (a choice
sequence), was to him ‘entirely meaningless’. These claims were explicitly
asserted in Borel’s writings:
It is necessary to say something on the notion of a continuum, the
only well-known example of an uncountable set (...). I regard this
notion as obtained from geometrical intuition; one knows that the
completely arithmetical concept of the continuum requires that one
admits the legitimacy of a countable infinity of sucessive choices.
This legitimacy seems to me to be highly debatable, but neverthless
one should distinguish between this legitimacy and the legitimacy
of an uncountable infinity of (sucessive or simultaneous) choices.
The latter concept seems to, as I have remarked before, entirely
meaningless (...). (Émile Borel, ‘Sur les principes de la théorie des
ensembles’, 1909.)2
To Borel the meaningless of talking about choice sequences was not because
the concept in itself was unintelligible (in fact he admits that in some areas
of mathematics it could have use), but because when talking about individual
choice sequences we would not be able to settle questions of identity (the very
same problem we are dealing in this thesis):
On my part, I regard it as possible to ask questions of probability
concerning decimal numbers obtained in this way, by choosing dig-
its, either entirely arbitrarily, or imposing some restrictions which
leave some arbitrariness. But I regard it as impossible to talk about
a single individual such number since if one denotes such number
by a, different mathematicians, in talking about a, will never be sure
2Quoted in A.S. Troelstra, ‘On the origin and development of Brouwer’s concept of choice
sequence’, p. 467. Unfortunately we also did not have access to any of Borel’s articles we are
quoting here, so they are taken directly from Troelstra’s article cited above.
26
to be talking about the same number. (Émile Borel, ‘La philosophie
mathématique et l’ infini’, 1912.)3
In an early stage of his thinking, Brouwer was in agreement with Borel’s
points of view and consequently faced the same difficulties about the contin-
uum. He first assumed the continuum as a primitive notion. But soon (around
1917) he realized that this holistic view of the continuum was not implied by
his intuitionism ((a)+(b2)); in particular by his criticism and rejection of some
classic logical principles. From an intuitionistic point of view there was no
objection against considering sequences obtained by successive choices instead
of being completely defined in advance. What seemed illegitimate in the (so
called) ‘empirical’ view of Borel, fitted very well in his view of mathematics as
created in the mind of an ideal mathematician. This move enabled Brouwer to
reinstate the arithmetical account of the continuum, but now in an intuition-
istic context. Brouwer’s new arithmetical theory of the continuum based on
choice sequences is analytic in contrast to the earlier holistic theory where the
geometric continuum had to be understood as a whole. In the new theory,
reflection on what it means to be given a choice sequence led Brouwer accept
new mathematical entities and to settle new mathematical principles. We will
now consider how Brouwer’s mathematical path was determined by his philo-
sophical ideas; and in particular the so called ‘two acts of intuitionism’: two
moments in Brouwer’s philosophical activity that explain (among other things)
his passage from the geometric conception of the continuum to the arithmetic
conception.
2.2 Brouwerian intuitionism
Let’s think of a basic mathematical operation: {2, 3}{ 2 + 3, for example. One
intuitively knows that the result is 5, i.e., we can prove it by simple mental
steps. Let’s construct the number 2 in our mind by abstracting from two every
day objects and keep it in memory. In the same way, we can construct the
number 3 and keep it in memory. Now we can construct the number 5. If we
compare it with the result of the sum we have made, we will see that they are the
same, so we can judge that 2 + 3 = 5. According to Brouwer, all mathematics
is like this, i.e., all mathematical reasoning is an intuitive mental construction.
By ‘mental’ Brouwer wants to stress that mathematical results are obtained
exclusively by means of a subject’s introspective reflection. A mathematical
theorem is achieved by the subject only when he is capable of constructing
it by means of some intrinsic mental process. So, mathematical theorems are
mental entities, not extra mental things. By ‘construction’ Brouwer means that
in the (mental) process of establishing a mathematical theorem each stage of
reasoning is based on the previous one and retains its degree of accuracy. The
construction of a mathematical theorem entails that each step on the path to
the final conclusion (the theorem itself) can be clearly analysed and reduced to
the most elementary insights of the subject’s mind. By ‘intuitive’ he wants to
emphazise that in the process of establishing a mathematical theorem each stage
of the mental construction is allowed by an intuition, i.e., by an evident and
3Quoted in A.S. Troelstra, ‘On the origin and development of Brouwer’s concept of choice
sequence’, p. 467.
27
necessary (inner) experience/perception. This inner perception is what allows
or forbids a construction, i.e., is what determines the validity of a construction.
Let’s see a quote of Brouwer:
Intuitionism considers the falling apart of moments of life into quali-
tatively dierent parts, to be reunited only while remaining separated
by time, as the fundamental phenomenon of the human intelect,
passing by abstracting from its emotional content into the funda-
mental phenomenon of mathematical thinking, the intuition of the
bare two-ity.4
For Brouwer, all thinking (inner life) is based on the phenomenon of time,
i.e, all moments or acts of reasoning are connected between them by moments
of time. Brouwer makes a sharp distinction between subjective time (inner
time counsciousness) and objective time (time measured by physics). The
phenomenon that connects all acts of reasoning is the subjective time. So it
becomes natural, according to Brouwer, to base mathematics on the subjective
time. This is done by abstracting from the content of the moments connected
by time (the emotional content) and taking into consideration only the inner
time by itself, so taking into consideration the pure form of subjective time, i.e.,
the schematic character of time as a mental operation. This schematic character
of time is what Brouwer calls the two-ity, the “basal intuition of mathematics”.
(ibidem.)
This intuition of two-ity (...) creates not only the numbers one and
two, but also all finite ordinal numbers, inasmuch as one of the
elements of the two-ity may be thought of as a new two-ity, which
process may be repeated indefintely; this gives raise still further to
the smallest infinite ordinal number ω. Finally, this basal intuition
of mathematics, in which the connected and the separate, the con-
tinuous and the discrete are united, gives raise immediately to the
intuition of the linear continuum, i.e., of the ‘between’, which is not
exhaustible by the interposition of new units and which therefore
can never be thought of as a mere collection of units. (Ibidem.)
For Brouwer, it is from the intuiton of two-ity that all primary notions
of mathematics gets their origin. The two-ity creates the numbers 1 and 2
simultaneously by reference to the pure form of time ‘then-now’. The ‘then’
corresponds to 1, the ‘now’ to 2. The number 3 and subsequent numbers are
created by indefinetly repetition of this mental operation of two-ity, when an
element of the two-ity falls into a new two-ity, embedding this new two-ity into
the old one. Brouwer points out that it is necessary to have a two-ity as starting
point and not a unity. The insight that this process of embedding two-ityes can
be iterated give rise to the infinite ordinal ω and, consequentely, to the series of
natural numbersN. This infinite object has to be thought of as potential and not
as actual. This is so because the subject can start a potentially infinite sequence
of objects but it cannot complete it. (OnB, pp. 5-6.)
The basic intuition of mathematics, the two-ity, doesn’t gives rise only to the
discrete magnitudes, it originates also the continuous ones; in fact it gives raise
4L.E.J. Brouwer, ‘Intuitionism and formalism’, in Philosophy of Mathematics, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, New York, 1983, p. 80.
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to magnitudes such as R. Continuity is what is ‘between’ the elements of a two-
ity; it is the abstract form of time that flows between ‘then’ and ‘now’. (OnB, p.
6.) The ‘then’ and ‘now’ are discrete moments, what is between them are not
discrete but continuous moments. For Brouwer, the ‘then-now’, the discrete,
and the ‘between’, the continuous, are irreducible and complementary notions.
They are directly apprehended by the mind with full evidence. This early notion
of the continuum as given by intuition is due to the first act of intuitionism:
The first act of intuitionism separates mathematics from mathemat-
ical language, in particular from the phenomena of language which
are described by theoretical logic, and recognizes that intuitionist
mathematics is an essentially languageless activity of the mind hav-
ing its origin in the perception of a move of time, i.e., the falling
apart of a life moment into two distinct things, one of which gives
way to the other, but is retained by memory. If the two-ity thus
born is divested of all quality, there remains the empty form of the
common substratum of all two-ities. It is this common substratum,
this empty form, which is the basic intuition of mathematics.5
The first act of intuitionism separates mathematics of mathematical lan-
guage, i.e., it settles mathematics as an intrinsic mental activity that is not
reducible to the formal or grammatical character of simbolic languages (claim
(a)). In particular it separates mathematics as a mental activity from logic as a
pure mechanical activity devoided of intuition. This is so because, according
to Brouwer, the intuition of the two-ity, in which all mathematics is based, is
not dependent of any linguistic skills. The intuition of the two-ity is essentially
a cognitive experience that does not pressuposes any symbolic or formal kind
of reasoning. It is part of pre-linguistic phenomenon. And it is not even nec-
essarily shareable among subjects. In fact, according to Brouwer, it is quite the
opposite:
[Logic is] to be a faithful, automatic, stenographic copy of the lan-
guage of mathematics, which itself is not mathematics, but no more than
a defective expedient for men to communicate mathematics to each
other and to aid their memory for mathematics. (...) Mathematics
is created by a free action independent of experience; it develops
from a single aprioristic basic intuition (...). A logical [or linguistic]
construction of mathematics, independent of the mathematical in-
tuition, is impossibe – for by this method no more is obtained than
a linguistic structure, which irrevocably remains separated from
mathematics (...).6
By this quotation it becomes clear that for Brouwer linguistic considerations
about mathematics is a “second order” activity, i.e., something that takes into
consideration a pre-established and primitive mental activity. Mathematics,
5L.E.J. Brouwer, ‘Historical background, principles and methods of intuitionism’, in South
African Journal of Science, volume 39, 1952. We did not have access to this article of Brouwer,
so the respective quotes are taken from BmH where the original reference is present; this particular
quote is in BmH, p. 24.
6L.E.J. Brouwer, On the foundations of mathematics (PhD thesis), in Collected works I, North-Holland,
Amsterdam, 1975, pp. 92 and 97.
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therefore, is essentially languageless. It studies non-linguistic constructions
out of something that is not of a linguistic nature. For Brouwer, in this sense,
linguistic considerations about mathematical activity are inessential to the de-
velopment of pure mathematical reasoning.
These considerations about mathematics and mathematical language are
directed against the formalist project of Hilbert. For Hilbert, a mathematical
assertion is a sequence of simbols whose meaning is given by the symbols
themselves present in the sequence. So, the symbolic character of mathematics
is what makes mathematics what it is, i.e., the symbolic character of mathe-
matics is what grounds mathematics as a valid intellectual activity. Hilbert has
used this insight to legitimate classical mathematics proposing that all classical
mathematics was a sucession of conservative extensions of finitary axiomatic
theories.7
Brouwer’s considerations about language and mathematics stress a concern
about the proper locus for certainty in mathematics. For a platonist the proper
locus of certainty about mathematics is in an independent realm of abstract
objects; for a formalist, it is on the symbols written on a paper; for an intuitionist,
however, certainty is only to be found in the mind. For an intuitionist, the
certainty of our mathematical thought is not accounted for in terms of grasping
some abstract entities outside the mind or by apprehending the scheme of
a sequence of symbols written in a paper, but in terms of the mind’s own
structure. (OnB, p. 3.)
Another relevant difference between the intuitionist and the platonist and
formalist is that the platonist and the formalist try to give a philosophical ac-
count of classical mathematics, a pre-existent body of mathematical reasoning.
The intuitionist however is indifferent with respect to whether mathematics
as founded on his notion of construction happens to coincide with classical
mathematics or not. What counts for the intuitionist is the solidity of the philo-
sophical basis in which mathematics gains its validity. Brouwer erected his
mathematics on the basis of his own philosophy, not the contrary. He was not
seeking a philosophical basis for an already existent mathematical theory, he
was looking for a mathematics that was philosophically sound.
In the first act of intuitionism the continuum is conceived as a whole, that
‘therefore can never be thought of as a mere collection of units’. The ‘con-
tinuous’ and the ‘discrete’ are seen as primitive and complementary, i.e., one
cannot be constructed upon the other. Brouwer explicitly states this view in the
following:
The continuum as a whole was given to us by intuition; a construction
for it, an action which would create from the mathematical intuition
‘all’ its points as individuals, is inconceivable and impossible. The
mathematical intuition is unable to create other than denumerable
sets of individuals. But it is able, after having created a scale of
order type η, to superimpose upon it a continuum as a whole. (On the
foundations of mathematics (PhD thesis), p. 45.)
So, in this stage of Brouwer’s thinking the arithmetical continuum does not
play a role because the continuum ‘is not exhaustible by the interposition of new
units’. This is so because in this stage of philosophical development Brouwer
7See David Hilbert, ‘On the infinite’, in Philosophy of Mathematics, pp. 183-201.
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had many new ideas about the nature of mathematics (it has genuine content,
it is a languageless activity, it is deeply related to time and mind, etc.) but he
still was assuming the objects of mathematical theories as being the classical
ones (viz., definable infinite sequences). The notion of choice sequence was
dismissed by Borel as inadequate for mathematical purposes. But in the case of
Borel he was committed to classic logic. Brouwer however did not share such
commitment and hence he was not forced (as Borel) to reject the notion of choice
sequence as mathematical inadequate. Eventually, Brouwer realized that from
an intuitionistic point of view non-classic objects as choice sequences were not
forced to be abolished. In fact Brouwer realized that, from an intuitionistic
point of view, choice sequences and other non-classic objects were allowed
to play a role in mathematical theories. Brouwer called this new stage of his
philosophical conception of mathematics the second act of intuitionism.
The second act of intuitionism (...) recognizes the possibility of
generating new mathematical entities: firstly in the form of infinitely
proceeding sequences p1, p2,..., whose terms are chosen more or
less freely from mathematical entities previously acquired; secondly
in the form of mathematical species, i.e., properties supposable for
mathematical entities previously acquired.8
The second act of intuitionism recognizes the possibility of introducing new
entities or new kind of entities into the mathematical realm. In particular it
allows the introduction of new kind of entities such as choice sequences and
species that are not present at the usual classical realm of mathematical objects.
A choice sequences is a potentially infinite sequence whose terms are freely
chosen from a domain of mathematical entities previously acquired (e.g., the
domain of natural numbers). Such a sequence is never finished and may
be subjected to various conditions. Species are an intuitionistic analogue to
classical (cantorian) sets. One may think of a species as a set of elements
singled out from a previously constructed totality by a property. In a species,
entities that share a certain property are collected. But what Brouwer means by
‘property’ is a very peculiar notion:
Often it is quite simple to construct inside such a structure, inde-
pendently of how it is originated, new structures, as the elements of
which we take elements of the original structure or systems of these,
arranged in a new way, but bearing in mind their original arrange-
ment. The so called ‘properties’ of a system express the possibility
of constructing such new systems having a certain connection with
the given system. (On The Foundations of Mathematics (PhD thesis),
p. 52.)
Suppose we have a collection or ‘structure’ of mathematical objects (defined
by a law). Then, if we can establish certain mental relations between some
elements of the given collection, we get a species, i.e., a new collection of
objects that are connected by a property they share. Species can also have
other species as elements, giving rise to species of higher order. An important
8L.E.J. Brouwer, ‘Historical background, principles and methods of intuitionism’, in South
African Journal of Science, quoted in BmH, p. 24.
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difference with classical sets is that species are intensional objects, i.e., objects
that come to exist solely in virtue of some property defined in such a way that
it gathers their elements as objects sharing that property. By this fact, species
cannot be identified with their elements. Species are collections originated by
a previous defined mental property. Two species can have the same elements
but be different species, because the properties that gathers the two collections
can be different ones. In the case of sets, their identity is determined by their
elements (axiom of extentionality); if two sets have the same elements, then they
are the same set irrespectively whether they are given by different properties or
not. On the other hand the identity of a species consists in the way it is defined,
not in the elements they gather.
With the second act of intuitionism, new objects as choice sequences and
species are introduced into the (intuitionistic) mathematical universe. The
introduction of choice sequences in particular enabled Brouwer to reinstate
the arithmetical account of the continuum, but in an intuitionistic context. The
new intuitionistic account of the continuum provided a much more satisfactory
grasp of the continuum than to postulate the continuum as a primitive intuition.
R is now defined as an infinite collection of species, each species gathering choice
sequences sharing some property.9
2.3 Weak Continuity Principle (WC-N)
Even if the concept of choice sequence is philosophically interesting, how can it
be put to use? How can we introduce such putative objects into mathematical
theories and methods? The concrete problem is the following: if we want to
apply a function to a choice sequence, or evaluate whether a predicate holds
of it, a sequence will have to act as an argument, to which then a method is
applied to calculate the function’s output or value. But we cannot construct
the argument in its entirety, as a choice sequence is always in state of growth,
i.e., is an unfinished object. There will never be a moment, then, at which the
argument is fully constructed and the subject can go on to apply the function
or predicate to it. (OnB, p. 35.)
In some cases it is obvious that not the whole choice sequence is needed;
for example, if the function returns to the 10th element in the sequence or if the
choice sequence is given by a law. But what about the general case, when the
choice sequence is lawless? For Brouwer, the answer is simple: we never need
the whole sequence, an initial segment of the sequence is sufficient to determine
the output of the function in which the lawless sequence is an argument. The
formalization of this thesis is given by WC-N:
WC-N: ∀α∃xA(α, x)→ ∀α∃n∃x∀β(β¯n = α¯n→ A(β, x))
(where A is an extensional predicate, α and β range over choice sequences,
n and x over natural numbers and α¯n, β¯n stand for the initial segments of α and
β respectively of length n). The principle says that if we have a construction
that assigns a number to every choice sequence, all the information it needs
to do so is an initial segment of that sequence. More information (intensional
9For some mathematical detail see, e.g., EI, pp. 22 et seqs.
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properties) may be given, but is not required. The antecedent of the WC-N says
that to each choice sequence α is related a natural number x; the consequent
says that there is a natural number n such that any choice sequence β whose
first n choices coincides with the first n choices of α is related to x in the same
way as α is related to x. Thus, sharing the first n values with α is a sufficient
condition for any choice sequence β to be related to that x; no more properties
of β need to be considered.
Intuitionistically, the assignment of a function value to an argument requires
a construction. When the argument is a choice sequence, two types of infor-
mation about the argument are available to the subject. First, there is the initial
segment of choices made so far. This is extentional information: it doesn’t
matter how the sequence is defined, just what choices are made at what stage.
Second, there is the set of restrictions that the subject may have imposed so
far. This is intentional information: it depends on how the sequence is defined.
Both kinds of information are of a finite character. Out of these, the function
value has to be constructed. The weak continuity principle claims that, if the
function if defined for any choice sequences (the general case), only the first
type of information is needed.
The weak continuity principle has always been held plausible and Brouwer
used it freely. But he never gave a (suitable) justification for it notwithstanding
the fact that without a principle such as WC-N, choice sequences could hardly be
more than a mere intelectual curiosity or excentricity. Let’s see why justification
is required for WC-N.
The universe of choice sequences is inhabited (among other) by lawlike and
lawless sequences and WC-N has to be true of both kinds of sequences; in other
words WC-N has to held for the entire universe of choice sequences. Limited
to the lawless sequences, the validity of WC-N seems to be plausible: as there
are no first-order restrictions, there simply is no information about the choices
except for the values chosen so far (the initial segment). So any other sequence
with the same initial segment, when used as an argument for A (the binary
predicate in WC-N), must give the same result. (OnB, p. 35.)
WC-N doesn’t seems however to work as well for lawlike sequences. Let’s
see the following argument. Assume we have a proof of ∀α∃xA(α, x). That
means that if we take a particular α, we can begin to construct a proof of
∃xA(α, x). When the proof is completed, only finitely many values of α have
been chosen, as proofs are completed in finite amount of time. Therefore, for
any β with the same initial segment we have ∃xA(β, x). The problem with
this argument is that the possible presence of intensional information (always
present in lawlike sequences) has been neglected. For example, suppose that
of the sequence α four values have been chosen so far, but also, at the fourth
step, a restriction has been posed that from now on α is constant. Then one can
immediately say what the 100th value in α will be. However, only four values
of α have been chosen, and it is certainly not the case that any β that begins with
the same four values will also agree with α on the 100th position. One could
try to save the argument by allowing only numerical information about choice
sequences in the construction of proofs. In effect, this is to treat all sequences
as if they were lawless. But once more the principle would be established only
for the class of the lawless sequences, which is not what we asked for. What
is required is an argument to the effect that, even if one is allowed to use intensional
information, just an initial segment would suffice. (OnB, p. 36.)
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One way to obtain a rigorous argument for the validity of WC-N for the
universe of choice sequences would be to derive it formally as a logical principle
for choice sequences. Another way would be to justify it directly as an axiom
for a theory of choice sequences or to derive it from a set of less controversial
axioms for a theory of choice sequences. The first hypothesis is not possible
and we will present an argument that supports this fact. The argument is
based on a conclusion of Michael Dummett stated in Elements of intuitionism.
While Dummett is discussing the problem of (intuitionistic) quantification over
choice sequences in comparison to the classical quantification, he presents the
following case as a puzzling one (for intuitionists). Suppose we want to prove
the truth of a ∀∃-statement in which choice sequences occurs, a statement of
the form ∀α∃nA(α,n) (A(α,n) is an extensional predicate). Notice that the
consequent of WC-N is a statement of this kind. So, the statement implies
that there must be a uniform effective procedure for finding, for each given α,
an n such that A(α,n). As α is a choice sequence, it cannot be ‘given’ in its
entirety, so the procedure for finding n must operate upon some finite amount
of information about α that we may possess at some stage. In this particular
case, the claim is made that n may be computed from some sufficiently long
initial segment of α, without further regard to possible restrictions upon future
choices of terms that may have been imposed by that stage. In other words,
if a statement of the form ∀α∃nA(α,n) is to hold, we must have an effective
rule by which we can decide, for every finite sequence, whether or not it is
sufficient to determine an n such that A(α,n) holds for every α of which that
finite sequence is an initial segment, and which enables us to compute such an
n if the sequence is sufficiently long; and every choice sequence α must have
some initial segment from which the rule will compute such an n. (EI, p. 46.)
After giving this explanation, Dummett concludes that “that this is implied
by a statement of the form ‘∀α∃nA(α,n)’, where A(α,n) is extensional, is not
an immediate consequence of the meanings of the [intuitionostic] quantifiers,
but needs to be argued for on the basis of a more exact analysis of the notion
of a choice sequence.” (Ibidem.) What is implied in Dummett’s affirmations is
that the meanings of the intuitionistic quantifiers when used for quantifying
over choice sequences are not sufficient to settle the truth of ∀∃-statements, i.e.,
these type of sentences cannot be derived in a pure formal basis, just through
the meanings of (intuitionistic) logical operators. As (both the antecedent and)
the consequent of WC-N are sentences of that form, it goes the same for it: WC-
N cannot be proved to be true just through the meanings of the logical operators
in it, so it cannot be formally derived. And this is so because its strength (what it
claims to be true) is based on specific insights about (quantification over) choice
sequences which are not consequence of the meanings of the quantifiers. So
this hypothesis of justification of WC-N is ruled out. How about to justify WC-
N within the framework of a theory of choice sequences, i.e., in a framework
where we restrict the quantification only to lawless sequences? In fact this
second hypothesis (where we can say more about the quantifiers than in the
general case) is taken more seriously and there has been a strong effort to justify
WC-N as a principle for choice sequences within a particular axiomatic theory
for choice sequences. In particular, Anne Troelstra has done major work on this
field of research and we will now consider his account of choice sequences.
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2.4 Troelstra’s analytical approach to lawless sequences
In the task of justifying WC-N as an axiom or as a derivated principle for choice
sequences, it is useful to make reference of an ideia coined by Kreisel under the
recommendation of Gödel: the ideia of informal rigour when one is performing
the conceptual analysis of an object or a class of objects.
The ‘old-fashioned’ idea is that one obtains rules and definitions by
analyzing intuitive notions (...) Informal rigour wants (i) to make
this analysis as precise as possible (...) and (ii) to extend this analysis,
in particular not to leave undecided questions which can be decided
by full use of evident properties of these intuitive notions.10
So, the path traced by this method is to seek to obtain axioms for a certain
sort of objects by studying the way these objects are given in intuition, i.e.,
by studying the way these objects’s properties come to appear to us in our
mind. In particular it stresses a way to seek certain axioms for choice sequences
by studying the way the properties of choice sequences are given to us. This
aproach to the study of choice sequences is called by Troelstra the analytical
approach:
The method of justifying axioms for choice sequences by reflection
on what it means to be given a choice sequence (‘conceptual analysis
of the notion’) can be carried considerably farther than is done
in Brouwer writings, and leads to interesting insights and results.
(CinM II, p. 643)
Besides the analytical approach to the study of choice sequences, there are
two more approaches: the holistic approach and the ‘figure of speech’ approach. The
holistic approach rules out individual choice sequences as objects of study, it
only considers the notion of choice sequence as an object of study and the point
of departure of this approach is to grasp this notion as a whole. The “figure of
speech” approach tries to explain what means to quantify over choice sequences
without explicit reference to individual choice sequences. In a more formal ver-
sion, it tries explains, within the context of a given language, what it means
to quantify over choice sequences by translating sentences involving choice
quantyifiers (∀α, ∃α) into sentences not involving such quantifiers (a ‘contex-
tual definition’ of ∀α, ∃α). And then, the characteristic principles for choice
sequences are translated into true sentences. (CinM II p. 644.) The differences
between the holistic and the ‘figure of speech’ approaches to choice sequences
are the following. A holistic approach to the study of choice sequences would
not allow us to speak of individual choice sequences. Sentences with quantifica-
tion over choice sequences would be regarded as sentences stating properties
about the notion of choice sequence, since the idea of an ‘arbitrary individual
choice sequence’ cannot be properly defined. What is intended is to grasp the
notion of choice sequence as a whole. (About this see the discussion on Weyl’s
account of choice sequences below.) The ‘figure of speech’ account is akind
to the holistic approach, inasmuch the idea of an arbitrary individual choice
10Georg Kreisel, ‘Informal rigour and completeness proofs’, in Problems in the philosophy of math-
ematics, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1967, pp. 138-139.
35
sequence is also rejected. The method to argue this mutual claim is, however,
rather different: one admits quantification over individual choice sequences
and then tries to show how these sentences can be translated into equivalent
sentences without quantification over choice sequences. In the ‘figure of speech’
approach the point of departure is an explanation of what means to talk about
choice sequences. Speech involving choice sequences can be paraphrased into
a speech involving only mathematical objects whose epistemic status is not
disputed (e.g., lawlike sequences).
Troelstra stresses the fact that the three approaches to the subject of choice
sequences “can merge gradually and almost imperceptibly into each other.”
(Ibidem.) But the analytical approach is the one to be mainly pursued by him
because “choice sequences are not only a good example of the possibilities
(and limitations) of conceptual analysis, but are also of interest in themselves,
as demonstrating the possibilities of coherent reasoning about [individual] in-
complete objects”; i.e., the analytical approach enables us to study the role of
intensional aspects of choice sequences in mathematics. (CinM II, p. 643.) For
Troelstra, an example for the cogency of conceptual analysis over choice se-
quences is Brouwer’s weak counterexamples using lawlike sequences showing
that classical logic is ‘unreliable’ in intuitionistic mathematics, while lawless
sequences allow to refute the laws of classical logic (on intuitionistic grounds),
since WC-N has consequences as ¬∀-PEM. (Ibidem.) One source of limitations
to the analytical approach is in the fact that, in building a theory, we unavoid-
ably idealize, i.e., in thinking about choice processes carried out by an ideal
mathematician, certain aspects of an actual choice process (mood, time, etc.)
are automatically left out, are abstacted from and regarded as mathematically
irrelevant. Another source of limitations to the analytical approach is that we
can try to be as precise and rigorous as possible in the justifications of principles
valid for such notion, but we cannot expect absolute rigour: in presenting the
justification for certain principles in terms of a conceptual analysis, we may
have to accept that sometimes we have to make intuitive jumps, namely when
a new insight seems to be required, while we are unable (at the moment) to
analyze the matter any further. In such cases, Troelstra accepts that the best we
can do is to show as clearly as possible what it is that we have to accept. (CinM
II, pp. 643-644.)
We will now compactly state Troelstra’s set of axioms for the domain of
choice sequences and then we will present a critical discussion for each one. LS
is an axiomatic theory for lawless sequences with the following four axioms11:
LS1: ∀n∃α(α ∈ n)
LS2: ∀α∀β(α , β ∨ α = β)
LS3: ∀α[(, (α, ~β)→ A(α, ~β))→ ∃n(α ∈ n ∧ ∀γ ∈ nA(γ, ~β))]
11The language of LS contains the following variables: x, y, z,u, v,w, ... for natural numbers,
a, b, c, d, e, f , ... for lawlike sequences, α, β, γ, δ, ... for lawless sequences, and in addition a constant
K for a species/class of sequences; K is the inductively defined class of (lawlike) neighbourhood
functions. The following abbreviations are used: ~α := (α1, α2, ..., αn); ∀~α := ∀α1,∀α2, ...,∀αn. The
following definitions are introdued: , (α, ~β) := α , β1 ∧ ... ∧ α , βn; 5 ~α := ∀i,∀ j(αi , α j). The
notation ‘α ∈ n’ means that a finite sequence n is an initial segment of α and the notation ‘∀α ∈ n’
stands for ‘all lawless sequences α with the (same) initial segment n’.
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LS4: ∀~α∃a[5 ~α→ A(~α, a)]→ ∃e ∈ K∀n[en , 0→ ∃a∀~α ∈ n(5 ~α→ A(~α, a))]
Troelstra starts by saying that there is not a single type of choice sequence,
but there are many (lawlike, lawless, hesitant, etc.) according to the type of data
(information) which can be known about the sequences in the course of their
construction. (CinM II, p. 645.) Let’s remind that for a lawless sequence the
choice of future values is at any stage completely free and that distinct lawless
sequences are completely independent, i.e., the values of any such sequence are
not determined or restricted relative to the values of other lawless sequences.
So we may think of a lawless sequence α as a process of generating values
α(0), α(1), α(2), ... in N without any general restriction, such that at any stage of
the process only finitely many values of α are known (and the further choices
completely left free). (CinM II, p. 645.)
The complete freedom of choice in lawless sequences suggests that the fol-
lowing principle is true for them:
LS1: ∀n∃α(α ∈ n).
The intuitive content of this axiom, the density axiom, is that each possible
initial segment n occurs as an initial segment of some lawless sequence α, i.e.,
any finite sequence is an initial segment of a lawless sequence. (Ibidem.) For
Troelstra, a good intuitive representation of this idea is that the sequence of the
casts of a die (except that that now the values have to come, not from N, but
from {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}).12 At no stage we know more than an initial segment of
this sequence. However, as the values are not freely chosen, but determined by
throwing the die, we cannot be certain that all initial segments will accur, no
matter how many dice we take into consideration. To get a better aproximation,
we should permit a number of deliberate placings of the die before we starting
throwing; this ensures the validity of (the analogue for dice of) the density
axiom. (Ibidem.)
Let’s now present Troelstra’s critical discussion of LS1. He starts by saying
that there is a slight difficulty in the preceeding discussion of this axiom: if we
rigorously stick to the idea that at any stage a single value is to be chosen, and
no further restrictions are to be made, can we then be certain that any possible
initial segment will occur as initial segment of some lawless sequence? How
can we be certain that a particular initial segment of lenght 10 (for example)
will occur? (CinM II, p. 646.) Bringing again the analogy with de casts of a
die, we can put this difficultyt in another terms: as a thought experiment, we
may envisage all possible sequences of casts of dice started simultaneously, we
expect but cannot be certain that all possible initial segments from {1, 2, ..., 6} will
occur. As to the lawless sequences themselves, the assertion that a particular
initial segment will not occur (formally ¬∃α(α ∈ n)) intuitively conflicts with
the freedom of making choices, so we convinced that at least it is true that
¬¬∃α(α ∈ n), but that is not enough to justify the density axiom. (Ibidem.) Let’s
remember that in intuitionistic logic the principle ¬¬A→ A is not valid, so we
12Troelstra likes this idea, but it is also known that Brouwer already objected to it. (Remark by
Freudenthal, reported in Dirkvan Dalen’s introduction to Brouwer’s Cambridge Lectures on Intuition-
ism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981.)
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cannot justify (passing from ¬¬∃α(α ∈ n) to) ∃α(α ∈ n), asserted in the density
axiom.
Troelstra’s idea to move over this ‘slight difficulty’ is to modify the ini-
tial idea of a lawless sequence permitting a better analogy between lawless
sequences and casts of a die. So, to get a better analogy, says Troelstra, we
should for lawless sequences permit the specification of an arbitrary initial seg-
ment in advance. Then we may think of our universe of lawless sequences as
containing at least some αn ∈ n, for each n, i.e., containing at least an arbitrary
lawless sequence with an initial segment n given in advance. Our universe may
contain other lawless sequences besides αn. Thus the density axiom seems to
be guaranteed for this slightly modified idea of lawless sequence, permitting
the stipulation of certain initial segments a priori. And it is this new idea of
lawless sequence that Troelstra adopts in the further conceptual analysis. To
avoid confusion between the original and the new (modified) idea of a lawless
sequence, he introduces the designation “proto-lawless sequence” to the original
unmodified idea and mantains the designation “lawless sequence” to the new
modified one. Based on this, we may think of the proto-lawless sequences as
forming part of the universe of lawless sequences, consisting of those lawless
sequences for which no initial segment was specified in advance; and in fact,
he says, we have no reasons to uphold the density axiom for the proto-lawless
sequences. (Ibidem.)
If we write α ≡ β to indicate that α and β really refer to the same (intensional)
process, then, translated in terms of “casts of a die”, α ≡ β means that α and β
are the same sequences of casts of the same die. By this definition of intensional
identity we have, for all properties A,
A(α) ∧ α ≡ β→ A(β).
If α has a property A and α is given by the same intensional process that
generates β, then β also has the property A; in other words, of α and β are given
by the same process, we can substitute one by the other in any formula in which
one of them occurs. Another property of intensional identity is that it is always
decidable in intuitionistic mathematics:
α ≡ β ∨ ¬(α ≡ β),
since we know whether α and β refer to the same process or not (in terms
of dice: we know whether we are referring to the same die or not). (CinM II,
pp. 646-647.) Generally, intensional identity is decidable because it depends
solely upon the way the objects are given to us, and we must be able to tell
whether the way in which an object is presented to us on one occasion is or is
not the same as that in which an object is presented to us on another. (EI, p.
215.)
The intensional identity of lawless sequences already implies extensional
equality of lawless sequences:
(1) α ≡ β→ α = β,
where as usual α = β is formally defined as ∀x(α(x) = β(x)). If two sequences
are given by the same process, then their values will coincide. Otherwise, it
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would be possible for two identical lawless sequences to had different initial
segments, for instance; which is absurd.
The reciprocal case,
(2) α = β→ α ≡ β,
is not so intuitive. Does the fact of two lawless sequences conicide in its
values means that they are generated by the same intensional process? Is it
not reasonable to think of two lawless sequences that has the same values even
though being intensional different processes? They can accidentally have the
same values. Suppose we have α = β and α . β. Notice that the distinctness
of α and β (α . β) conflicts with α = β since α = β implies that β is com-
pletely determined by α and α . β means that α and β are independant of each
other. Formally, we can state that (α . β) → α , β, which conflicts with the
assumption that α = β.
Troelstra says that one may be tempted to try to refute it by the following
‘counter example’. Suppose sequences α and β are given to us by means of
values produced by two distinct black boxes (a black box is simply a process the
workings of which are unknown to us), one for α and one for β. To us (subjec-
tively) α and β therefore appear as (proto-)lawless sequences. But suppose we
are told, after a long time, that there is a hidden connection between the boxes,
such that they will keep turning out the same values; then suddenly we know
that α = β. We could not decide this beforehand, nor were we given, at the start,
a guarantee that the decision could ever be made in the future. So we have no
right to assert the axiom schema of decidability of equality generally. However,
says Troelstra, this ‘counterexample’ starts from the wrong picture of lawless
sequences. In fact, we should look at the example in a different way. Initially,
α and β were given to us as distinct processes; later, we have learn that α = β,
and this is a type of information which was not permitted by our description of
a lawless sequence. If, though considering α and β as distinct (α . β), we have
to reckon with the possibility that later we will learn that α = β, then α and β
cannot be considered as lawless from the beginning, but falling under another
notion of sequence. This is argued by Troelstra because choice sequences ini-
tially given as distinct and lawless should remain independent. (CinM II, pp.
647.)
There is another argument for LS2, presented by Dummett (EI, pp. 215 et
seq.) that makes use of a major principle for lawless sequences, the principle or
schema of open data. This principle states that for lawless sequences any prop-
erty which can be asserted must depend on initial segments of these sequences
only. If A is a property of lawless sequences, not containing any further choice
parameters, we can formulate the one-variable or schematic form of the axiom
of open data:
A(α)→ ∃n(α ∈ n ∧ ∀β ∈ nA(β)).
The intuitive content of this principle is that if α has a property A, then ex-
ists an initial segment n of α such that for any βwith n, β also as the property A.
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(CinM vol. II, p. 648.) If we introduce a parameter β13 stating that α and β are
in the relation A plus the clause that they are generated by different processes,
we get the following version of the open data schema:
A(α, β) ∧ (α . β)→ ∃n∀γ ∈ n((γ . β)→ A(γ, β))
This version of the schema of open data states that for any two independant
sequences α, β that bare the relation A, we only need an initial segment of the
first to establish that a third sequence γ sharing the same initial segment and
being independant of β is in the same relation A to β.
Given this, Dummett’s argument runs as follows. It was shown that inten-
sional identity verifies the principle of excluded middle: α ≡ β ∨ α . β. We
know also that intensional identity implies extensional equality: α ≡ β→ α = β.
Then, to prove the reciprocal, it is enough to show that the conjunction of α = β
and α . β leads to a contradiction (since ¬¬(α ≡ β) implies α ≡ β by the prin-
ciple of excluded middle for intensional identity). Suppose we have α = β
and α . β as the absurd hypothesis. If we settle that A(α, β) is the extensional
equality α = β, we have A(α, β) ∧ α , β. Hence, by the (modified) principle of
open data, there exists a finite sequence n such that, for all γ ∈ n (i.e., γ coincides
with α up to n − 1), we have A(γ, β). Let’s take (by the density axiom) a γ in
such conditions, so that γ(n) , β(n). Then γ , β, which is a contradiction.
Using the density axiom and the (modified) priciple of open data it was
shown that α = β ↔ α ≡ β. This result allows the replacement of intensional
identity by extensional equality in LS. Then, by substitutivity and decidability
of intensional identity, we can assert the following:
Axiom schema of decidability of equality: α = β ∨ α , β.
By simple quantification over the free variables α, β we get
LS2: ∀α∀β(α , β ∨ α = β)
The replacement of intensional identity by extensional equality is technically
advantageous and makes LS a more economic and elegant theory.
Dummett’s argument for LS2 gives us the motto for discussing LS3. If we
introduce the abbreviation
. (α, β0, ..., βn) := (α . β0 ∧ α . β1 ∧ ... ∧ α . βn),
we can also easily state the general form of open data with parameters:
Axiom of open data: A(α, ~β)∧ . (α, ~β)→ ∃n[α ∈ n ∧ ∀γ ∈ n(. (γ, ~β)→ A(γ, ~β))]
This version of the schema of open data intuitively states that for every in-
dependent lawless sequences in the relation A, we only need an initial segment
of them to establish whether another lawless sequence, different from them,
bares the same relation to A. Notice that , (α, ~β), in virtue of the identification
13We use this slightly modified version of open data for an easier explanation of the argument.
Dummett uses the general form with a n-variable parameter.
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of = and ≡, expresses that α is independent (distinct from) of the ~β and this
condition is really necessary, for otherwise it could give raise to conflicts with
the density axiom. As a fact of matter, Troelstra shows an instance of a sen-
tence originated by the axiom of open data without the condition , (α, ~β) that
is refuted by the density axiom). Suppose we have A(α, β) := ∀n(αn = βn) and
apply to it the axiom of open data without , (α, ~β), , (γ, ~β). We find then that
if α = β, ∃m(α ∈ m∧∀γ ∈ m(γ = β)), which is obviously false and also refutable
by the density axiom: take any γ ∈ αm ∗ 〈βm + 1〉. (CinM II, p. 648.)
On the critical discussion of the principle of open data, Troelstra starts
by indicating a possible objection. For the proto-lawless sequences, the open
data’s schema seems to him to be irreproachable, but as to its general validity
for (the modified) lawless sequences, it is possible to raise an objection: there
is one piece of information concerning a lawless sequence α which cannot be
read of from an initial segment of α, namely the length of the initial segment
that was fixed in advance. In a more rigorous account, let ΦI be the operation
assigning to each lawless sequence α its initially specified segment. Then for
any α there is an n such that ΦI(α) = n, i.e., such that ΦI assigns n to α. This
originates a counterexample to open data’s schema: applying the open data’s
schema to ΦI(α) = n, we find that, for some extension m of n the following is
the case, ∀β ∈ m(ΦI(β) = n), and this is easily refuted, e.g. by considering a β
with ΦI(β) = m ∗ 〈0〉. So, if we wish to maintain the open data’s schema, we
should only consider properties A which do not refer to ΦI. A more natural
way of looking at the matter, says Troelstra, is perhaps the following one. Just
as in the actual process of generating values of a lawless sequence, we have
abstracted from irrelevant circumstances accompanying a process of choosing
in the physical world (time between choices, the weather, etc.), it seems to be
mathematically irrelevant which part of an individual lawless sequence was
determined a priori, and which part generated by further free choices. Thus for
the sake of open data’s schema we have to restrtict A(α) to properties different
from ΦI. (CinM II, p. 649.)
As to the axiom of open data (with parameters), whenever we assert at some
stage A(α, ~β), there are three types of data regarding α on which our assertion
could be based: (1) an initial segment of α, (2) ΦI, which was already excluded
by the preceeding analysis, (3) assertions of the form α = βi, α , βi, i.e., the
identity or non-identity of α with one of the other parameters. Under the as-
sumption of , (α, ~β) only the first type of data is relevant, which leads to the
axiom. On the other hand, however, at any stage there is more information than
just the initial segment determined so far: we also know the stages at which the
values were choosen, or equivalently, how many stages where added at each
preceeding stage. But just as in the case of ΦI above, this ought to be regarded
as irrelevant; we abstract from such details of the generation process. Given the
previous analysis, and by quantification over the free variables of the axiom of
open data with parameters, we are justified to assume
LS3: ∀α[(, (α, ~β))→ A(α, ~β)→ ∃n(α ∈ n ∧ ∀γ ∈ nA(γ, ~β))]
as an axiom of LS. (CinM II, pp. 649-650.)
WC-N can now be derived from LS3. Assume (1) ∀α∃xA(α, x). As an
instance of LS3 we have (2) A(α, x) → ∃n(α ∈ n ∧ ∀β ∈ nA(β, x)). By isolating
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the consequent of (2) we get (3) ∃n(α ∈ n∧∀β ∈ nA(β, x)). Then, by quantifying
over the free variables of (3), we get (4) ∀α∃x∃n∀β(αn = βn→ A(β, x)). Finally,
(1)-(4) allows us to formulate WC-N.
LS3 is a form of continuity that enables us to assert that properties of lawless
sequences depend on initial segments of the sequences only. But it does not
exhaust our intuitions about continuity and, in fact, stronger forms of continuity
axioms can be argued for. Suppose Φ ∈ NN 7−→ N is a continuous functional
in NN. Then, says Troelstra, it seems plausible to assume that “we actually
know whether an initial segment of α suffices to compute Φα.” (CinM I, p.211.
Troelstra’s italics.) This is to say that we can actually associate with φ a lawlike
function ϕ ∈ N 7−→ N such that
ϕ(α¯n) = 0⇔ α¯n is not sufficiently long to compute Φα from it; and
ϕ(α¯n) = m + 1⇔ α¯n is sufficiently long to compute Φα from it, and Φα = m.
From this definition ofϕ follows two immediate results: (i) for any sequence
α it is allways possible to determine that there is a initial segment sufficiently
long to compute it, i.e., ∀α∃x(ϕ(αx) , 0); and that after we have found the
element n that suffices to compute α, any other initial segment m longer than
αn yield the same result, i.e., ∀n∀m(ϕn , 0→ ϕn = ϕ(n∗m)). The first condition
is a consequence of Φ being defined everywhere and the second condition is
due to the fact that the value computed should not change if more information
about the argument becomes available. Conversely, any ϕ satisfying these two
conditions defines a continuous functional Φ.
We are able now to define K0 as the class of (neighbourhood) lawlike func-
tions by
ϕ ∈ K0 := ∀α∃x(ϕ(αx) , 0) ∧ ∀nm(ϕn , 0→ ϕn = ϕ(n ∗m)).
The function ϕ ∈ K0 assigns an initial segment (of length) n to each α; so
we can say that ϕ determines an initial segment which compute α. We can now
state a form of LS4 without parameters:
LS40: ∀α∃aA(α, a)→ ∃e ∈ K0∀n(en , 0→ ∃a∀α ∈ nA(α, a)).
LS4’ is a final strengthening of continuity and it is obtained by substituting
in LS40 K0 by the class K of inductive defined (lawlike) neighbourhood functions:
LS4’: ∀α∃aA(α, a)→ ∃e ∈ K∀n(en , 0→ ∃a∀α ∈ nA(α, a)).
To describe K and discuss how it relates to K0 we need to introduce in
advance some definitions.14 We define a tree T as an inhabited, decidable set
of finite sequences of natural numbers closed under initial segments; so T is a
tree iff 〈〉 ∈ T, ∀n(n ∈ T ∨ n < T) and ∀n∀m(n ∈ T ∧ m ≺ n → m ∈ T). T is a
regular tree if ∀s ∈ T, s is a terminal node, i.e., ¬∃x(s ∗ 〈x〉 ∈ T) or ∀x(s ∗ 〈x〉 ∈ T).
14‘〈〉’ is the null sequence, ‘x ≺ y’ means that x is the predecessor of y (with x, y finite sequences)
and ‘x ∗ y’ can be read as ‘x followed by y’ (x, y are numbers, finite sequences or infinite sequences,
which becomes clear due to notation).
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A regular tree T is well-founded when all branches (sequences) ‘leave’ the tree,
i.e., ∀α ∈ NN∃n(αn < T).
Let’s write T as the class of regular well-founded trees. Thus, T is precisely
the class of sequences determined by elements of K0. Let’s now define the
class IT as the class of regular well-founded trees inductively defined. The
following two clauses generate regular well-founded trees: (1) the single node
{〈〉} is a regular tree; (2) if T0,T1,T2, ... is an effective sequence of such trees, we
can combine them into a new regular well-founded tree saying that their sum∑
n Tn is a regular well-founded tree. If a regular tree is generated by repeated
application of (1) and (2) only, we call it an inductive tree. The class IT of
such inductive trees is then generated by the following reformulations of (1)
and (2):
(1’) {〈〉} ∈ IT ,
(2’) ∀x(Tx ∈ IT )→ ∑x Tx ∈ IT .
IT can also be described as the least class satisfying (1’) and (2’), since we
only put something in IT by virtue of its construction from (1’) and (2’); so,
if X is any class of sets of finite sequences satisfying (1’) and (2’), then also
IT ⊆ X . By this reason, the inductively defined trees contitute a subset of
the regular well-founded trees,IT ⊆ T . And if we assume that the functions
generated by the elements of IT form the class K, then we also have K ⊆ K0.
The point in using K in LS4 instead of K0 is due to the following fact: the
identification of K0 and K amounts to the assumption that all the regular well-
founded trees (all sequences) are in fact generated by the above special method
of induction. Intuitionisticaly however, notwithstanding the fact that we can
prove K ⊆ K0, the converse case is not formally established, and thus, it has to
be assumed as a principle that K0 ⊆ K. Classically we can prove K0 ⊆ K, but
the proof uses the principle of excluded middle, and is therefore of no use in
obtaining an intuitionistic justification of K0 = K. The assumption of K0 = K
is equivalent to state that all sequences are in fact generated (by induction).
This principle is called bar induction and it is an essential assumption to the
development of intuitionistic mathematics.15
The identification of K0 and K is necessary in order to state the final version
of LS4 with parameters:
LS4: ∀~α∃a[5 ~α→ A(~α, a)]→ ∃e ∈ K∀n[en , 0→ ∃a∀~α ∈ n(5 ~α→ A(~α, a))].
This princple is, in Troelstra’s words, “the biggest single ‘jump’ in the justi-
fication of the axioms for lawless sequences” (CinM II, p. 655). The intu-
itive motivation for equating K0 and K is that we are equating two notions
of well-foundedness: the ordinary well-foundedness and the inductive well-
foundedness for regular trees. This assumption, however, is only plausible if
we assume K to contain all choice sequences, not only the lawlike ones.
15See Fernando Ferreira, ‘Grundlagenstreit e o Intuicionismo Brauweriano’ in Boletim da Sociedade
Portuguesa de Matemática, Nž 58, 2008, pp. 1-23. This paper was also very useful to understand the
distinction between the first and the second act of intuitionim.
43
2.4.1 The Elimination theorem
Let’s now discuss (in a not too much technical way) a very interesting theorem
about lawless sequences, proved by Kreisel and Troelstra within LS: the elimi-
nation theorem for lawless sequences.(CinM vol. II, pp. 658-665; in these pages
Troelstra presents the theorem in more technical and detailed terms.) Troelstra
describes at some detail a subtheory S of LS: S is the lawlike fragment of LS,
i.e., the part of LS not involving lawless variables. Given this the following
result holds:
Elimination theorem: There is a syntactically effective translation τ (see op. cit.,
pp. 663-664), mapping formulas of LS without free lawless variables to formulas of S
such that:
(i) A⇔ τ(A) for A without lawless variables,
(ii) LS ` A↔ τ(A),
(iii) LS ` A⇔ S ` τ(A).
The part (i) of the theorem is simply the result that the translation τ permitts
to show the equivalence between sentences involving quantified lawless vari-
ables (A) and sentences not involving such lawless variables (τ(A)). Part (ii)
shows that, within the context of LS, sentences involving lawless variables are
equivalent to their translated counterparts. And part (iii) of the theorem states
that any sentence involving lawless variables is provable in LS if and only if its
translation is provable in S.
The elimination theorem has two possible conceptual interpretations con-
cerning lawless sequences. The proponents of (lawless) choice sequences as
legitimate mathematical objects look at the theorem as showing that speech
about choice sequences has mathematical coherence. The translation yields
equivalent statements of the form A ↔ τ(A) where A quantifies over lawless
sequences and τ(A) does not. But as A is a component of the statement A↔ τ(A)
as a whole, the lawless sequences are still involved. So, being part of a genuine
mathematical statement, A cannot be regarded as illusory. (BmH, p. 41.) For
this reason, and under the suggestion of Kreisel, the translations are usually
understood as giving a complete analysis of lawless sequences via contextual def-
inition and, therefore they cannot be regarded as eliminating lawless sequences.
Therefore, this theorem does not eliminate (in the strong sense of the word)
lawless sequences but explains them in terms of less controversial mathematical
entities, viz. lawlike sequences. And, for the proponent of (lawless) choices se-
quences, this fact supplies lawless sequences with the same degree of coherence
as lawlike sequences.
Another possible way of looking to the elimination theorem takes the ‘figure
of speech’ account of choice sequences at face value, i.e., literally. Let’s call this
interpretation of the elimination theorem the eliminativist account of lawless
sequences. The eliminativists would say that the elimination theorem shows
that the discourse about lawless sequences is nothing but an illusory way of
talking about lawless sequences; for, in fact, what we are talking about, within
the context of LS, are lawlike sequences, i.e., as the quantification over lawless
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sequences is eliminated, the only things which we quantify over (which we
talk about) are lawlike sequences. So, the eliminativists can say that we are
mislead in talking about lawless sequences and that they don’t occour as prim-
itive individual objects in LS. There are very interesting analogies in the history
of philosophy of mathematics that can elucidates this thesis. (1) For Frege,
mathematics (number theory) does not deal with numbers but with logic (‘log-
ical concepts’) and it is his motivation in trying to show that the arithmetical
laws are in reality logical laws. (2) For Hilbert, the real objects of mathematics
were empirical signs (‘marks on paper’) and not sets. (3) And for Wittgen-
stein, mathematics was no more than a prescription of rules for constructing
(mathematical) sentences (‘language games’). The same can be stated by an
eliminativist: LS does not deal with lawless sequences but with lawlike ones;
even using variables (in an illusory way) for lawless sequences what we are
really talking about are lawlike sequences. (BmH, pp. 40-41.)
There is, however, a not so radical eliminativist interpretation of the elimi-
nation theorem. It is a mixture of the ‘figure of speech’ and the holistic approaches
to choice sequences. In the eliminativist literal interpretation of the ‘figure of
speech’ account, the quantification over lawless sequences is regarded as illu-
sory because we can translate the sentences with quantification over lawless
sequences into equivalent ones in which such quantificaton does not occur. The
holistic account of choice sequences accepts the universe of choice sequences as
a single primitive notion (as a whole), i.e., quantification over choice sequences
is permitted but only as a primitive (non definable) notion. So, in the holistic
account of choice sequences there is not such thing as a contextual definition
of quantification over lawless sequences because quantification over choice se-
quences is seen as a primitive notion. This interpretation seems to be the one
favored by Weyl. We turn to Weyl’s interpretation now.
2.5 Weyl’s asymmetric interpretation of quantifiers
for choice sequences
The third interpretation of the elimination theorem joins together these two
accounts of insigths on quantification over choice sequences in a very specific
way. To explain this possible interpretation of the elimination theorem we will
present Hermann Weyl’s ideas on the subject of choice sequences, exposed in
the context of his general theory of the continuum, with particluar emphasis on
his original and somewhat eccentric ideas on what it means to quantify over
mathematical entities. Weyl’s particular view on quantification over choice
sequences is an interpretation of his writings advanced, among others, by
Troelstra when he says that in “Weyl’s discussion of choice sequences (...) there
is a faint echo of the semi-intuitionist’s holistic view of the continuum, but
on the other hand some of his formulations tend towards a ‘figure of speech’
interpretation.” (CinM II, p. 644.) For the exposition of Weyl’s ideas on
choice sequences and in order to understande how its own view deviates from
Brouwer’s we will follow the exposition of the subject presented by v. Atten, D.
v. Dalen and R. Tieszen in the article ‘Brouwer and Weyl: the phenomenology
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and mathematics of the intuitive continuum’.16 The exposition of Weyl’s ideas
on this paper is an elegant reproduction of the arguments presented on Weyl’s
famous 1921 article ‘On The New Foundational Crisis of Mathematics’.17
Weyl holds that there is a use in mathematics for the notion of lawless se-
quence, in that it allows us to conceptualize the continuum in the right way. “It
is one of the fundamental insights of Brouwer that number sequences, devel-
oping through free acts of choice, are possible objects of concept formation.”
(‘New Crisis’, p. 94.) On the other hand however, he claims that “the expression
‘There is’ commits us to Being and law, while ‘every’ releases us into Becoming
and Freedom.” (‘New Crisis’, p. 96.) The explanation given by Weyl of his
semantics for the quantifiers seems to be that it is essential to pure mathematics
that its objects can be coded in, or represented by natural numbers:
Every application of mathematics must set out from certain objects
that are to be subjected to mathematical treatment, and that can be
distinguished from one another by means of a number character.
The characters are natural numbers. The connection to pure math-
ematics and its constructions is achieved by the symbolic method,
which replaces these objects by their characters. The point geometry
on the straight line is, in this way, based on the system of the above-
mentioned dual intervals, which we are able to identify by means
of two whole number characters.” (‘New Crisis’ pp. 100-101.)
The restriction that any mathematically acceptable entity has to be coded in
natural numbers is based in Weyl’s claim that “the sequence of natural num-
bers, and the intuition of iteration underlying it, are ultimate foundations of
mathematical thought.” (‘New Crisis’ p. 91.) For Weyl, application of mathe-
matics does not always mean what it normally would, and does not necessarily
contrasts with what is usually understood as pure mathematics. For him point
geometry (for example) already is an application of mathematics, whose coded
objects are rational segments. This example illustrates that the substitution of
numbers for objects in the process of symbilization cannot be a mere labeling of
those objects. Some information needs to be preserved, depending on what we
want to use the mathematics for. When that is done we are back in the realm
of ‘pure mathematics and its constructions’.
Since laws are finitely specifiable (countable), they can be coded in natural
numbers and therefore, by the criterion above, Weyl accepts lawlike sequences
as genuine individual objects of (pure) mathematics. Lawless sequences, how-
ever, cannot in general be coded by natural numbers, hence they are not to
be regarded as individual mathematical objects. So, although he recognizes a
role for lawless sequences in conceptualizing the continuum, in the end math-
ematics is only about numerically codifiable objects, viz. lawlike sequences.
(Ibidem.)
16M. van Atten, D. v. Dalen and R., ‘Brouwer and Weyl: the phenomenology and
mathematics of the intuitive continuum’. We had access to this article through the URL:
www.phil.uu.nl/∼dvdalen/articles/Brouwer-Weyl-page.pdf. This article was also published in
Philosophia Mathematica, volume 10, 2002, pp. 203-226; but unfortunately we did not have ac-
cess to it. For commodity we will refer to this paper as ‘Brouwer and Weyl’ only.
17H. Weyl, ‘On The New Foundational Crisis of Mathematics’, in From Brouwer to Hilbert. The
debate on the foundations mathematics, pp. 86-118. For commodity we will refer to this paper just as
‘New Crisis’
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Based on his approach to mathematical entities, Weyl advances the thesis
that from conceptual truths about lawless sequences, one arrives at genuine
mathematical statements by substituting lawless for lawlike sequence variables:
The proper judgments that can be gained from these universal judg-
ments come into being (...) in the case of the freely developing choice
sequence, by substituting for it a law φ that determines an individ-
ual number sequence in infinitum. (‘New Crisis’, p. 100.)
This means that the concept of lawless sequence is meaningful, but only
if in the course of mathematical application we are able to substitute lawless
vriables by lawlike variables in the sentences they occur. In fact, individual
lawless sequences are beyond the reach of Weyl’s methods of construction:
only objects that can be coded into natural numbers can be constructed in the
strong sense. (‘Brouwer and Weyl’, p. 14.) Weyl tries however, by a disputed
argument, to show that, albeit lawless sequences are not mathematical objects,
they have mathematical applicability. He says that “this fact is supported
by the possibility of establishing correspondences between them [and lawlike
sequences]” (‘New Crisis’, p. 94.) He implicitly postulates that we can choose
a lawless sequence as to follow some lawlike one. As all lawlike sequences can
be embedded in the continuum of lawless sequences (‘New Crisis’, p. 100) and
it may be part of the meaning of a lawless sequence that it does or does not
possess a property E (‘New Crisis’, p. 96), then there will be general judgment
directions for lawlike sequences (‘New Crisis’, p. 100). The idea behind this
postulate is that we will be able to choose the elements of a lawless sequence
such that it happens to coincide extensionally with the elements of a lawlike
sequence and, doing so, we will guarantee that some properties of lawlike
sequences would be inheritated by the lawless sequences. And so, we will
be able to make general (universal) judgments for lawlike sequences. In fact,
what Weyl is doing is to restrict the domain of lawless sequences which we
can deal with by taking into account only the class of lawless sequences that
coincidentally follow some lawlike sequence.
There are those who regard this postulate as unacceptable because to specify
a lawless sequence α by saying that it follows some lawlike sequences a would
contradict the lawless character of α. As lawless sequences are necessarily
unfinished objects, one cannot say that a law and a sequence of free choices may
simply be alternative ways to describe the same completed infinite sequence.
(‘Brouwer and Weyl’, p. 15.) It can be argued however that what is postulated
by Weyl is not that the (idealized mathematician’s) generation of a lawless
sequence is determined to follow a lawlike one, but that by chance the completely
free generated lawless sequence coincides extensionaly with a lawlike one.
Suppose the idealized mathematician starts a lawless sequence and, after some
amount of time, by looking back to the sequence generated so far he realizes
that (by a twist of fate) the lawless sequence he is generating embodies a law
he was unaware of until now. Suppose now that the idealized mathematician,
freely generating the (same) sequence, is not interested in looking back and
just continues generating new elements of the sequence, that by chance will
continue to coincide extensionally with a lawlike sequence. In these conditions,
we cannot say that the idealized mathematician is specifying a lawless sequence
by following a law (which conflicts with the free character of lawless sequences);
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but that he is simply generating a sequence by free acts of choice that by
chance coincide extensionally with a lawlike sequence.18 And then it can be
generally accepted that there is a class of such lawless sequences. Perhaps,
Weyl’s postulate can be consistently paraphrased in this way.
Weyl’s semantics for universal and existential quantifiers runs as follows.
Universal quantification is allowed to range over lawless and lawlike variables.
Existential quantification, however, is only allowed to range over lawlike vari-
ables. Further, with respect to universal quantification, a sentence of the form
∀αA(α) means that a certain property A is true for the notion of lawless sequence
as a whole. When it comes to instanciate an individual with such property, we
can only assert it if we can present a lawlike sequence such that A(a). So,
generally, we are able to assert ∀αA(α), but when we eliminate the universal
quantifier we are not allowed to assert A(α), only A(a). With respect to existen-
tial quantification, a sentence of the form ∃aA(a) is allowed for lawlike objects
only. A sentence of the form ∃αA(α) would be seen as ill-formed in Weyl’s
semantics. The universal quantifier ranges over lawless sequences, but state-
ments about individual sequences must be about lawlike ones. In the subject of
choice sequences, this semantics for universal quantification is the clearest sign
that Weyl rules out lawless sequences as individuals. (‘Brouwer and Weyl’, p.
16.) Besides this consequence, Weyl’s asymmetric quantification over choice
sequences is the formal counterpart of the postulate we are discussing: univer-
sal statements about choice sequences (∀αA(α)) are meaningful with the clause
that when we try to state the same property A as a property of an individual
sequence, we have to pass from the lawless variable α to a lawlike variable a
such that A(a).
Although Weyl’s accout of choice sequences can, to some extent, be argued
to suffer from severe difficulties (for eample, it can be argued that Weyl’s notion
of choice sequence is misleaded and does not agrees with the right Brouwerian
notion), we can say that its general idea about choice sequences, or some of
his insights about the role of choice sequences in mathematical ontology, are
vindicated by the elimination theorem. The theorem shows that, in some sense,
to talk about lawless sequences is equivalent to talk about lawlike ones. And
(we can extrapolate to a Weylian insight that) this can be a sign that we don’t
need, or have not to accept lawless sequences into our mathematical theories,
even though we can accept that the notion of lawless sequence has a role in the
intuitive pre-theoretical mathematical discourse.
2.6 The need of further philosophical explanation
We have presented in this part of the thesis three accounts of choice sequences
and debated the problems raised by the most important principle that governs
them. We have seen that Brouwer’s genetic account of choice sequences is very
original and appelative but he doesn’t argues for the validity of WC-N, he
just asserts it as being unproblematic, with no further justification. Then we
saw why we have to look for a justification for WC-N: it seems to fail for the
entire universe of choice sequences, in particular it seems to fail for the lawlike
18Notice that in Brouwer’s setting, such fact is impossible since it would be a fact about mathe-
matical objects that transcends the creating subject’s knowledge. But, of course, nothing guarantees
that Brouwer’s conception of the creating subject is the right one, or the only possible one.
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sequences. Besides this, it cannot be formally derived as a logical theorem
because it expresses properties of the quantifier combination ∀α∃n not already
implicit in the BHK-explanation, which are seen to hold by reflection on the
way choice sequences are given. This conclusion forces us to look a justification
for WC-N in the context of LS.
The task of justifying WC-N within LS is (mostly) followed by Troelstra
who, in the path to achieve a set of axioms for choice sequences, is forced to
modify the Brouwerian original idea of a lawless (choice) sequence due to the
analytical approach he assumes. However, even with this slight, but necessary,
modification of the notion of a lawless sequence, we have seen that difficulties
continue to arise: (1) the density axiom doesnt’t uphold for the original idea of
choice sequence and decidability of equality demands impositions on choice
sequences (such as a priori independence among them) that don’t seems natural;
open data schema seems to fail in preserving (intensional) properties of choice
sequences, that are in the heart of the very idea of a choice sequence, while for
open data with parameters (LS3), we have to restrict it from applying to certain
kind of properties (such as ΦI). We have also seen that LS4 is only plausible
under the assumption of K0 = K, otherwise it would not be possible to generate
the domaiin of all choice sequences.
Besides these difficulties to erect a suitable (set of axioms for the) theory of
choice sequences, there is the elimination theorem holding that (for the mod-
ified, but not necessarily for the original idea of) lawless sequences can be
paraphrased into lawlike ones. An uncontroversial interpretation of this theo-
rem states that it only proves the (initially stated) coherency of mathematical
reasoning (and acceptance) about lawless sequences by showing that sentences
about them can be formally reconducted to sentences whose degree of founda-
tion is unquestionable. We have seen, however, that it is possible to argue in
favor of a more controversial interpretetion of the theorem, by means of the
eliminativist(s) framework(s) of it. In particular, we showed that a Weylian
account of the theorem, in contraposition to the more radical figure of speech
approach, can be presented as a possible way of interpreting it, notwhitstanding
the (frequently appointed) flaws of the Weylian account of choice sequences.
As to WC-N in the framework of LS, it can be derived as a theorem. LS3
already implies WC-N and LS4 strengthens it. These formalities, however, do
not makes WC-N immune to the problems we resented in section 3. In fact,
the difficulties posed by WC-N are, in the context of LS, consequences of LS3.
The prblems discussed about open data axioms, mutatis mutandis, go the same
for WC-N: how to face the need to make irrelevant the intensional properties
of choice sequences? An argument is needed for accepting that the intrinsic
intensional character of choice sequences is irrelevant to establish mathematical
relations among them. This remains an unsolved problem.
Through the analysis of choice sequences presented so far, we conclude that
the legitimacy of regarding choice sequences as genuine mathematical entities
remains a problematic matter. In fact, the philosophical problems raised by the
subject are explicit in the mathematical difficulties in settling a suitable theory
for them. First, there is a need for showing the generally accepted mathematical
character of such eccentric entities: what is the property possessed by choice
sequences (besides the fact that they can be generated from natural numbers)
that makes them mathematical objects? How can the intensional character of
choice sequences like potentiality, temporality and subjectivity be incorporated
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in a natural way into mathematics? These are questions that mathematics itself
cannot answer. The answers to these questions are of a philosophical nature
and need to have a good philosophical account. A philosophical framework
advanced to deal with these problems will be presented in the next chapter.
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Chapter 3
The phenomenological
account of choice sequences
3.1 Intuitionism and Phenomenology
In this part of the thesis we will focus mostly on Mark van Atten’s chapters
3-6 of Brouwer meets Husserl: On the Phenomenology of Choice Sequences. The aim
of the book is to use phenomenology to justify Brouwer’s choice sequences as
mathematical objects. And the thesis to establish is the following:
One correct, phenomenological argument on the issue whether
mathematical objects can be dynamic (e.g., choice sequences) is not
Husserl’s (negative) argument, but a reconstruction of Brouwer’s
(positive) one. (BmH, p. 5.)
The thesis involves a meeting of the thoughts of Brouwer and Husserl. It
is uncontroversial that there is a conceptual and factual connection between
Husserl’s phenomenology and Brouwer’s intuitionism (or constructivism in
general). To van Atten, this conceptual proximity is not surprising, for in both
lines of thought the main principle is that all genuine knowledge refers back,
direct or indirectly, to intuitions, i.e., experiences in which the objects are given
as themselves. To make explicit this unsurprising connection, van Atten refers
to three philosophers of mathematics who have used Husserl’s phenomenology
to justify intuitionism, or parts of it: Oskar Becker (Husserl’s disciple), Arend
Heyting (Brouwer’s disciple) and Hermman Weyl. A paradigmatic example
is Heyting’s well-known interpretation of the logical constants (¬,∧,∨,→,↔
,∀,∃) where he uses the phenomenological concepts intention and fulfilment (of
an intention) to analyze intuitionistic ideas about meaning. (BmH, p. 6.)
Notwithstanding the connections between Brouwer’s and Husserl’s thoughts
there are also some conflicting positions; the main divergence is their concep-
tions about the nature of the mathematical universe in relation to time. For both
philosophers, mathematical objects are related to time. However, according to
Husserl, the mathematical universe is finished and the mathematical truths (the-
orems), like the objects themselves, are omnitemporal. (Experience and Judgment,
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section 64c.)1 In contrast, Brouwer conceives the mathematical universe as the
mathematician’s construction. Therefore, for him, the mathematical universe is
not omnitemporal and finished but dynamic in the sense that some objects (viz.
choice sequences) are open-ended and are developed in time. Van Atten calls
the brouwerian universe intratemporal with respect to time. With the aim of
showing the correctness of his vision on the mathematical universe, Brouwer
appeals to notions such as construction acts and free choice (of the idealized math-
ematician). On the other side, says van Atten, Husserl affirms without arguing,
and never mentioning choice sequences, that mathematical objects are static
objects. He simply considers that part of the meaning of mathematical asser-
tions is that mathematical objects possess this property. But this is precisely
what Brouwer contests in his arguments. And the fact that, in these arguments,
Brouwer makes appeal to certain acts (of consciousness) makes Brouwer seem,
in this matter, the real phenomenologist of the two, says van Atten. (Ibidem.)
These considerations suggest that it might be possible to find an argument
in favor of the dynamic universe, reconstructing Brouwer’s argument within
Husserl’s phenomenology. This reconstruction, nevertheless, will defend some
thesis that were explicitly rejected by Husserl. According to van Atten, there
are three possible conclusions: (1) all mathematical objects are omnitemporal
(defended by Husserl); (2) no mathematical object is omnitemporal (defended
by Brouwer); (3) some mathematical objects are omnitemporal and some are
not (van Atten’s thesis of the co-existence of both type of objects in the math-
ematical realm). For van Atten, choice sequences are an example of dynamic
objects, therefore not omnitemporal. Whether there exists or not other dynamic
mathematical objects is left open, not compromising Brouwer’s strongest thesis.
In relation to Husserl’s thesis, it suffices to give a counterexample to refute it.
This is the motive, says van Atten, why he talks of a correct argument and not
of the correct argument. (BmH, p. 7.) However, although van Atten is arguing
directly against a particular thesis of Husserl, his purpose is to try to do justice
to some of Brouwer ideas without compromising phenomenology as a (good)
philosophical method to settle philosophical issues.
So, assuming that Husserl’s and Brouwer’s thesis are contradictory, van
Atten has to gather evidence for the following claims he makes:
1. Measured by phenomenological standards, Husserl’s (negative) argu-
ment is not correct.
2. Transcendental phenomenology provides the full ontology for the a priori
sciences. Or, in other words,
3. In transcendental phenomenology, ontological questions in the a priori
sciences are decidable. Therefore,
4. Brouwer’s (positive) argument can be reconstructed in phenomenology.
(BmH, p. 9.)
The arguments for claims 1, 2 and 3 will be presented in the following
sections 2-5 of this chapter and the 4th claim will be discussed in section 6
dedicated to the phenomenological constitution of choice sequences, carried out
1E. Husserl, Experience and Judgment, Investigations in a Genealogy of Logic, Routledge & Kegan
Paul, London, 1973. We will refer to this book from now on as ‘EJ’.
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by van Atten at the chapter 6 of his book. In section 7 we present an application
of van Atten’s phenomenological constitution of choice sequences: an argument
for WC-N. Through the following sections of this chapter, we will also present
the motives why van Atten accuses Husserl of falling into dogmatism by not
considering possible non-static objects as mathematical genuine entities. As
the autor says, he will use Husserl’s own method against him.
3.2 The heterogeneous mathematical universe
At the end of the fourth chapter of Brouwer meets Husserl (BmH, pp. 51-52) van
Atten advances an old but striking proposal: the heterogeneous mathematical
universe. What this means and how it is defensible is the task of this sec-
tion. According to van Atten, both Brouwer and Husserl had a conception of
the mathematical universe as homogeneous, but in relevant diferent ways. By
‘homogeneous’ the author wants to emphasize the temporal aspect of the math-
ematical universe. A homogeneous mathematical universe in this context can
be seen as an ontological domain whose objects are all of the same fundamental
temporal kind. They share some essential temporal feature that groups them as
belonging to that domain. In the Husserlian case, the temporal property shared
by the objects of the mathematical universe is the omnitemporality, and in the
Brouwerian case is the intratemporality. Van Atten’s purpose is to show that
a (kind of) Brouwerian conception of the mathematical universe is defensible
from the point of view of Husserlian phenomenology. That is done by separat-
ing Husserl’s personal view of the mathematical universe (which contradicts
Brouwer’s conception directly) from what can be proved from the standpoint
of phenomenolgy about the mathematical universe (which according to van
Atten can accomodate the Brouwerian universe).
Husserl holds that all mathematical objects are omnitemporal, i.e., they are
static and exist at every moment in time. (EJ, section 64c.) An object is static
exactly if at no moment are parts added to it, or removed from it (BmH, p 16).
So, for Husserl, mathematical objects are temporal objects exisiting in every
moment of time and always the same. It becomes clear that, although Husserl
repudiates the classical ‘natural attitude’ that characterizes (mathematical) re-
alism, his conception of the mathematical universe is, in an important way,
classical. It is classical insofar as for him mathematical objects can be con-
sidered finished objects that do not grow in time. This immutability of the
mathematical objects is the feature that makes the Husserlian mathematical
universe homogeneous.
However, it is precisely the opposite feature that makes the Brouwerian
universe also homogeneous. For Brouwer, all mathematical objects have a
beginning in time. Some of them have an ending, are bounded2, the finite
ones, and others are open-ended or unbounded, the infinite ones. For him, the
infinite totalities are in a process of constant growth in time since the moment
of their beginning. Such view of the infinite totalities implies a conception of
them as potential, as not finished. This kind of mathematical objects obviously
have an essential relation to time, they are temporal objects but not by the way
of omnitemporality, like in Husserl’s view. They are intratemporal objects, i.e.,
2For the definitions of ‘bounded’ and ‘unbounded’ objects see BmH, p. 16.
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they do not exist in every moment of time, and they are dynamic, i.e., they have
parts added (but not removed) at some moment of time. So, for Brouwer, “all
mathematical objects are intratemporal, and some of them are dynamic and
unbounded” (BmH, p. 52). Choice sequences are paradigmatic intratemporal,
dynamic and unbounded objects.
The proposal of an heterogeneous universe advanced by van Atten (BmH,
p. 51) is the following:
HU: Some mathematical objects are omnitemporal, some are not.
Both Husserl and Brouwer would dissent from this claim by obvious reasons.
However, the purpose of van Atten is to prove that the proposal of the hetero-
geneous universe “can be fitted into Husserl’s general philosophy” (BmH, p.
52). In order to do so, Van Atten has to show that the following two claims are
true:
1. Omnitemporality of mathematical objects is not a necessary consequence
of phenomenology as a philosophical method;
2. Phenomenology does not obstruct an intratemporal (at least partially)
account of the mathematical universe.
3.3 Phenomenology and revisionism in philosophy
of mathematics
In the beginning of chapter 5 of Brouwer meets Husserl, Van Atten introduces
the term ‘revisionism’ (in mathematics), which he defines as “the term that
applies to any philosophical standpoint which reserves the potential right to
sanction or modify pure mathematical practice” (BmH, p. 52).3 By ‘pure math-
ematical practice’ van Atten doesn’t mean everyday mathematical practice but
the practice of the specialist mathematician that works in the foundations of
mathematics; by ‘pure’ he is referring to the mathematician that seeks to give to
mathematics the rigth foundations, to justify it in solid and indubitable grounds.
A distinction between weak and strong revisionsm is made by the author.
Weak revisionism “potentialy sanctions [or limits] a subset of this [mathemat-
ical] practice” and strong revisionism “potentialy not only limits but extends
it in different directions.” (BmH, p. 53) Weak revisionism does not extend the
actual pure mathematical practice, it just attempts to justify the alresdy existent
body of theories as being correct. But it can limits it in the sense that possible
some parts of the existent body of theories may be dropped. Strong revisionism
however, by reserving the rigth to limit or extend certain mathematical prac-
tices, implies that “certain combinations of limitation and extension may lead
to a mathematics that is no longer compatible with the unrevised one.” (Ibidem;
our underline.) It may lead, no that it necessarily leads, because it is a question
of ‘reserving rights’, as the author says. Examples of non-revisionism, weak
revisionism and strong revisionism are respectively, Wittgenstein’s, Hilbert’s
and Brouwer’s philosophies of mathematics (BmH, pp. 53-54).
3This definition of ‘revisionism’ is borrowed from Crispin Wright, Wittgenstein on the Foundations
of Mathematics, Duckworth, London, 1980, p. 117.
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According to van Atten, Husserl’s view is a defense of a weak revision-
ism. The revisionism described by Husserl is not concerned with the content of
mathematics but with its epistemological methodology. It is not concerned with
what mathematical principles and fundamental concepts are the right ones but
more with the task of ensuring that we achieve a clear insigth into the meaning of
actual mathematical concepts and principles, establishing in this way that math-
ematics is not just a useful tool, a technique, but genuine theoretical knowledge.
According to van Atten, Husserl’s view in Logical Investigations, Prolegomena to
Pure Logic (section 71) is that phenomenological philosophy should provide the
foundation and insight for actual or classical mathematics (BmH, p. 55).
This view is the view defended by the so called ‘early’ Husserl. However,
says van Atten, the ‘late’ Husserl doesn’t change essentialy his view on this
matter. In Ideas III4, the stress is once more on methodology, like in Logical
Investigations, Prolegomena to Pure Logic. But this time, says van Atten, a new
and essential idea was introduced in Husserl’s treatment of this matter, namely,
that of transcendental phenomenology as providing the universal ontology (BmH,
p. 55).
This claim is assured by the (phenomenological) ‘method of clarification’ of
concepts (Ideas III, sections 18-20) that, according to van Atten, aims at transcen-
dental constitution of ontological entities (BmH, pp. 58 et seqs.). According to
the author, this novelty means that for Husserl “transcendental phenomenol-
ogy forms a (particular) unity with the ontologies of the particular sciences”
(BmH, p. 54). This interpretation of trancendental phenomenology is based,
among others, on the following passage of Idées III:
Everything that the sciences of the onta, the rational and empiri-
cal sciences, offer us (in the enlarged sense they can all be called
‘ontologies’, insofar as it becomes apparent that they are concerned
with unities of the ‘constitution’), resolves itself into something phe-
nomenological (...). (Ideas III, section 14, pp. 66-67.)5
This new idea on the relation of phenomenology and ontology makes all the
difference when we come to relate what is Husserl’s own view and what can be
stated from the point of view of phenomenology as philosophical method. This
is the one of the cornerstones of van Atten’s discussion on the relations between
choice sequences and the phenomenological consequences on mathematical
ontology. According to van Atten, the concept of clarification used by the ‘late’
Husserl has a stronger meaning that the idea of getting insight on mathematics
defended by the ‘early’ Husserl. This is so because the concept of clarification of
meaning “is a retrogressive inquiry back to sense-conferring living intention”
(BmH, p. 58), in other words, it is a genetic analysis on the meaning of concepts
back to the act (of consciousness) that conferred the meaning of the concept in
4Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philoso-
phy, Third Book: Phenomenology and the Foundations of Science, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1980;
translated by Ted E. Klein and William E. Pohl. Referred to as ‘Ideas III’.
5In the original: Alles, was uns die Wissenschaften von den Onta, die rationalen und empirischen
Wissenschaften (im erweiterten Sinn Können sie alle “Ontologien” heißen, sofern es sich zeigt, daß
sie auf Einheiten der “Konstitution” gehen) darbieten, “löst sich in Phänomenologisches auf (...)”.
Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Drittes
Buch, Die Phänomenologie und die Fundamente der Wissenschaften. Ed. M. Biemel, Husserliana Band
V, Kluwer Academic Publishers Netherlands, 1997.
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question, his true living meaning. This is nothing more than a transcendental
constitution of the sense of that concept.
These considerations make clear that phenomenology relates to mathemat-
ical ontology in the following manner: the mathematical entities get their on-
tological sense from intentional or transcendental constitution (BmH, p. 56),
and the task of phenomenological philosophy is, with regard to mathematics,
to transform it from a merely technique to genuine (i.e., insightful) knowledge
by clarification of its concepts. Or as Husserl himself says:
The point is to lead the sciences back to their origin, which demands
insight and rigorous validity, and to transform them into systems
of cognition based on insight by work that clarifies, makes distinct,
and grounds ultimately, and to trace the concepts and statements
back to conceptual essences, themselves apprehensible in Intuition,
and the objective data themselves, to which they give appropriate
expression insofar as they are actually true. (Ideas III, section 18, p.
83.)6
Husserl’s views on philosophy of mathematics fit into a weak revisionism
because his attempt is not to modify the mathematical practice (of the time) but
just to make the mathematical concepts and principles more clear, to make their
sense obvious and epistemically rigorous. His purpose was not to defend that
some parts of mathematics were incorrect or meaningless (but he keeps open the
possibility that upon phenomenological analysis some parts of existing practice
cannot be upheld); this was the purpose of Brouwer, who says, for example, that
the law of excluded middle is not generally valid; this comes into conflict with
classical mathematics. Van Atten wants to show that, on phenomenological
grounds, there is no reason to pressupose that the method of clarification only
takes the form of an epistemological inquiry into the concepts and method of
mathematics without more dramatic consequences besides making the actual
mathematical concepts, principles and practice more intuitive. For van Atten,
the method of clarification has deep consequences with respect to mathematical
ontology. With the phenomenological clarification of the meaning of concepts
“comes the possibility of rejecting supposed objects” as genuine mathematical
objects. (BmH, p. 58)
3.4 The strong revisionism implied by transcenden-
tal phenomenology
In the previous section we saw how Husserl’s personal view on the foundations
of mathematics can be said to suport a weak revisionism, as defined by van
Atten. We discussed how van Atten’s claims that Husserl’s mature conception
of meaning clarification of the scientific concepts differs essentially from his
6In the original: Es gilt, die Wissenschaften auf ihren Einsicht und strenge Geltung verlangen-
den Ursprung zurückzuführen und sie in Systeme einsichtier Erkenntnis zu verwandeln durch
klärende, verdeutlichende, letzt-begründende Arbeit, die Begriffe und Sätze auf in der Intuition
faßbare begriﬄiche Wesen selbst und die sachlichen Gegebenheiten selbst zurückzuführen, denen
sie angemessenen Ausdruck geben, soweit sie wirklich wahr sind. Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu einer
reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Drittes Buch, Die Phänomenologie und die
Fundamente der Wissenschaften, pp. 96-97.
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first conception of that notion and that, for the author, that difference is not
innocuous with respect to the ontology of mathematics. Now we will present
van Atten’s arguments that attempt to show how this difference gives rise
to a strong revisionism in the phenomenological account of the mathematical
universe.
In order to prove that Husserl’s phenomenology implies a strong revision-
ism, van Atten has to argue in favor of four crucial claims:
1. Existence is the objective correlate of transcendental constitution;
2. for formal (or purely categorial) objects, transcendental possibility implies
existence;
3. in purely formal sciences, the capacity for clarification is exactly the ca-
pacity for transcendental constitution;
4. the objects figuring in actual mathematical practice need not exhaust the
totality of objects that are possible according to essence. (BmH, p. 59)
The first claim is argued for in p. 57, where the author gathers some textual
evidence in Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations, section 267. The second claim gets
his source of validity essencially from Experience and Judgement, section 96c.8
These two claims are in an intimate relation with each other: for formal or
categorial objects, transcendental possibility is synonimous of transcendental
constitution, and once that transcendental constitution has existence as corre-
late, this warrants that transcendental possibility implies existence. This means
that for categorial objects, existence comes from the mere possibility of consti-
tution.
But as it became clear in the previous section, clarification aims at consti-
tution of the meaning of concepts that are already figuring in actual practice
and it does not exclude the possibility of dismissing concepts figuring in actual
practice and of accepting new ones. It follows that the objects figuring in our ac-
tual practice can be excluded as illegitimate and that new ones can be included
in that practice as consistent possibilities for which there is phenomenological
evidence (BmH, p. 64). The first conclusion comes from the fact that, if by
clarification of a concept present in the actual practice we cannot achieve a
satisfactory account of its constitution, then we cannot say whether it exists or
not. The second one comes from the fact that if clarification of the meaning of
a concept not pertaining to the actual practice amounts to a constitution of its
meaning as a possible mathematical concept, then we can introduce it in our
actual mathematical practice as a legitimate object. According to van Atten,
this is so because “the particular feature of mathematical essences is that they
govern a priori possibilities” (BmH, p. 62), possibilities that are independent of
particular sense data. Stating this proposition more clearly, the valid mathe-
matical meanings are those for wich the possibility of fulfilment is not a priori
excluded, for which intensional fulfilment is ideally possible BmH, p. 63).
7Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction To Phenomenology, Martinus Nijhoff,
traslated by Dorion Cairns, 1982 (7th impression). Referred to as ‘CM’.
8We are not quoting the respectives texts here because (1) we will quote and discuss them at
some length in the next chapter and (2) it seems not be necessary to the task of explaining van
Atten’s claims at this point.
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Based on these observations, says van Atten, “the same methods that enable
Husserl to exercise his weak revisionism in fact make a strong revisionism
possible” (BmH, p. 64), since clarification has the power to ‘re-create’ formal
objects that already figure in actual mathematical practice as it has also the
power to ‘create’ formal objects that do not. This conclusion opens the door
to criticize Husserl’s ‘dogmatic’ conception of the mathematical universe as
omnitemporal.
3.5 That omnitemporality does not follows from phe-
nomenology
The constitution of any genuine object must be constitution in time. This means
that to any object “a temporal form belongs to it as the noematic mode of its
mode of givenness” (EJ, section 64c, p. 258). However, this temporal mode of
givenness of mathematical objects in particular does not belong to their essence.
Temporality is not a part of the ‘noematic essence’ of mathematical objecs. This
is so because, for Husserl, mathematical objects do not get their identity (are not
constitued) by temporal determination, i.e., the temporal determination in the
noema (the specific binding to time) is not part of what makes these objects the
mathematical objects they are, because at any time they are given as identically
the same. Therefore they are omnitemporal. (BmH, pp. 70-71)
For van Atten, this last claim of omnitemporality is too strong. He says that
he can accept Husserl’s argument insofar “as it says that mathematical objects
are temporal, as opposed to atemporal.” (BmH, p. 71.) But it cannot accept it as
a cogent argument for omnitemporality, since omnitemporality would forbid
choice sequences (non-lawlike objects), whose unfinished character requires a
temporal determination for their individuation. For this reason, van Atten has
to show that Husserl’s claim is wrong, but also preserve the validity of phe-
nomenology as the correct method to settle philosophical questions. The form
of doing this is obvious: to argue that Husserl’s own methodology suggests a
way to criticise the omnitemporality claim. (BmH, p. 71.)
For Husserl, the omnitemporality of mathematical objects is a matter of
essence, i.e., it is part of the essence of the categorial region ‘mathematical
object’ that temporality does not influence their identity: mathematical objects
are always the same irrespectively of time. But how did Husserl disclose such
an essence? According to phenomenology, there is just one method to disclose
essences: eidetic variation. Eidetic variation consists in (when looking to a
certain region of objects) searching for the property(ies) that gather them, i.e.,
the property(ies) that all members of the region have in common, imagining all
the possible variations of the objects belonging to that region. The purpose of
these variations is to find the invariant.
While what differentiates the variants remain indifferent to us, this
form stands out in the practice of voluntary variation, and as an
absolutely identical content, an invariable what, according to which
all variables coincide: a general essence. EJ, section 87a, p. 341.)9
9In the original: Sie hebt sich in der Übung willkürlicher Variation, und während uns das
Differierende der Varianten gleichgültig ist, als ein absolut identischer Gehalt, ein invariables Was
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It is by reflection on all the eidetic possibilities of a certain kind of object
that we disclose the essence that groups them in that kind. However, says van
Atten, Husserl didn’t follow his own method. For he left out of the eidetic
variation a purported mathematical object: choice sequences. An object whose
(intra)temporal character is essential to its identity, i.e., is a part of its essence.
This position is explicitly made in the following passage:
What I want to suggest is that Husserl’s eidetic variations were one-
sided, caused by an ontological prejudice that mathematical objects
must be finished objects. Husserl neither then nor later considered
choice sequences. His eidetic variations are done (or taken for
granted) only on finished objects (...).(BmH, p. 71)
For van Atten, Husserl’s variations only included classical objects, and
therefore the essence arrived at is not necessarily that of the mathematical region
in general, but just that of a subregion of the total mathematical region: that of
finished mathematical objects. The same argument is applicable to the temporal
homogeneity or heterogeneity: Husserl doesn’t arrive to an heterogeneous
conception of the mathematical universe because he was just looking for the
homogeneous classical one.
For van Atten, this criticism of Husserl’s conception of the mathemati-
cal universe is an inequivocal motive to suppose that the mathematical uni-
verse is heterogeneous and, consequently, to make plausible that there exists
some mathematical objects that are intratemporal and dynamic, viz. choice
sequences. But this criticism provides only the motive to suppose that the math-
ematical universe is heterogeneous; it does not provides the confirmation of that.
The confirmation that mathematical universe is heterogeneous can only be pro-
vided by proving that some dynamic intratemporal object in fact exists. And to
prove that a dynamic intratemporal object exists in the realm of mathematical
objects is equivalent to perform its trancendental constitution. This is the task
of van Atten at the 6th chapter of his book. We will now present it.
3.6 Phenomenological constitution of choice sequen-
ces as mathematical objects
With respect to the task of showing that phenomenology can establish choice
sequences as genuine mathematical objects, it was argued above how phe-
nomenology is capable of ontological judgments with regard to pure mathe-
matics. Generally, complete justification for asserting the existence of a sup-
posed object consists in giving a strict constituition analysis for that object, and
what is specific to the case of pure mathematics is that the laws governing strict
constitution of its objects are precisely the laws of categorial formation: for for-
mal objects, transcendental possibility and existence are equivalent. What has to be
shown by the author is that choice sequences can be strictly constitued as for-
mal, or categorical, objects. He continues, explaining that this will be attempted
in two steps: (step 1) he has to show that choice sequences can be constitued as
heraus, nach dem hin sich alle Varianten decken: ein allgemeines Wessen. Edmund Husserl,
Erfahrung und Urteil, Untersuchungen zur Genealogie der logik, p. 411; Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg
1985, revised and Edited by Ludwig Landgrebe.
59
objects at all and (step 2) that this is constitution of purely categorical objects.
(BmH, p. 85.)
3.6.1 Choice sequences as objects
A choice sequence is begun at a particular moment in time, and then grows as
we choose further numbers. This process is generally open-ended and may be
continued forever. For van Atten, there is a clear, implicit understanding in this
way of speech that a choice sequence is an object of some sort. In fact, he says,
the way we usually speak about choice sequences manifests an implicit thesis:
that our discourse is about some sort of objects. So, it is his aim to make this
thesis explicit, i.e., to disclose that in virtue of what we have such a discourse
that implicitly assumes that a series of choices forms a unity, in virtue of what
such a discourse constitutes an object. (BmH, p. 89.)
In general, to constitute an object by a descriptive analysis we have to take
two steps: first, we have to identify the activity in which the putative object is
given in (the passive synthesis of) consciousness; then, we have to identify the
invariant by an objectifying act of (the active synthesis of) consciousness, i.e., we
have to carry an act that thematizes the invariant. (EJ, section 13, p. 72.) The first
step is the pre-constitution of the object and the second step is the constitution
itself. An example is the constitution of the series of natural numbers: first
we identify the activity by which they are given in counsciensness, the activity
of counting (one, two, three, four, etc.), then we carry out an objectifying act
over the invariant (the sequence 〈1, 2, 3, 4, ...〉) by identifying it as a unity (N)
through the several differents acts in which it is thematized. For the constitution
of choice sequences we also have to carry these two steps. First we have to
identify the activity in virtue of which choice sequences are given in passive
consciousness; then we have to identify the invariant, implicitly established in
the self-giveness of choice sequences.
Van Atten says that the activity that founds the (self-)giveness of choice
sequences is that of choosing. (BmH, p. 89.) Choice sequences are given to us, or
come to appear in our counsciensness, by the activity of choosing elements of
N. In this activity choice sequences are pre-constitued, meaning that after this
activity one only needs to carry out an objectifying act to constitute them as
objects at all. (Ibidem.) For van Atten, the fact that choice sequences change over
time not only does not rule out they are invariant over time in some respect,
but actually pressupose such an invariance. And this is so because only some
substrate that remains identical can change (or remain the same) over time. In
the case of choice sequences, what is this substrate, this invariant?
Before answering this question, van Atten advances two alternatives; both
regarding by him as not working. The first alternative supposes that the con-
cept of choice sequence is the invariant. Against this hypothesis he argues that
“the invariant is not any concept, however specific, that a sequence would fall
under.” (Ibidem.) For, a concept and an object falling under that concept are
two different things. In the case of choice sequences, says van Atten, this dis-
tinction between concept and object (falling under it) becomes clear when we
consider the concept of a choice sequence and the sequence itself: a sequence
consists of linearly ordered parts, while a concept governing it does not. Also,
he continues, a non-lawlike sequence unfolds in time, a concept does not (i.e., a
concept does not change through time). The second alternative supposes that
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the initial segment is the invariant. Indeed, once values are chosen for an initial
segment they cannot be changed later on. But again, he says that “[initial]
segments cannot be the invariant that are the evidence for choice sequences
as genuine objects.” (BmH, p. 90.) And this is so because different choice
sequences may have the same initial segment. What differentiates choice se-
quences among them are their intensional properties, and since initial segments
are extensional properties of choice sequences, they cannot be the invariant for
choice sequences. We can think of two lawless sequences, one started at t0 and
other at t1, with the same initial segment. This is not sufficient to settle the
two as being the same sequence, for it may happen that they come to differ at
some stage of growth. What makes choice sequences be different (or the same)
is their intensional properties, and (in the example above) such a difference
need not consist in more than having been begun at different moments of time
(t0 , t1).
We have seen that, for van Atten, neither concepts nor initial segments are
the invariants for choice sequences. But, he says, the reason why the second
alternative does not work provides the clue for the right invariant for choice
sequences. Van Atten argues that “the ‘and so on’ that indicates continued
choices is recognized by Husserl as a categorical form (Urteilsform)” (BmH, p.
90) in the following quote of Experience et Jugement:
There appears here the new form of determination: “and so on”, a
basic form in the sphere of judgement. The “and do on” enters into
the forms of judgement or it does not, depending on how far the
thematic interest in S [the object of which our experience is to be
explicated] extends; therefore, it produces differences in the forms
of judgements themselves. (EJ, section 51b, p. 218.)10
After announcing Husserl’s point of view on the notion of ‘and so on’ with
respect to judgments, and based on it, van Atten presents another argument
for the incorrectness of regarding initial segments as the invariant for choice
sequences and a suggestion to determine the invariant for choice sequences:
In considering initial segments as the identity-constituting invari-
ant, precisely this horizon ‘and so on’ is not thematized, is left out of
our interest. In doing so, we miss the fact that choice sequences are
unfinished objects. I will now work out the suggestion that what
remains invariant is the character of the sequence as a developing
sequence, a development that started at a particular point in time.
(BmH, p. 90.)
To carry out this task, van Atten begins by presenting three (sort of) defi-
nitions of the notion of and so on: ‘[a] mental process with several members,
progressing in an orderly manner [that] carries with it such an open horizon’
(Husserl); ‘the indefinite repetition of the same thing or operation [that] may be
defined in a complex way’ (Brouwer); ‘the concept of successive applications
of an operation’ (Wittgenstein). To apply this idea to choice sequences, he says,
10In the original: Es tritt hier die neue Bestimmungsform des “und so weiter” auf, eine Grund-
form in der Urtelssphäre. Das “Undsoweiter” geht in die Urteilsgestalten ein oder nicht, je nach-
dem, wie weit das thematische Interesse an S reicht; es schafft also Differenzen in dem Urteilsformen
selbst. Edmund Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil, Untersuchungen zur Genealogie der logik, p. 259.
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we have to consider the free choice of a number as an operation. In fact, Brouwer’s
first act of intuitionism introduces the notion of and so on as a primitive mental
operation (a categorical form in Husserl’s terms), the sucessive iteration of a
rule defined in a complex manner or not. (BmH, p. 91.)
At this point, van Atten recalls the thesis presented above that the process
of choosing initiates and extends the same object, i.e., it is the same, identical
object that is extended at every stage of growth. And this implies that some
substrate must remain the same during the process of growth. In other words,
the idea of an unchangeable substrate is necessary to the consistency of the idea
of change or growth of an object. (Ibidem.)
Another thesis presented by the author is that there is a distinction between
the process of generating a choice sequence and the choice sequence itself:
There is the the identity of the process, and the identity of the
sequence. These are not the same. The process may have all kinds
of characteristics that the sequence does not share. (BmH, p. 91.)
For example, the process consists of acts (of choice) and the sequence does
not. He says that a notable consequence of this difference is that the time
span between sucessive acts of choice does not show up in the sequence, i.e.,
it plays no representing role beyond the mere ordering. But there are more
differences between the process and the sequence. The process may involve
revising intensional properties (e.g., abandoning a provisional restriction) that
need not leave a trace in the sequence itself. (Ibidem.)
The identity of the sequence and the identity of the process are different
things. But, says van Atten, there is a close relation between the two: the iden-
tity of the sequence is founded on the identity of the process. In other words,
there is no identity of the sequence without the identity of the process. And
this is why both sequence and process are individuated by the same moment
of beginning: the sequence only comes into being at the moment the process
of growth starts. This is also the reason why, for van Atten, the individuation
of open-ended choice sequences is determined by the particular moment the
process initiates. With respect to lawless sequences, “its particular moment
of occurence cannot be abstracted from, because that might lead to identifica-
tion of different non-lawlike sequences that share their initial segments so far.”
(BmH, p. 92.)
If the sequence is founded on the process, how do we go from the process
to the sequence itself? The answer is: an act of abstraction from process to
sequence. Some aspects of the process, says van Atten, are abstracted from in
all cases. The temporal intervals between sucessive choices are an example of
what can be abstracted from. But what can be abstracted from varies with the
kinds of sequence we have: the temporal aspects of lawlike sequences (given by
lawlike processes) can be abstracted from without loss of the sense of identity
of the sequences; in the case of lawless sequences, however, we have seen that
some temporal aspects (as the moment of beginning) cannot be abstracted from.
(Ibidem)
Now that we have seen the explication of the main aspects about the con-
stitution of choice sequences as individual objects we will present it in a more
orderly manner, by stages, and then explain them in detail:
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1. Keeping in retention (in memory), or recollectiing, the process as it has
developed till now.
2. Re-presentation of the process.
3. Choice of the next element.
4. Sinking back into retention of the sequence, and return to stage 1.
(founded on these four acts, and occurring between going back from
4 to 1, there is:)
5. Apprehension of the identity of the process through its categorical form
of ongoing process.
At the first stage we consider the process as been given now for the first
time, i.e., we consider the sucessive choices that we have obtained until now.
And the first step then is to locate that process in memory: going back to the
first moment the process has been presented to us and has begun to generate
the sequence. In the case we have chosen the previous number only a moment
ago, this locating does not involve active recollecting because the process is still
held in memory and has not sunk back in the past yet. (BmH, p. 92.)
The second stage of constitution consists in thematize (re-present) the pro-
cess not as having been extendable once, but as being extendable now. This
means that we have to make actual, or present, the temporal horizon that the
process had at the moment we stopped it by keeping the process in memory
(stage 1). This is so because if we remember the process as open-ended after the
most recent choice, is has to be given as open-ended again now. In other words,
we have to make actual the (anticipatory or protentive) intentions associated
to the process. (Such intentions may be ‘empty’ in the sense of not prescribing
any specific element(s); this is different for lawlike sequences.) (Ibidem)
The third stage is precisely the fulfillment of the intentions made actual in the
previous stage: the choice of the next element. If this next element satisfies all
the (possible) restrictions imposed to the process, the choice fulfils the previous
intention (made actual at stage 1) and gives rise to a new intention directed at
an immediately new element. This is also the stage where restrictions can be
lifted, revised or added. (BmH, pp. 92-93.)
The fourth and fifth stages are retrospective ones. The fourth stage is the
stage where we return to stage 1 and the sequence obtained till now sinks back
into retention giving place to a new cycle, and to new intentions to be fulfilled
(i.e., to new choices to be made). The last stage (founded on the four previous
acts) is the stage where we apprehend the identity of the process going back
from stage 4 to stage 1. This identity functions as the foundation for the identity
of the choice sequence, i.e., where we go from the identity of the process to the
identity of the sequence by an act of abstraction from the underlying process.
(BmH, p. 93.)
3.6.2 Choice sequences as mathematical objects
Once performed the constitution of choice sequences as objects in general, van
Atten has to show that they are mathematical objects. He starts by pointing two
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doubts that may threaten the coherence of choice sequences as mathematical
objects, from the traditional (and husserlian) point of view. The first is that
choice sequences are unfinished and hence time-dependent objects, they start
at a particular moment in time, and grow from there on. The second doubt
derives from the subject-dependency of choice sequences, as we think about the
real mathematicians and the choice sequences generated by them (the threat of
psychologism). (BmH, pp. 95-96.)
Against these two doubts, van Atten presents an argument based on Kreisel-
Troelstra τ translation. The translation shows that sentences quantifying over
lawless sequences are equivalent to other sentences that do not, and whose
mathematical nature goes unquestioned (sentences only involving natural num-
bers, constructive functions and inductively defined neighbourhood functions).
And because of that, says van Atten, the sentences that are translated must also
be mathematical ones. For van Atten, translations suffice to show that the
concept of (lawless) choice sequence is mathematically coherent. (BmH, p. 96.)
Using the translation, van Atten argues that the psychological or subjec-
tivist character of choice sequences does not threaten the possibility of their
being mathematical objects: mathematical statements do imply statements that
quantify over choice sequences, for the equivalences that the translation yields
works both ways (from sentences involving choice sequences to sentences not
involving them and from sentences not involving choice sequences from sen-
tences involving them). (Ibidem)
This general argument for the mathematical coherence of the concept of
choice sequence, by itself, does not compel us to acccept that there are objects
falling under that concept, says van Atten. However, he says, in the presence of
the constitution analysis, that would make no sense, for after this constitution
they are given to us as genuine individual objects. In this stage, the acceptance
of the intentional properties of choice sequences as mathematically innocuous
is only dependent on a satisfactory contextualization. This is the task of the
author in subsections 6.3.1-6.3.3 (BmH, pp. 96.101). Van Atten resumes each
subsection in the following way:
1. It is not their reference to time simpliciter that distinguishes choice se-
quences from other mathematical objects (for all mathematical objects
have a relation to time), but the particular way in which they refer to time
(intratemporality).
2. This particular reference to time does not threaten their status as formal
objects.
3. Their subject-dependency (part of which is the freedom of generation)
poses no problems for mathematics. (Ibidem)
The temporality of choice sequences
Van Atten shares with Brouwer and Husserl the idea that all mathematical
objects refer to time. But he does not agree with them when one says that
all mathematical objects are intratemporal (Brouwer) and the other says that
all mathematical objects are omnitemporal (Husserl). For him, there are om-
nitemporal mathematical objects (the finished ones or the unfinished ones but
determined by a law) and intratemporal mathematical objects (the unfinished
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and lawless ones). For Husserl, all mathematical objects are omnitemporal be-
cause, as they exist at all times, what is proven about them (theorems) is proven
once and for all, i.e, is proven for all times, past, present and future. But, says
van Atten, what can be proven about choice sequences is also proven once and
for all:
But choice sequences, instead of being necessarily infinitely tem-
poral in two directions (and thereby omnitemporal), would be so
in just one direction: the future. In that case still what is proven
once, is proven forever. But (...) it was this feature of mathematics
that lead Husserl to say that mathematical objects are static and
omnitemporal. (...) It follows that infinite temporality only in the di-
rection of the future preserves the original motivation for the thesis of
omnitemporality.(BmH, p. 97; our italics.)
In this quote van Atten argues that the same argument used by Husserl
to establish the thesis of omnitemporality for mathematical objects can be
used, mutatis mutandis, to establish his thesis of intratemporality for lawless
sequences. In fact, van Atten is performing his claim that Husserl, in respect to
the particular relation of mathematical objects to time, remains ‘dogmatic’.
Lawlike sequences, although unfinished mathematical objects, are given by
a law that, followed at any other point in time, would yield the same elements
in the sequence; so we have not to force the intratemporality thesis upon them,
i.e., they can be considered omnitemporal objects without loss of their charac-
teristic intensional features; that is, lawlike sequences, albeit being essentially
intratemporal objects, can in practice be tretaed as omnitemporal ones. For van
Atten, this fact proves that they are in fact intratemporal mathematical objects.
Therefore, the specific relation of choice sequences to time is not an obstruction
for the thesis that they are mathematical objects.
Both lawlike and lawless sequences are intratemporal objects, but Husserl
only admits lawlike sequences as mathematical objects because, in the specific
case of lawlike sequences, intratemporality coincides with omnitemporality.
So they can (wrongly, but harmless for mathematical purposes) be seen as
omnitemporal objects. And this is exactly what Husserl does, because for
him all mathematical objects are omnitemporal. If Husserl had formulated the
thesis of intratemporality (like Brouwer did) he would have realized that some
mathematical objects might be intratemporal, and then he would not be able to
force the omnitemporality thesis on phenomenological grounds.
The formal character of choice sequences
For (the late) Husserl, the non-formal objects are those that have in their con-
stitution sensuous elements, i.e., those whose constitution lies upon physical
sensations. For example, the constitution of a (particular) tree depends on sen-
sations such as color, shape, extension, etc. But, as mathematical objects, these
kind of objects also refer to time: their constitution is contitution in time. So,
says van Atten, the relation to time does not excludes the formal character of
an object, precisely because:
(...) The constitution of any identical object presupposes the absolute
flow of time. The reference to time does not make choice sequences
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from otherwise pure into mixed [sensations-dependent] categorical
objects. (BmH, p. 98.)
What determines the categorical or non-categorical features of an object is
this dependency-relation to sense data, not the relation to time. Because the
temporal aspects of choice sequences are not sensuous, the particular way they
refer to time does not rule out that they are formal or categorical objects. To
make this claim stronger, van Atten refers to a quote of Husserl saying that not
all irreal (=ideal) objects are free of sensuous elements (e.g., the geometrical
objects have sensuous components as shape, extension, etc.), only the formal-
mathematical ones.11 (Ibidem)
The subject-dependency of choice sequences
A lawless sequence is bound to the particular subject generating it in a very
specific way: it is essential to a lawless sequence to have a bearer or owner, and
such a sequence cannot be handed over from one subject to the other. On the
other hand, lawlike sequences can be reproduced or ‘cloned’ from one bearer
to the other. But the fact that particular lawless sequences are unshareable, says
van Atten, does not lead to unshareable truths, i.e., does not imply that true
sentences about them are also unshareable among different subjects. (BmH, p.
98.)
If the implication was the case, the subject-dependency of choice sequences
would consist in a major obstruction to admit them as mathematical objects.
The following quote presents the way how van Atten rules out this putative
obstruction:
A non-lawlike sequence develops in stages, and at any stage the
only information the subject has consists of an initial segment and,
possibly, a number of intensional properties such as self-imposed re-
strictions on future choices. Initial segments and sets of restrictions
are finite, therefore all information can be shared. All the subject
knows about a particular sequence is intersubjectively accesssible.
And (...) it is equally important that the categorical form ‘choice
sequence’ can be shared between different subjects.12 (BmH, pp.
98-99.)
Albeit choice sequences are generated by particular subjects, they are given
to us in the basis of some information: initial segments and possible restric-
tions. Both kind of information are of a finite character, and so are shareable by
the subjects who generates them. Therefore, the truths about them have to be
shareable because the information on which these truths are founded are share-
able too. Besides this, there is the fact that they are categorical objects, therefore
making them objects of any possible consciousness in which they can be sized
upon in a perfectly adequate way. This is possible because choice sequences are
not absolute arbitrary creations of the mind; they are constructions according
to the laws of categorical formation. And those laws are not arbitrary ones nor
they are unshareable among subjects.
11Husserl argues this in Experience and Judgement, sections 64-65.
12Our italics.
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Two further objections may arise against the subjective nature of choice
sequences. First, based on the fact that initial segments (and possible resctric-
tions) are sufficient to determine the truths about choice sequnces and that we
never have to construct an individual choice sequence in its entirety (in a math-
ematical proof), “what do we need choice sequences for, instead of just all finite
sequences?” (BmH, p. 99.) Second, “we may wonder whether the freedom
in generating choice sequences is really possible and, if so, whether this does
not make everything arbitrary; we may be misguided, we may think that “they
seem to involve free choice, but, metaphysically, they are really lawlike as well.
(Ibidem)
To the first objection, van Atten advances a pragmatic argument. He says
that the use of just initial segments will rule out the possibility of constructing
the intuitive continuum (we will have instead a ‘reduced’ continuum), the mo-
tivation and one of the most sucessful applications of choice sequences. The
categorical form of choice sequences (‘and so on’) is the key element to capture
the intuitive continuum, to capture the continuum as potential. So, the categor-
ical character of choice sequences makes the substitution of lawless sequences
by finite sequences inadequate. Against the second objection, van Atten says
that it pressupposes a world of ‘things in themselves’ (or noumena, in Kan-
tian terminology). Such a notion as a noumenon is ruled out by Husserl’s
transcendental idealism where he performs the phenomenological reduction (or
pioχη).13 Through the phenomenological reduction, the dichotomy between
phenomenon and noumenon is rejected out and replaced by the correlation
object/consciousness-of-the-object (noema/noesis). And because of this corre-
lation, within a phenomenological framework, sequences that for all we can
know are lawless but are really lawlike, are ruled out. (BmH, pp. 99-100.)
3.7 A phenomenological argument for WC-N
After concluding the phenomenological constitution of choice sequences as
mathematical objects, van Atten applies the phenomenological analysis to jus-
tify WC-N (BmH, pp. 103-110.). Van Atten’s strategy to justify WC-N is the fol-
lowing one: instead of given a direct justification for WC-N, he will try to justify
a slight modified version of WC-N, namely GWC-N (‘G’ for graph-extensional),
that works as well as WC-N for choice sequences and its applications (in real
analysis) but does not pose the same problems as WC-N.
Van Atten says that a special case of WC-N is one where the predicate A
is required to be graph-extensional, i.e., A refers to the choice sequence only
through its values (=the graph of the choice sequence). So, GWC-N is (the same
as) WC-N for a graph-extensional predicate A. The formalization of GWC-N
runs as follows:
GWC-N ∀α∃xAGExt(α, x))⇒ ∀α∃n∃x∀β(β¯n = α¯n→ A(β, x)),
where AGExt(α, x) means that A is graph-extensional.
13For more details on the phenomenological reduction see Husserl’s Ideas Pertaining to a Pure
Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phe-
nomenology, section 32.
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Notice that the predicate A in WC-N is already an extensional predicate,
the only change is the additional clause that this extensionality is given by
a graph. The consequent of GWC-N remains identical to the consequent of
WC-N; therefore, the desired conclusion remains basically the same: given
the graph-extensionality of A, we only need α and β to share the same initial
segment to determine if β has the same property A. But an important difference
between WC-N and GWC-N is that, in WC-N the possible role of intensional
properties is not excluded, while in GWC-N we only accepts properties that
depend on the graph of α and β; therefore, in GWC-N the possible role of
intensional properties is ruled out by definition.
An example makes this distinction clear. Assume that the creating subject
generates choice sequences as individual objects, and can therefore enumerate
the sequences generated so far. Then WC-N does not hold generally for exten-
sional predicates. Suppose we have an operation F that enumerates the choice
sequences. Then we have that ∀α∃n(α = F(n)). Let’s assume that the opera-
tion F is encapsulated by the (extensional, but not graph-extensional) predicate
G(α,n), i.e., G(α,n) := (α = F(n)). We have then ∀α∃nG(α,n). Now, applying
WC-N, it follows that ∀α∃m∃n∀β(βm = αm → G(β,n)). But this means that
the same n will be paired to different choice sequences, which conflicts with
the notion of ‘enumeration’. Therefore, in the presence of an enumeration,
WC-N does not hold generally. This is possible because the predicate G is not
graph-extensional. (BmH, p. 104.)
There is however a feature about the notion of graph-extensionality to be
considered. The notion of extensionality can be formalised as follows: A is an
extensional predicate iff∀n(αn = βn)→ (A(α)↔ A(β)). But it is not clear how to
formalise the correlated notion of graph-extensionality, or whether this is even
possible. (Ibidem) On the other hand and contrary to the notion of extensionality,
a graph-extensional predicate cannot be based on an intensional property. From
this, van Atten says that “one might conjecture that graph-extensionality (...)
has to be taken as primitive.”(Ibidem)
For the intuitionistic reconstruction of analysis, it suffices to have GWC-N
instead of WC-N. The main theorems of intuitionistic analysis, like the con-
tinuity theorem, the unsplitability of the continuum, the uniform continuity
theorem are obtained using GWC-N.
Van Atten has showed the advantages of GWC-N over of WC-N. But still,
GWC-N requires the same kind of justification that is required for WC-N: it has
to be justified within the theory of choice sequences. For van Atten, however,
the task of give a philosophical justification for GWC-N seems easier that doing
the same for WC-N.
Van Atten’s strategy is to take the analysis of the intuitive notion of choice
sequence and extend it by making explicit the application of Husserl’s principle
of the noetic-noematic correlation to GWC-N:
Roughly, this principle states that the structure of the way an object
is given to us (the noema) is parallel to the structure of the acts
in which that object is intended (the noesis). In the case of choice
sequences, this leads to the question: in what ways can the freedom
the subject enjoys in the process of generation be reflected in the
intensional properties of the sequences themselves? That gave the
idea of provisional restrictions, and it also gives rise to the already
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familiar concepts of lawlike and lawless sequences. (BmH, p. 106.)
Looking at a particular description by Brouwer of choice sequences as freely
generated objects where he says that “the freedom to proceed with the choice
sequence can after every choice be arbitrarily restricted” and that “the arbitrary
nature of this restriction, permitted at each new choice as long as the possibility
to proceed is retained, is an essential element of the free becoming of the [choice
sequence], as is the possibility to link to every choice a restriction of the freedom
to make further restrictions of freedom”14 we can see the key concept to be used
by van Atten to justify GWC-N: the concept of a provisional restriction.
There are two kinds of restrictions:
• definitive restrictions, which have the form ‘from now on, restriction R
holds, and it will not be revised anymore’;
• provisional restrictions, which have the form ‘for an unspecified number
of stages, restriction R holds’.
Both kinds of restrictions should be decidable, says van Atten. Otherwise,
“the subject will not be able to conduct its choices in accordance with them.”
(BmH, p. 107.) So, in this framework, we can look at the process of generating
a choice sequence as choosing, at each stage, not only an element n, but also
a (finite) number k of restrictions of different orders, R0, ...,Rk. Van Atten
advances that, given this condition, the subject can make any revision in its
ideas about how to go on generating a choice sequence, but in accordance with
the following clauses:
1. this revision does not go against any definitive intensional properties of
the sequence,
2. this revision admits the existing initial segment, and
3. after the revision, it is still possible to extend any initial segment of the
sequence.
Van Atten’s idea with this distiction and subsequent clauses to it is to ‘force’
the subject (who generates a sequence) to be explicit about lifting or not a
provisional restrcition at each stage, because “it is up to the subject’s own choice
to make an intensional property [or restriction] either provisional or definitive”.
(BmH, p. 108.) In other words, as long as a restriction of a particular sequence is
not definitive, that restriction can be changed at some latter stage; and, unless
a provisional restriction is explicitely lifted, it remains in effect at subsequent
stages. This requirement of explicitness, says van Atten, is a consequence of the
creating subject’s full responsability for the objects in intuitionistic mathematics
and, in particular, for the generation of choice sequences. (Ibidem)
In this circumstance lies the the answer to the following question:
‘If I know that you imposed a provisional restriction at some earlier
stage, what more do I know that I should not have known if you had
14This quotation is from a note related to Brouwer’s manuscripts for the 1927 Berlin lectures.
Troelstra’s ‘On the origin and developement of Brouwer’s concept of choice sequence’, in The L.E.J.
Brouwer Centenary Symposium, pp. 465-486, Amsterdam, 1982 (eds. Troelstra and van Dalen).
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imposed no restriction?’ The extra information that a provisional
restriction gives you consists in the following. If I tell you that I will
not begin by lifting the provisional restriction, then you do know
something about my next choice of a term, namely, that it has to
respect this restriction. Had I imposed no restrictions, then you
would not have known this. (BmH, p. 108.)
In this quote lies the rationale to make explicit the importance of provi-
sional restrictions upon choice sequences. In using provisional restrictions
upon choice sequences, all the information that we must have about them (an
initial segment and possible restrictions) turns out to be essentially of an ex-
tensional character; in fact, turns out to be of a graph-extensionally character.
(For initial segments, the conclusion is trivial.) The extra information that a
provisional restriction alows us to know is that the next element of the sequence
should respect such and such conditions, so the generation of the sequence is
not absolutely arbitrary but has to respect some (finite) conditions, the set of re-
strictions imposed in some stage. However, the provisional character does not
obstruct the freedom of the sequence because it can be lifted at any subsequent
stage of growth of the sequence.
In traditional literature about choice sequences there is a particular type
of choice sequence that can be interpreted as an application of the distinction
between provisional and definitive restrictions: the hesitant sequence. A hesitant
sequence β is a process of generating values β0, β1, β2, ... such that at any stage
we either decide that henceforth we are going to conform to a law in determin-
ing future values, or, if we have not already decided to conform to a law at an
earlier stage, we freely choose a new value of β. The decision whether or not
to conform to a law may stay open indefinitely. Applying the distinction made
above, a hesitant sequence is, from the start, a provisionally lawless sequence
(which the subject at any stage may decide to turn into a definitively lawlike
sequence).
Let’s see now how, in van Atten terms, from the recognition of the two
types of restrictions, definitive and provisional, may be derived an argument for
GWC-N. Basically, the argument runs as follows. Any intensional property that
might be useful in constructing a choice sequence should already be included
in the (first order) restrictions, as only these have a direct relation to the graph
of the sequence. But on a hesitant sequence, the restrictions are precisely the
provisional ones. The provisional restrictions are open to revision, i.e., they
can be lifted at any stage of generation of the sequence; so, the intensional
properties that a sequence has at any stage do not necessarily characterise that
sequence also at all later stages. The only non-provisional information left is the
initial segment of the sequence. Therefore, the only information we have and
need to determine possible properties of the sequence, in particular whether it
coincides with a second sequence, is the initial segment. This is exactly what
GWC-N asserts.
Roughly speaking, GWC-N asserts that all the information we need to
determine possible properties of a (lawless) sequence is of a graph-extensional
character. Graph-extensional information are limited to initial segments. All
information we have acess to determine possible properties of a sequence are
(1) initial segments and (2) first order restrictions; and these restrictions may be
definitive or provisional ones. First order restrictions are the only intensional
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information we need to determine possible properties of sequences. Hesitant
sequences are those sequences that only allow provisional restrictions. So, for
hesitant sequences, we only need initial segments and provisional restrictions
to determine all of its possible properties. If we assume that lawless sequences
are precisely the hesitant sequences for which it is left open-ended the decision
whether or not to conform it to a restriction, then provisional restrictions are the
only intensional information we need to determine possible properties of the
sequences. So far we have realized that all information we have to determine
future properties of (provisionalized) lawless sequences are initial segments
and provisional restrictions. But – and this is the key step in this argument–
provisional restrictions cannot be used to determine future properties of choice
seaquences because (by definition) they can be lifted at any stage of growth of
the sequence; what makes them (according to van Atten’s analysis) inessential,
and hence dispensable, to determine the properties of choice sequences. So, the
only reliable information that can be used to determine the properties of choice
sequences are their initial segments, graph-extensional information.
One last remark is done by van Atten. A condition for this argument to
work is that the universe of choice sequences contains, for each element α, the
‘provisionalised’ version of α, say α′. α′ is a provisionalised version of α iff
they have the same initial segment and are subject to the same restrictions, but
in the case of α′ all of these restrictions are provisional. Van Atten says that in
the universe of all choice sequences, this requirement is met by definition. This
means that in the universe of all choice sequences the provisionalised version of
any sequence exists by definition; otherwise, the universe of all choice sequences
would not be the universe of all choice sequences (contradiction).
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Chapter 4
Critical discussion of the
phenomenological account of
choice sequences
The previous chapter was devoted to present in some detail van Atten’s phe-
nomenological account of the ontological problem of accepting choice se-
quences as legitimate mathematical objects. In fact, this account of choice
sequences can be seen as the most complete philosophical analysis about this
subject until now. Van Atten’s phenomenology of choice sequences is successful
where Brouwer’s philosophy is not: it presents a plausible justification for the
introduction of choice sequences as mathematical objects, viz. the phenomeno-
logical constitution of choice sequences as mathematical objects; and it presents
a justification for a suitable substitute of WC-N, viz. GWC-N. It is however a
fact that some claims advanced by van Atten are not so evident as they seem.
And it is our task now to make this clear through a critical discussion of his
arguments.
Van Atten’s analysis can be divided into two main moments: a deconstruc-
tive one and a constructive one. The main purppose of van Atten is to show that
a heterogeneous mathematical universe is possible within phenomenological
standards, precisely by showing that choice sequences are legitimate mathe-
matical objects. Hence that some dynamic objects are mathematical objects.
The deconstructive moment aims to show that some of Husserl’s views on
mathematical ontology are stronger than he claims. The constructive moment
aims to show that choice sequences can be phenomenologically constituted as le-
gitimate mathematical objects. The deconstructive moment can be divided into
two main claims: (1.1) Husserl’s phenomenology is able to decide ontological
questions in mathematics and (1.2) Husserl’s phenomenology implies a strong
revisionism in mathematics. The constructive moment can in turn be divided
into three claims: (2.1) choice sequences can be constituted as individual objects
in general; (2.2) choice sequences can be constituted as individual mathematical
objects; (2.3) then, Husserl’s phenomenology implies an intratemporal account
of mathematical objects. We will try now discuss each of these five claims
separately (insofar as is possible to separate them).
The argument for the implied strong revisionism of phenomenology runs
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as follows: for formal objects, transcendental possibility implies existence; in
purely formal sciences, the capacity for clarification is exactly the capacity
for transcendental constitution; so, the objects figuring in actual mathematical
practice need not exhaust the totality of objects that are possible according to
essence, moreover new ones can be introduced by the process of phenomeno-
logical constitution.
The notion of clarification is introduced by Husserl as a necessary task to
perform on the most fundamental concepts of science (Ideas III, chapter IV).
Sometimes the fundamental notions of a particular science, due to a extensive
but uncritical application, become unclear or confused. Their original sense is
no longer taken into account with evidence in the applications, and obscurity
may arise. An example of such obscurity is the discovery of the paradoxes
in the foundations of mathematics in the beginning of the 20th century due
to the wide uncritical application of the concept of set. So, to avoid such
problems within science, it is necessary to make clear the original meanings of
the fundamental concepts; this clarification has as its goal to make explicit the
initial or original sense of concepts. And there is only one way to make their
original sense explicit: making clear the steps that led to the their constitution
as valid intentional objects. In Husserl’s terms: “Clarification must follow
precisely the stages of the constitution of the exemplary object of intuition in
question.” (Ideas III, section 20, p. 88.)
Clarification presupposes constitution, as van Atten argues. In fact, it is
re-constitution since, in analyzing the constitution of a concept or object, its
original sense is restated or re-validated. By doing this, a criticism of what
is authentic and of what is inauthentic to the original sense of the concept in
question is achieved. The authentic is what is essential to the constitution
of its sense, the inauthentic is what is not. (Formal and Transcendental Logic,
Introduction.) And to determine what is authentic in the sense of a concept is
precisely to confer its right sense, i.e., to constitute it.
Claim 1.2 implicitly makes use of the notion of clarification. It expresses the
possibility that mathematical concepts may be revised through phenomenolog-
ical clarification. And claim 2.3 states that the current mathematical concepts
do not exhaust the totality of possible mathematical concepts. This is possible
by an act of clarification of concepts already belonging to actual mathematical
practice. In van Atten’s view, the clarification of actual concepts lead to two
conclusions: (1) that some actual concepts do not have any correspondent ev-
ident sense or any correspondent sense at all, therefore they can be rejected as
mathematically invalid or inauthentic (BmH, pp. 60, 62, 63); and (2) that new
concepts can be introduced into the mathematical practice when, by clarifying
their constitution process, it becomes evident that they are authentic mathe-
matical concepts (BmH, p. 64). To the conjunction of these two statements van
Atten calls strong revisionim. He argues that with strong revisionism comes
the possibility of introducing new mathematical concepts that are no longer
compatible with the current mathematical practice. To do so it is only needed
to show that such concept is mathematically valid, i.e., that it can be constituted
as a mathematical genuine concept.
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4.1 Does intentional constitution implies existence?
What does van Atten means when he states that ontological questions are
decidable by phenomenological standards? To decide an ontological question
for a particular area of science is to determine which objects can be assumed
to exist within the framework of a particular theory describing that area of
knowledge. In mathematical theories, if an object exists, then we are able to
quantify over it, i.e., it has to stand as a bounded variable of a proposition (the
Quinean criterion). In other words, such an objects has to be within a domain
of quantification. It can be argued that what van Atten has in mind is that
by phenomenological considerations it can be determined which domains of
objects we can assume to quantify over. And that to determine which domains
of objects we can quantify over is to perform an intentional constitution of
that domain. This claim is justified by what van Atten calls the principle of
transcendental idealism: in phenomenology, existence is the objective correlate
of constitution. (BmH, pp. 57, 59.) The textual source for asserting this is
Cartesian Meditations, section 26 (quoted below). This principle gives rise to a
slightly different claim when restricted to mathematical (or formal) objects: for
mathematical objects, possibility implies existence. (BmH, pp. 59 and seqs.)
The main textual source where van Atten bases this claim is Experience and
Judgement, section 96c (also quoted below).
The idea that phenomenology is capable of ontological assertions, says van
Atten, is based (among others) in the following quotation from Husserl: “All
entities get their ontological sense from intentional constitution.”1 This quota-
tion is a version of the principle of transcendental idealism and it means that
all entities acquire their ontological status in the process of constitution, i.e., it
is the process of constitution of an intentional object that determines whether
it belongs to this or that ontological region. Implicit in this quotation, how-
ever, is that only through intentional constitution an object becomes a legitimate
ontological entity of some sort. But what van Atten calls ‘principle of transcen-
dental idealism’ goes further: it claims that, in general, intentional constitution
is suficient to establish existence, i.e., constitution stands as a criterion for the
existence (or non-existence) of any kind of object whatsoever.
For Husserl there are two fundamental kinds of entities: the real and the
ideal entities. The real entities, for example, are those objects given in world
experience, the physical objects. The ideal entities are objects which can only
be thought; Husserl also calls them irreal objects. There are several criteria
for distinguishing between real/ideal entities and, perhaps, the most general is
the relation to time: real objects are temporally individuated and ideal objects
are temporally non-individuated. Ideal objects can be divided into sensual-
dependent and sensual-independent objects. An example of an ideal sensual-
dependent objects is the abstract entity (or universal) ‘redness’: it is not a
physical object like a ‘red car’ but it depends on particular red colored objects,
or on sensations of red colored objects. Ideal sensual-independent entities are
called by Husserl formal or categorical objects, since they have no material or
hyletic parts as constituents of their being. Examples of categorical objects are
the logical operators of propositional logic, or the purely mathematical concepts
1E. Husserl, ‘The Encyclopedia Britannica article’ in Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenol-
ogy and the Confrontation with Heidegger, p. 150.
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like ‘set’, ‘function’, ‘relation’, ‘class’, etc.
An important difference between real and ideal objects is the following
one: in the constitution of the sense of real objects, the apprehension of the
corresponding object of constitution is not part of their sense. (EJ, section 63.)
The intentional sense of a real object does not ensure that such an intention is
already fulfilled, i.e., that to such intention corresponds an adequate examplar.
Such a fulfillment has to be carried out by a confirmation or verifying synthesis
(CM, section 24), presenting to the (transcendental) subject a possible state of
affairs (a possible world, a model, etc.) in which such intention is exemplified.
(CM, section 25.) For ideal objects however, Husserl argues that, in some way,
their apprehension as a unity is part of their constitution. (EJ, section 63.)
Since they are pre-constituted in the predicative activity, they are in advance
presented or given as elements of judgements. That is, the constitution of ideal
objects implies that they are also apprehended as substantives of assertions.
This means that in the sense of ideal objects is already implicit that they can
be thematized, i.e., that they are to be treated as singular intentional objects.
For instance, in the sense of the intentional object ‘redness’ is already implicit
that it can be subjected to predicative statements such as ‘redness is a colour
property’, for example. The same goes for categorical objects: altogether with
the sense of (logical) ‘conjunction’ comes the possibility to assert, for example,
that ‘conjunction is a truth-function’. Thus the particular way ideal objects are
intentionally constituted implies that they can be thematized as singular objects
of possible judgements.
Does what we have presented so far in any way justifies van Atten’s claim
that, in general, constitution implies existence? Let’s investigate in which con-
text he assumes this principle as valid. When interpreting Husserl’s quotation
above, besides the claim that it is a version of the transcendental idealism
principle, van Atten also says that:
It singles out a special group among all transcendental phenomena,
namely those experiences in which the intentional object is given
as itself, as existing. In Cartesian Meditations, Husserl calls the corre-
sponding group of constitution processes cases of strict (‘prägnant’)
constitution [CM, section 23]. There are correspondences between
the essence of an object and the strict constitution of such an object.
That is, the way in which an object is given as an identity through
various acts is characterised by a rule that is specific for that kind
of object [Ideas I, section 142], [FTL2, section 98]. Strict constitution
is constitution according to this rule. Finally, existence is the objective
correlate of strict constitution [CM, section 26]. (BmG, pp. 56-57. Our
emphases.)
In this quotation van Atten explains what we have exposed above: that
for a special group of objects, constitution implies the intuitive donation of the
constituted object as a singular unity. And he reports to the constitution of these
kind of objects as ‘strict’ constitution. Then he restates Husserl’s claim that for
this kind of objects the constitution is performed by a specific rule that links
the constitution to the intuitive apprehension of the object as a singular general
2Edmund Husserl , Formal and Trancendental Logic, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1969; translated
by Dorian Cairns.
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essence (the invariant in Husserl’s terms) and that this is strict constitution. In
the end of the quotation, van Atten states that strict constitution has existence
as objective correlate. That is, any possible object for which we have a strict
constitution exists. He refers to Cartesian Meditations, section 26, for justification
of this claim; let’s see how. In this section, Husserl seeks to stress that evidence
is the only source of validity. Or, in Husserl’s own terms:
It is clear that truth or the true actuality of objects is to be obtained
only from evidence, and that it is evidence alone by virtue of which
an “actually” existing [wirklich seinder], true, rightly accepted object
of whatever form or kind has sense for us (...).(CM, section 26. p.
60.)3
Husserl uses the designation ‘wirklich seinder’ (which we think a better trans-
lation would be ‘effective being’4) in the composition of this thesis, but also (for
him) equivalent terms as ‘true’ and ‘valid’. He does not uses the word ‘exis-
tence’ (‘Existenz’, in german) to characterize the correlate of evidence. This is a
clue to dismiss possible misinterpretations of the meaning of ‘existence’ in this
context. It is also a clue to the possibility that such word must not be assumed
to mean what it usually means in the context of modern theories of ontological
commitment.5 In fact, a few lines further he defines what he understands by
‘effective’:
Actually existing object [Wirklich seiender Gegenstand] indicates a par-
ticular system within this multiplicity, the system of evidences re-
lating to the object and belonging together in such a manner that
they combine to make up one (though perhaps an infinity) total
evidence. (CM, section 29, p. 63.)6
Thus, an effective object (folowing the proposed translation) is defined as
(the outcome of) an ordered sequence or ‘system’ of evident acts or intuitions,
syntethically associated. Further, this sequence may be infinite. Such a no-
tion of an effective object has a very specific meaning, that does not coincides
with the usual modern notion of existence, which we think van Atten has
in mind. Therefore, van Atten’s interpretation of existence does not coincide
with Husserl’s analog and it may be considered as a forced interpretation. In
Husserl’s conception, ‘Wirklich’ is equivalent, in a specific way, to being true,
being valid or being effective. Based on this, the principle of transcendental
idealism can be restated as follows: the constitution of an object implies its
effectiveness, i.e., intentional constitution turns out mere intentional objects into
3In the original: Es ist klar, daß Wahrheit bzw. wahre Wirklisckeit von Gegenständen, nur
aus der Evidenz zu schöpfen ist, und daß sie es allein ist, wodurch wirklich seinder, wahrhafter,
rechtmäßig geltender Gegenstand, welcher Form oder Art immer, für uns Sinn hat, und mit all den
ihm für uns unter dem Titel wahrhaften Soseins zugehöringen Bestimmungen. Edmund Husserl,
Cartesianische Meditationem, Husserliana VI, Band 8, p. 61.
4This translation was proposed to me by Pedro M.S. Alves.
5By ‘modern theories of ontological commitment’ we are referring to the Quinean slogan that
to be (to exist) is to be the value of a bound variable in the context of first-order predicate logic.
6In the original: Wirklich seiender Gegenstand indiziert innerhalb dieser Mannigfalttigkeit ein
Sondersystem, das System auf ihn bezogener Evidenzen, derart Synthetisch zusammengehörig,
daß sie sich zu einer, wenn auch vielleicht unendlichen Totalevidenz zusammenschließen. Edmund
Husserl, Cartesianische Meditationem, Husserliana VI, Band 8, p. 64.
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effective intentional objects. And if we interpret the claim that all entities get
their ontological sense from intentional constitution as saying that intentional
constitution provides an ontology of effective objects, then it is a fact that (as
we advanced below) ontology in phenomenological terms does not coincide
with modern theories of ontological commitment. Therefore, it is not obvious
that ontological questions are decidable, in the modern sense, in the context
of Husserlian phenomenology. If we assume a weaker sense of ontological
decidability, namely that the intentional constitution of an object determines
to what ontological or material region it belongs, then we can say that some
decidability is possible by the constitution of an object. This, however, is not
the sense of ontological decidability that van Atten is arguing for.
4.2 Does formal possibility implies existence?
Let’s now discuss the version of the principle of transcendental idealism for
mathematical or formal objects: for mathematical objects, possibility implies
existence. (BmH, pp. 59 and seqs.) Van Atten defines transcendental possibility
as follows:
An object is transcendentally possible exactly if it is conceptually
possible [i.e., if it implies no formal nor material contradiction]
and moreover can be strictly constituted (that is, ideally, with full
evidence). (BmH, p.60.)
Thus, transcendental possibility pressuposes logical possibility, conceptual
possibility and constitution. As we have seen in the previous section, constitu-
tion implies existence, in van Atten’s view, therefore transcendental possibiblity
also implies existence. The term ‘possibility’ is here introduced by van Atten
due to Husserl’s claim that
All existential judgments of mathematics, as a priori existential judg-
ments, are in truth judgments of existence about possibilities; all
particular mathematical judgments are direct particular judgments
about possibilities – but about possibilities of particular judgments
concerning mathematics. (EJ, section 96c, p. 371.)7
For Husserl this means that mathematical assertions such as ‘there is an x
with property A’ are not assertions about (f)actual entities but modal assertions;
they are assertions about possible objects, as opposed to impossible ones. So
the assertion above can be paraphrased as ‘it is possible that there is an x with
property A’. For Husserl, existential mathematical propositions determine
what is a priori thinkable as having this or that property. If a determinate
concept is hence a priori thinkable as having some property, then it is possible.
Notice that to be possible is not the same as to be factual, or effective in the
terminology introduced in previous section. In fact, Husserl makes clear this
distinction:
7In the original: Alle Existenzialurteile sind in Wahrheit Existenzialurteile von Möglichkeiten;
alle mathematischen partikulären Urteile sind unmittelbar partikuläre Urteile von Möglichkeiten,
aber von Möglichkeiten partikulärer Urteile über Mathematisches. Edmund Husserl, Erfahrung
und Urteil, Untersuchungen zur Genealogie der Logik, p. 450.
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But, as we said, these [judgments of existence] are not particulari-
ties pure and simple, actual particularities, but a priori possibilities of
particularity. (...) The true sense [of mathematical existence] is not
simply a «there is», but rather: it is possible a priori that there is. (EJ,
section 96c, p. 370.)8
It is clear that the meaning of ‘existence’ in mathematics is, for Husserl,
to be correlated with validity. Mathematical entities are precisely the valid, or
possible ones as opposed to the invalid, or impossible ones. Talking about
geometry and existential statements in mathematics, he claims the same in the
negative form:
Negative existential propositions have the function of separating
out the invalid concepts, the expressions corresponding to no essence.
Ideas III, section 15, p. 71.)
When we are dealing with formal objects we are dealing with objects that
have no material or sensuous properties as part of their meaning, we are dealing
with categories, i.e., with schematic forms. These schematic forms have a
function of their own: to serve as generators. For example, the categorial object
‘∧’ is a generator of logical conjunctions, propositions of the form A ∧ B. And
it is part of the sense of ‘∧’ that it is an a priori valid scheme whenever it is
applied (assuming that the propositions to which it is applied are true). The
particular propositions generated by ‘∧’ are of an infinite number. So, not all
the particular cases of conjunctions are presented to us in fact, but they remain
as valid possibilities, through the sense of ‘∧’. That is, it is intrinsic to the
meaning of ‘∧’ that: if A and B are true propositions, then it is also true that
A ∧ B. And this is valid for any (true) A and B whatsoever. It is in this sense
that Husserl states that mathematical assertions are about a priori possibilities,
i.e., about validity.
How can we, in the context of Husserlian phenomenology, interpret van
Atten’s claim that possibility implies existence? Van Atten’s interpretation is
due to the way how he defines possibility: an object is possible if it is free from
formal and material contradiction, and if it can be strictly constituted. For van
Atten, strict constitution implies existence. Therefore, possibility also implies
existence. We have seen however how existence is to be (rightly) interpreted
in Husserl’s phenomenological conception: as effectiveness or validity. So, we
believe that existence, in the phenomenological sense, does not correspond to
the actual sense van Atten attributes to it.
4.3 Omnitemporality versus Intratemporality
Does Husserl’s claim of omnitemporality for mathematical objects suffers
from inconsistency? It is a suggestion of van Atten that the strong revisionism
of Husserl’s phenomenology rules out omnitemporality as the only temporal
8In the original: Aber es sind, wie gesagt, nicht Partikularitäten schlechthin, wirkliche Partiku-
laritäten, sondern apriorische Möglichkeiten von solchen. (...) Der wahre Sinn ist nicht schlechthin
ein, “es gibt”, sondern: es ist apriori möglich, daß es gibt. Edmund Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil,
Untersuchungen zur Genealogie der Logik, p. 450.
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mode of mathematical objects. Is this claim accurate? Van Atten defines om-
nitemporal objects as those temporal objects that are static (do not change) and
exists at every moment of time, past, present and future. (BmH, p. 16.) This
definition of omnitemporality has as consequence that omnitemporal objects
are to be seen as identically the same at every moment of time, since they do not
change and they exist (unchanged) at every moment whatsoever. Let’s now
see how Husserl defines omnitemporality:
It [the omnitemporal object] is referred to at all times; or correla-
tively, to whatever time it may be referred, is always absolutely the
same; it sustains no temporal differentiation, and, what is equiv-
alent to this, no extension, no expansion in time, and this in the
proper sense. (EJ, section 64c, p. 259.)9
For Husserl, omnitemporality is defined as invariance trough time in a very
definite sense, i.e., an ideal object is omnitemporal iff it can be recognized as the
same object at any given moment of time in which it could be presented. This
has as consequence that the particular moment in which it is presented as the
same is not relevant to its sense, albeit such an object can only be constituted,
or presented as such, in a moment of time. This means that the act through
which the ideal object is constituted, the noesis, can only be performed in a
particular moment in time; but the noetic mode of giveness in time, however,
is not essential to the ideal object itself, i.e., to its sense present in the noema.
And Husserl explains why the time-relation of such objects are not essential to
their sense:
It [the ideal object] is contingently (kata symbebékos) in time, insofar
as it can «be» the same in any time. The different times do not extend
its duration, and ideally this is arbitrary. This implies that, properly
speaking, it has no duration as a determination belonging to its
essence. [For the ideal objects] (...) once they have been actualized
or «realized», they are also localized spatiotemporally, but in such a
way, to be sure, that this localization does not actually individualize
them. (EJ, section 64c, pp. 259-260.)10
In another words:
Irreal objectivities make their spatiotemporal appearence in the
world, but they can appear simultaneously in many spatiotem-
poral positions and yet be numerically identical as the same. It
belongs essentially to their appearence that they are subjective for-
mations, therefore localized in worldliness (spatiotemporality) by
9In the original: Es ist auf alle Zeiten bezogen, oder auf welche auch immer bezogen, immerfort
absolut dasselbe; es erfh¨art keine zeitliche Differenzieerung und, was damit äquivalent ist, keine
Ausdehnung, Ausbreitung in de Zeit, und das im eigentlichen Sinne. Edmund Husserl, Erfahrung
und Urteil, Untersuchungen zur Genealogie der Logik, p. 311.
10In the original: Es liegt zufällig (κατα συµββηχς) in der Zeit, sofern es, dasselbe, in jeder
Zeit “liegen” kann. Die verschiedenen Zeiten verlängern nicht seine Dauer, und ideell ist diese
beliebig. Das sagt: eigentlich hat es keine Dauer als eine zu seinem Wesen gehörige Bestimmung.
(...) Aber jedenfalls, wenn sie aktualisiert worden sind, oder “realisiert”, sind sie auch raum-zeitlich
lokalisiert, und freilich so, daß diese Lokalization sie nicht wirklich individuiert. Edmund Husserl,
Erfahrung und Urteil, Untersuchungen zur Genealogie der Logik, pp. 311-312.
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the localization of the subject. But they can be produced in differ-
ent moments of time of the same subject as the same, as the same
in relation to their repeated productions and as in relation to the
productions of different subjects. (EJ, section 64c, p. 260.)11
Let’s now discuss some possible relations between van Atten’s and Husserl’s
definitions of omnitemporality. What we want to stress is the following: does
these two definitions of omnitemporality coincide with each other? We write
A-omnitemporality and H-omnitemporality for van Atten’s and Husserl’s def-
initions, respectively. Notice that in both definitions the identity of the object
is preserved in different moments of time. But does this consequence follows
from both definitions by the same reason? Our answer is negative, and we will
now show why.
An object is A-omnitemporal if it is static and exists at every moment of
time and it is H-omnitemporal if it is referred to at any moment of time as the
same object. So, if an object is static and exists at every moment of time, then it
is to be referred as the same at any moment of time; i.e., A-onmnitemporality
implies H-omnitemporality. But if it is referred as the same at any moment
of time, then is it also static and exists at every moment of time? That is,
does H-omnitemporality implies A-omnitemporality? In other words, is an
object that is not static or does not exists at every moment of time (or both)
necessarilly a non H-omnitemporal object? Is it possible to have conjointly an
H-omnitemporal but not A-omnitemporal object?
Suppose we have the following object: a finite sequence S with k elements
(k is finite and constant) whose domain is {0, 1}, i.e., each element of S is either
0 or 1. Finally, let’s add the clause that at any different moment of time at
least one element of S is permuted in the follwing manner: if it is 0, replace
it by 1 and if it is 1, replace it by 0. Doing this, we can assume that at least
one element of S is always different at any moment of time due to a rule.
For example, let’s assume k = 3, then we can stipulate that at moment t0
S = 〈0, 0, 0〉; and thus define a rule such that at any subsequent moment of
time one of the elements of S is to be replaced in a certain order such that, for
example, at moment t1 S = 〈1, 0, 0〉, at moment t2 S = 〈1, 1, 0〉, at moment t3
S = 〈1, 1, 1〉, etc. The point is that at any moment of time S has parts added
or/and removed from it (van Atten’s definition of a non-static object, BmH, p.
16.). Therefore, at any moment tn at least one element of S will be removed
from S (in the sense that it will be replaced by another numerical distinct object).
However, S can be presented as the same object at any particular moment of
time, since (as we have defined) each element of S at that particular moment
is generated by a rule. Moreover, the temporal character of S is not part of its
sense, since at any time it would be given as the same because it is generated
by a law (or a collection of laws). Given this we conclude that the non-static
object S fits into H-omnitemporality but not into A-omnitemporality. Another
example is the case of lawlike sequences. Lawlike sequences are examples of
11In the original: Irreale Gegenständlichkeit haben in der Welt raum-zeitliches Aufreten, aber sie
Können an vielen Raum-Zeitstellen Zugleich und doch numerisch identisch als dieselben aufreten.
Wesensmäß ig gehört zu ihrem Aufreten, daß sie subjektive Gebilde sind, also in der Weltlichkeit
(Raum-Zeitlichkeit) durch die Lokalität der Subjekte lokalisiert sind. Aber sie können in verschiede-
nen Zeitstellen desselben Subjektes als dieselben erzeugt werden, als dieselben gegenüber den
wiederholten Erzeugungen, und ebenso als dieselben gegenüber den Erzeugungen verschiedener
Subjekte. Edmund Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil, Untersuchungen zur Genealogie der Logik, ibidem.
80
non-static unfinished objects that are able to be fitted into Husserl’s notion of
omnitemporality. (We present concrete arguments for this claim below.) Any
lawlike sequence can be recognized as being the same, or as being generated
by the same rule, at any particular moment of time. (See EJ, section 51b.) The
only difference between lawlike sequences and the example above is that one
is a finite object and the other an infinite one. But both are H-omnitemporal
objects that do not fit A-omnitemporality.
How about existence? Does H-omnitemporality implies that an object has
to exist at every moment of time? Our answer is negative, for two reasons.
The first reason is that mathematical existence in Husserl’s terms is to be in-
terpreted as mathematical validity. Therefore, H-omnitemporality for mathe-
matical objects means that they are to be recognized as mathematically valid at
any moment of time whatsoever, not as existent at any moment of time, in van
Atten’s sense.
The second reason is that, when Husserl speaks about recognition of an
(omnitemporal) object as being the same at any moment of time, he is not stating
that it is to be, in fact, recognized as being the same at every single particular
moment of time, in a positive or categorically sense. He is saying instead that
if at an arbitrary particular moment of time it were presented, then it would
have to be recognized as being the same identical object. Husserl’s statement
of omnitemporality seems to be of a conditional character, while van Atten’s
claim of omnitemporality is of a categorical character. What H-omnitemporality
advances is that if it is presented at a moment, then it should be recognized
as identically the same object. Once more, we suggest, Husserl’s claim should
be interpreted as having a (weaker) conditional character, differently from the
(stronger) categorical character of van Atten’s claim. The conditional character
of H-omnitemporality becomes evident taking into account the following quote
of Husserl concerning ideal and, in particular, mathematical objects:
But afterwards we say: even before they were discovered, they were
already “valid”; or we say that they can be assumed – provided that
the subjects which have the ability to produce them are present and
conceivable – to be producible precisely at any time, and that they
have this mode of omnipresent existence: in all possible modes of
productions they would be the same. (EJ, p. 260; our emphasis.)12
It is obvious now that the way van Atten defines omnitemporality (and
then draw the implications) does not correspond to Husserl’s conception of it.
We showed that H-omnitemporality does not rule out non-static objects like A-
omnitemporality does. Non-static objects as lawlike sequences and the example
S can be fitted into H-omnitemporality. And we also showed that Husserl’s
conception of omnitemporality does not imply that ideal objects have to exist at
all moments of time as A-omnitemporality stipulates. Therefore, we conclude
that the particular concept of omnitemporality against which van Atten argues
is not the Husserlian concept of omnitemporality.
12In the original: Aber hinterher heißt es: auch ehe sie entdeckt worden sind, haben sie schon
“gegolten”, oder sie sind in jeder Zeit – wofern in ihr Subjekte da und denkbar sind, die sie zu erzeu-
gen das Vermögen häten – als erzeugbar eben anzunehmen und haben diese Weise allzeitlichen
Daseins: in allen möglichen Erzeugungen wären sie dieselben. Edmund Husserl, Erfahrung und
Urteil, Untersuchungen zur Genealogie der Logik, p. 312.
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At this point it is obvious that van Atten is wrong in asserting that Husserl
rejects choice sequences because they are not omnitemporal objects. We have
proposed that lawlike sequences, that are dynamic objects, can be fitted into
Husserl’s view. The problem with lawless sequences is not the fact that they
are intratemporal, and hence dynamic objects. The problem that would lead
Husserl to reject lawless sequences as mathematical objects is, we think, related
to the fact that they have not a determinate law attached to them. In Husserl’s
terminology, they do not have a determinate noema or sense that makes possible
to recognize them as the same object at any moment of time. In other words, the
problem is not essentially in the mode of temporality of choice sequences but
in the fact that, in general, choice sequences are not individually determinate
in a distinctive mathematical manner. This, we think, is what would forbid
Husserl to admit choice sequences as mathematical objects.
Does the motivation for omnitemporality motivates also intratemporal-
ity? For Husserl, albeit all mathematical objects refer to time in an omnitem-
porally way, their individuation as mathematical objects do not come from
the particular way they refer to time. Mathematical objects are the same at
any moment of time. Choice sequences however are intratemporal objects,
the particular moment they start to grow constitutes an essential part of their
individuality. For lawlike sequences, Husserl’s claim is innocuous. Lawlike
sequences, albeit intratemporal objects, can additionally be individuated by
the particular law that generates their values. So, for lawlike sequences, in-
tratemporality can be incorporated into the Husserlian omnitemporal account.
For lawless sequences however, their intratemporality is an essential and ir-
reducible characteristic. For lawless sequences, the nature of their process of
generation does not allow individuation as happens with lawlike sequences;
further, sharing the same initial segment does not suffice to determine that
two lawless sequences are the same, since they may diverge at some point of
growth. Therefore, for lawless sequences, the only criterion of individuation is
the precise moment they are initiated.
But the fact that choice sequences are intratemporal objects does not rule
them out as mathematical objects. Since:
Instead of being necessarily infinitely temporal in two directions
(and thereby omnitemporal), would be so in just one direction (the
future). In that case still what is proven once, is proven forever.
(...) It follows that infinite temporality only in the direction of the
future preserves the original [Husserlian] motivation for the thesis
of omnitemporality. (BmH, p. 97.)
Husserl’s original motivation for omnitemporality of mathematical objects,
in van Atten’s view, is that what is proven for them is proven once and for all,
is proven for any time. Van Atten’s claim is that this motivation is also true for
intratemporal objects. For lawlike sequences, the fact that they are attached to
a determinate law guarantee that what is true for them is true at all moments,
since the law that generates their values is the same at any moment of time.
For lawless sequences, argues van Atten, it turns to be the same: what is once
proven true for them is proven once and for all. But in this case we have to state
an additional clause: that it is the same in the direction of future, i.e., once a
true property of a lawless sequence is proven, then it remains true at any future
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moment. For van Atten, intratemporality can be viewed as a particular case of
omnitemporality when restricted to the future. Therefore, the motivation that
lead Husserl to admit classical omnitemporal objects as mathematical objects
remains valid for accepting intratemporal non-classical objects as mathematical
objects from a phenomenological standpoint.
For van Atten the motivation for omnitemporality is that once some prop-
erty of a mathematical object is proved, then it is proved once and for all; in the
case of lawless sequences, it is also proved once and for all but with respect to
the future. Let’s now change a bit the perpective. If we adopt a modal account
it is possible to show that, contrarily to van Atten’s claim, the Husserlian mo-
tivation for omnitemporality does not work for the intratemporality of choice
sequences. The argument is based on the application of the concept of coun-
terfactuals. An omnitemporal object in Husserl’s sense, besides being referred
as the same at any moment of time, has also to be referred as the same at any
counterfactual situation (at any possible world). At any other counterfactual
situation it could not be thinkable as having other properties than the ones
it already has. For example, the number pi is always referred as the same at
any counterfactual situation, i.e., there is not a possible world where pi has a
decimal expansion different from the usual one (pi = 3.14159...). So, the name
‘pi’ is a rigid designator, i.e., the name‘pi’ designates always the same object, viz.
the number pi, at any counterfactual situation. Let’s see the behavior of lawless
sequences under the framework of counteractual situations.
We can imagine a lawless sequence α having some property A(α) at a mo-
ment tk in the (f)actual situation, but having a different property, say B(α) (notice
that we can choose B(α) as to imply ¬A(α)), in a counterfactual situation at the
same moment tk. The idealized mathematician in the counterfactual situation
(who is the same in the actual situation) has the freedom to choose the values of
α differently than it had chosen. Assuming this possibilty, then the designation
‘α’ is not a rigid designator. It is not a rigid designator because one of the two
is the case: either ‘α’ designates different lawless sequences in different coun-
terfactual situations or it designates the same lawless sequence with different
properties in different couterfactual situations. Anyway, we have to assume
that the lawless sequences generated at different counterfactual situations, but
at the same moment tk, are not (exactly) the same. This possibility, however,
goes against the character of necessity of mathematical objects in Husserl’s
sense. Mathematical objects cannot have different properties in different coun-
terfactual situations. Notice, however, that the free character of the idealized
mathematician entails that in different situations it has the freedom to choose
the values of α differently. Otherwise it would be determined in advance to
choose the values of α as it actually did (contradiction?). It would be deter-
mined in the following sense: let’s assume that a lawless sequence α is in the
same position that pi, i.e., that ‘α’ is a rigid designator for the sequence α. Then
at any possible world (or, which is the same, in any counterfactual situation) the
creating subject could not have chosen the values of α differently from the ones
he had chosen in the actual world. This means, for example, that if at the actual
world and in moment tk the idealized mathematician had chosen the number
100 as the 1000th value of α, then the idealized mathematician at world wk (who
is the same at the actual world) and in the same moment tk, has to choose the
number 100 as the 1000th value of α. The assumption, however, that ‘α’ is a
rigid designator for the sequence α entails that the idealized mathematician is
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not free to choose the values of α differently from the choices it actually made;
at any possible world wn the idealized mathematician has to choose 100 as the
1000th value of α.
Do we have reached a dilemma? Do we have to choose between the neces-
sary character of mathematical objects (and omnitemporal objects in general)
and the freedom of the creating subject? The natural choice, for the proponent
of choice sequences anyway, is the second one: lawless sequences have to be
conceived as freelly constructed step-by-step through the free acts of choices
(not determined in any way) of the creating subject. If we are to assume choice
sequences as mathematical objects constructed by the creating subject, then we
have to accept the fact that the creating subject could have chosen the values of
a lawless sequence differentlly. This is precisely what van Atten states:
When a mathematical construction depends on free choices, we
have to reckon with the fact that, when at different times the sub-
ject is confronted with the same situation in which to choose, it
can do so differently each time, and hence these objects cannot be
omnitemporal. (CCM, p. 70.)13
Therefore, in accepting the creating subject’s free choices, a fortiori we have
to accept either that, albeit the properties of a lawless sequence became ‘crys-
tallized’ when proved, they are, after all, contingent. The lawless sequence α
above could have had other properties than the ones it actually has (e.g., the
creating subject could have chosen the number 500 as the 1000th value of α).
On the other hand, Husserlian mathematical objects cannot have their prop-
erties contingently in the sense above. Therefore, we think that the real motiva-
tion of Husserl for assuming omnitemporality for mathematical objects is not
just that once a property is proved it is proved once and for all. Additionaly to
the fact that what is proved is proved once and for all, Husserlian omnitempo-
rality is motivated by the fact that a mathematical object have its properties in
a non-contingent way and, by this reason, at any moment of time. And this is
the case irrespectively whether we assume omnitemporality for past, present
and future, or only for the future (intratemporality). Omnitemporality implies
that what is proved is proved once and for all, but also that what is provable
is provable in any time. Mathematical objects do not acquire new properties
with the flow of time nor at a counterfactual situation. All the properties of the
object are already present in its noema, irrespectively whether they are proved
at a determinate moment or at a subsequent moment, or even if they are not
proved at all. The respective noema of a mathematical object already con-
tains the properties of the object, even if they are not yet explicitly brought to
intuition through an act of consciousness. In Husserlian terminology, all prop-
erties of a mathematical object are already present in the internal horizon of the
noema, are implicitly present in the noema, and they are explicated (explizieren),
i.e., brought to evidence.14 However, the explication of an object, the intrinsic
temporal determination of an object, the disclosure of its internal or imanent
properties does not attribute to it new (non-existent-yet or not-present-before)
13Mark van Atten, ‘Construction and Constitution in Mathematics’, in The New Yearbook for
Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy vol. X, 2010, pp. 43-90. For comodity we will refer
to this paper as ‘CCM’.
14For this new terminology see, for example, EJ, section 24.
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properties, bul only makes evident what was already present, yet implicitly, in
its original intended sense. In Husserl’s own words, “the object, every object,
has its peculiarities, its internal determinations.” (EJ, section 24a, p. 112.) There
is a fundamental difference between the properties of an object (presented in
the noema) and the temporal way (through the respective noesis) in which
they are presented to a possible consciusness: through the acts of explication
of an object we do not attribute properties to the object that were not part of its
noema, we only reveal them and make them evident.
Lawlike sequences, albeit intratemporal, satisfy this condition, because, due
to the particular law generating their values, all their properties are not contin-
gent in the sense above (the designators of lawlike sequences are rigid designa-
tors). Lawless sequences, however, do not satisfy this condition, by the reason
presented above. Therefore, this modified motivation for omnitemporality rules
out intratemporality per se and, consequently, rules out lawless sequences as
Husserlian mathematical objects. The original and this modified Husserlian
motivation for omnitemporality of mathematical objects cannot be separated
from each other. For this reason, van Atten’s argument fails to establish its con-
clusion mainly because the non-contingent character of omnitemporal objects
is not discussed by him.
4.4 The form ‘and so on’: substrate or determina-
tion?
On pages 71-72 of Brouwer meets Husserl van Atten accuses Husserl of being
dogmatic. Husserl conceives a method to ‘disclose essences’, i.e., a method to
obtain essences with maximum generality: the eidetic variation. (EJ, sections 86-
93.) This method consists of, from a particular example falling under a concept,
to modify it at will by free imagination into new examplar cases in order to
achieve the concept, the essence in Husserl’s terms, in its full generality. This
is done by overlaping the different variations. When we overlap the possible
variants, something identical in all of them will coincide and arise: the invariant,
what necessarily they all have in common. This invariant is the characteristic
feature that makes them all be the same kind of object, and so we obtain the
essential feature of the concept under which all fall. (EJ, section 87a-e.)
Van Atten’s suggestion is that Husserl’s eidetic variations to disclose the
essence ‘mathematical object’ are not neutral, i.e, that Husserl does not consider
all possible variations, and so that Husserl’s eidetic variations “were one-sided”
(BmH, p. 71). Further, he says that Husserl never considered non-omnitemporal
objects, viz. choice sequences, among his variations. And because of this short-
sightedness the essence arrived at by Husserl is not necessarily of ‘mathematical
object’ but that of ‘classical mathematical object’. For van Atten to prove this
claim he has to show that choice sequences are indeed mathematical objects;
and to do so, within a phenomenological framework, is to be able to show
that choice sequences can be intentionally constituted as mathematical objects
with full evidence. We will now precisely analyze his attempt to achieve such
constitution.
The constitution of an ideal object can be divided into two major moments:
(1) the identification of the proper act by which it is presented in consciousness
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(pre-constitution in passive synthesis) and (2) the determination (or themati-
zation) of the invariant presented in that act (constitution in active synthesis).
For van Atten, the proper act by which choice sequences are given to the con-
sciousness is the act of choosing:
The activity that founds the self-giveness of choice sequences is that
of choosing. In this activity choice sequences are pre-constituted
(...), meaning that after this activity one only needs to carry out an
objectifying act to constitute the object. Such an objectifying act
thematises the invariant that established itself in passive synthesis.
(BmH, p. 89.)
So, for van Atten, the activity of choosing pre-constitutes choice sequences
in the passive experience, meaning that the originary and fundamental process
by which choice sequences are initially presented to our minds is the process
of choosing. After the identification of the act by which choice sequences are
given to consciousness as the act of choosing we only need to determine the
invariant presented by such activity and show that it is always the same, i.e.,
that it is identical in all possible choice sequences. Van Atten advances three
possible candidates to figure as the invariant present in all choice sequences:
that it is a concept, that it is the initial segment, or that it is the categorical form
‘and so on’. The first and second candidates are dismissed by him as incorrect;
then he argues that the correct invariant is the categorical form ‘and so on’.
That the invariant is not a concept nor an initial segment. A concept is
not the invariant, since concepts and objects are different things: a concept
and an object falling under it are two different things. The concept may have
properties that the object falling under it does not possess, and vice-versa. In
the case of choice sequences the object ‘choice sequence’, i.e., the sequence,
consists of linearly ordered parts, while a concept governing it does not. Also
the temporal aspects of the concept and of the sequence does not coincide. The
sequence is intratemporal, while the concept governing it is an omnitemporal
ideality: the sequence only comes to existence when the first choice is made and
that happens at a particulr moment in time; while the concept (what it means)
is the same at every moment of time. A choice sequence changes through time,
the concept does not. Initial segments also are not the invariant, since different
choice sequences may have the same initial segment. Initial segments are
extensional properties of choice sequences and what makes choice sequences
different among them is their intensional properties (e.g., having been begun
at different moments of time). (BmH, pp. 89-90.)
That the invariant is the categorical form ‘and so on’. A second reason
why initial segments are not the invariant is that, by assuming that they are,
an important feature of choice sequences is left behind: the character of a
choice sequence as a developing sequence. The developing character of choice
sequences is not contained in initial segments; these are finished entities, they
do not develop trough time as the choice sequence does. Choice sequences are
determined as such by being indefinitely developing objects. They are objects
that extend continually, but this indefinite extension does not transform them
into new objects different from the initial one. Because, says van Atten, it is the
same object that is extended, the same object that is growing. Therefore, some
substrate must remain identical if the idea of growth is to make sense. This
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substrate is the categorical form, or operation ‘and so on’. The categorical form
‘and so on’ is the substrate making possible that we can talk of the same object
that grows, making possible to talk about choice sequences. A last observation
has to be made. The process of constituting choice sequences as objects is not
complete if, stresses van Atten, we do not consider that the act of choosing
(pre-constituted in the passive synthesis) is, in fact, an act of free choosing. In
order to do this, he says, we have to consider “the more or less free choice of a
number an operation too.” (BmH, pp. 90-91.)
The act that presents choice sequences as intentional objects is the act of
choosing. The invariant present in all choice sequences is the operation ‘and
so on’ (sucessive application of an act). When we combine these two features
of choice sequences we get the new operation of choosing repeatedly, that char-
acterize choice sequences as open-ended. Further, we have to assume that this
new operation is free, i.e., that it is an operation of successive free choices. Thus
we have so far four (cumulative) elements in the process of constituting choice
sequences as objects: the single act of choosing (the founding act), the oper-
ation ‘and so on’ (the invariant), the new operation of successively choosing
(the combination of both) and the final operation of successive free choices (the
assumption).
The act of choosing as the act through which choice sequences are intention-
ally given does not poses any problem, in our view; it is, from a phenomeno-
logically poit of view, completely sustainable. That the specific substrate which
characterizes all choice sequences as such is the categorical form ‘and so on’ is,
however, questionable. The categorical form ‘and so on’ is in fact recognized
by Husserl as such. However, it is not assumed by him that it is restricted to
any concept or type of object in particular, but that it is an applicable operation
to any substrate whatsoever:
(...) every substrate of determination is originally always already
passively pregiven as something determinable, as something with a
horizon of indeterminate determinability and known in conformity
with a most general type. In the course of the explication [originary
disclosure of the properties of the substrate] this prescription is
increasingly fulfilled, but there still constantly remains a horizon
beyond the succession of actually constituted determinations and
open to new properties which must be expected. (EJ, section 51b, p.
217.)15
For Husserl the ‘and so on’, the undetermined horizon of determinability, is
a feature applicable to all possible substrates, meaning that we can conceive
any substrate (or any object in general) as being determinable (or predicable)
in infinitum. In fact, in Husserl’s context, the operation ‘and so on’ is not even
primarily seen as substrate, nor determining a specific domain of substrates,
but instead as a possible form of determination applicable to all substrates. Of
course, any determination can be turned into a substrate, i.e., it is possible to
15In the original: (...) Abschnitt gesehen, daß jedes Bestimmungssubstrat ursprünglich immer
schon passiv vorgegeben ist als bestimmbares, als dem allgemeinstein Typus nach bekanntes
Etwas mit dem Horizont unbestimmter Bestimmbarkeit. Im Verlauf der Explikation erfüllt sich
diese Vorzeichnung immer mehr, aber ständig bleibt noch über die Folge der aktuell konstituierten
Bestimmungen hinaus ein offener Horizont für zu erwatende neue Eigenheiten. Edmund Husserl,
Erfahrung und Urteil, Untersuchungen zur Genealogie der Logik, pp. 257-258.
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turn a determination into a substrate with other (higher order) determinations.
But the relevant point in this discussion is that the operation ‘and so on’ is
not seen from the standpoint of Husserl’s phenomenology as specific to any
particular substrate or kind of substrates, since it is a form of determination
of any possible substrate and not (primarily) the substrate itself nor a form of
determination exclusive to any kind of substrate.
However, it seems in fact that choice sequences possess the ‘and so on’
character intrinsically, i.e., that in the case of choice sequences it is not a mere
possible form of determination but an essential form of determination. Choice
sequences cannot be (correctly) conceived without this feature. But now we
ask: is the ‘and so on’ character of choice sequences a (form of) determination
of some substrate or it is the substrate itself? As a matter of fact, it cannot
be both at the same time, the substrate and the determination of the substrate
simultaneously. And it cannot be both by the same reason why van Atten
assumes there is a difference between a concept and an object falling under it:
the substrate and the form of determination of the substrate may have different
properties. The substrate behaves (develops) in a manner stipulated by the
form of determination ‘and so on’, but the form of determination ‘and so on’
does not behaves itself in the same way. The form of determination ‘and so on’
as such does not ‘develop’ through time, instead it prescribes such a developing
character to some substrate.
Based on the discussion above we think that a distinction between the invari-
ant substrate of choice sequences and (let’s say) the invariant form of determination
of choice sequences is possible, and that van Atten inaccurately equates both in
the wrong way. In colloquial terms, there is a difference between the identical
object subjected to a condition and the condition itself. In our view, to ask for
the invariant of choice sequences, as van Atten formulates the question, has
two possible interpretations:
1. to ask for the invariant character that makes choice sequences be what
they are, whose answer is: the invariant form of determination ‘and so
on’. In this case, the invariant is not an object but a condition: that, if
there are any objects to be called ‘choice sequences’, then they invariably
have to possess the character ‘and so on’ as a form of determination;
2. to ask for what remains identical in the process of growing of an individ-
ual choice sequence, i.e., for what identical component of the individual
choice sequence is behaving in conformity to the condition ‘and so on’,
whose answer is still open.
The first question asks for the general essence of choice sequences (the
invariant condition ‘and so on’) and the second question asks for the identity
of a particular choice sequence through the process of growth, i.e., the identical
object or substrate that grows. They are different questions and have different
answers, albeit van Atten seems to not distinguish both. In fact, in our view,
what van Atten advances as the answer to the second question (intended by
him as the right question) is the right answer for the first question.
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4.5 How can be apprehended an individual choice
sequence?
We now turn to the following question: how are choice sequences given to
consciousness?, how are choice sequences apprehended as individual objects?
What means for a choice sequence to be originally given as an intentional sin-
gular object? The giveness of an intentional object as itself in intuition, the
presentation of the intended object as an identical substrate or, more generally,
the transcendental experience of an ideal object is the goal of the process of
constitution. The process of constitution aims at this final achievement: the
originary and evident intuition of the object itself as identical by the transcen-
dental subjectivity. Is this possible for choice sequences? If it is, how? How
can be phenomenologically accomodated the intuition of an object like a choice
sequence? Van Atten’s answer to this question is to be explicitely found in
CCM:
With an eye on Brouwer’s infinitely proceeding sequences [choice
sequences], it should be noted that ideal, adequate giveness of a
potentially infinite sequence does not consists in its being given as
an actually infinite sequence, for that would contradict the essence
of the object qua potentially infinite. Rather, it consists in the give-
ness of the whole finite initial segment generated so far, however
large the number of its elements may be, together with the open
horizon [the categorial form ‘and so on’] that adequately indicates
the ever present possibility to construct additional elements of the
sequence. The absence of such further elements from an intuition
of the sequence at a given moment does not render that intuition
inadequate, because they do not yet even exist. (CCM, p. 65.)
An individual choice sequence is adequately given to consciousness when
(1) its respective initial segment is given to consciousness, (2) together with
the form ‘and so on’. Now we ask: how do these two factors constitute the
giveness of a singular unity, viz. the individual choice sequence? The giveness
of an individual choice sequence should present it as a single object, as a unity.
Instead, what we have are two distinct moments: the act that presents the
initial segment per se and the further act that presents the initial segment as
a developing object. For van Atten the conjunction of these two acts should
present the individual choice sequence as an individual entity. Notice that the
initial segment and the form ‘and so on’ separately do not give rise to the choice
sequence. They can be seen as independent entities: in one hand the initial
segment and the form ‘and so on’ in the other hand, i.e., they can be thematized
separately as independent objects. Therefore, how can they together make
us apprehend a third individual entity, different from both? Notice that the
originary apprehension of an object is something essentially simple, i.e., it is a
non-complex act or intuition concernig the nature of the apprehended objects
themselves. In Husserl’s own words, such an act is:
The contemplaive intuition which precedes all explication [temporal
determination], the intuition which is directed toward the object
«taken as a whole». This simple apprehension and contemplation is
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the lowest level of common, objectifying activity, the lowest level of
the unobstructed exercise of perceptual interest. (EJ, section 22, p.
104.)16
The most fundamental mode of giveness of any object whatsoever is such
that the object is intended as a whole, as an indecomposable unity and presented
to consciousness in a simple act. At this level of consciousness activity, in which
the intentional objects are originarily given in themselves, there is no place for
any kind of complexity. Even the (also lower) activity of determination of the
intuited substrate is placed at a higher level of consciousness, viz. at the level
of the “true explicative contemplation of the object (...) [where] the first appre-
hension and initial simple contemplation already has its horizons (...) which
are immediately coawakened.” (EJ, section 22, pp. 104-105.) At this level of
consciousness, in which the object is originarily and evidently apprehended or
intuited, is the object itself, in its entirety, that is apprehended. It is not appre-
hended through the previous apprehension of its parts or determinations, as if
the apprehension of the original object is a (kind of) second-order apprehen-
sion. It is the object itself that is given in the first place as a substrate of possible
determinatios, which are not yet determined or explicitated; its parts and de-
terminations are to be posteriorly brough to consciousness, not the reverse (see
EJ, section 24a).
It is clear that van Atten’s conception of the intuitive mode of giveness
of individual choice sequences does not fit the Husserlian conception. For
van Atten, the giveness of an individual choice sequence is accomplished by
the giveness of its initial segment, i.e., by the giveness of a finite part of the
choice sequence, plus the giveness of the form of determination ‘and so on’
applied to the finite initial segment. Assuming the cogency of the arguments
presentd by us for the incorrectness of admitting the form ‘and so on’ as the
substrate of individual choice sequences, then it is obvious that the giveness
of these two elements is not sufficient for the intuitive apprehension of the
individual choice sequence in itself. This is so because both the initial segment
and the form ‘and so on’ are not the substrate of the individual choice sequence
but its determinations; and the substrate is not originary given through its
determinations but in itself. Let’s analyse the modes of giveness of the initial
segment and of the form ‘and so on’ separately of each other (as far as possile)
to gain some insight on what was just said.
Apprehension of the initial segment. The initial segment is a finite part
of the choice sequence. It is a detachable or independent part of the choice
sequence, which Husserl calls a fragment in respect to a whole (see EJ, section
31). The fact that the initial segment is seen as a fragment of the choice sequence
does not means that the particular choice sequence to which it belongs can be
conceived without the respective initial segment. It means the opposite: that
the initial segment can be considered an indvidual object per se, independently
of the choice sequence to which it belongs, i.e., that it can be thematized as
a substrate having its own determinations. (This possibility is confirmed, for
example, by the technical fact that within the theory of lawless sequences LS,
16In the original: Die betrachtende Anschauung, die auf den Gegenstand “im Ganzen” gerichtet
ist. Diese schlichte Erfassung und Betrachtung ist die unterste Stufe niederer objektivierender
Aktivität, die unterste Stufe ungehemmter Auswirkung des Wahrnehmunsinteresses. Edmund
Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil, Untersuchungen zur Genealogie der Logik, p. 114.
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but of course, also within the theory of lawlike sequences, we can deal with
finite segments and establish properties about them only.) This independence
of initial segments means that they are able to be apprehended in themselves
as finite totalities. But now we ask: are all initial segments at the same level
concerning their apprehension? Does not the size of initial segments matter in
the way they are apprehended?
Can we apprehend any initial segment in itself “however large the num-
ber of its elements may be”? (CCM, ibidem.) Is the apprehension of an initial
segment with 10 elements at the same level of the apprehension of an initial seg-
ment with 1010 elements. Notice that both initial segments are finite sequences.
But, albeit of a finite size, can the second initial segment of a possible choice
sequence be really brought to the mind in itself? Are we capable of apprehend-
ing a sequence of 1010 elements as we are capable of apprehending a sequence
with only 10 elements? It is always possible to determine a rule that computes
any finite sequence no matter its size. In such cases, however, it is not the finite
sequence that is apprehended in itself but the rule which computes the values
of the finite sequence. This fact leaves to conjecture that the only way we have
to conceive the apprehension of a initial segment is through a rule, i.e., that in
general (considering any initial segment and not just the ‘small ones’) they are
apprehended through the sense encapsulated in the rule that generates their
values. What is given to consciousness in itself is the rule that generates the
values of the sequence. Therefore, for finite totalities (at least the large ones)
it is clear that this is the only way we can apprehend them in themselves as
a whole with full evidence. Thus, for initial segments, we have just seen that
their apprehension is analogous to the apprehension of lawlike sequences.
A possible way out of this crticism would consist in claiming that for the
idealized mathematician (as a transcendental subject) the intuition of large finite
totalities in themselves is in some way possible, and hence, does not give rise
to such problems. This, however, seems barely sustainable since the idealized
mathematician is an abstraction from the real mathematicians in which only
memory and time limitations are disregarded. The idealized mathematician
does not possess a more powerful intuitive capacity than the real ones.
Apprehension of the form ‘and so on’. Contrary to the initial segments,
the form ‘and so on’ is not a fragment of individual choice sequences. It is
not a detachable finite part of a totality, instead it pervades the choice sequence
through all its stages. Also contrary to the initial segment, the form ‘and so on’ is
the same identical entity present in any choice sequence, it cannot be something
numerically different in each choice sequence. For example, the categorical
form of logical conjunction ‘∧’ is not a different entity in each particular case
it takes place: the same categorial form is present in different propositions
A ∧ B and C ∧ D, but it is the same form that is present in them, namely the
schematic form ‘... ∧ ...’. Contrary, for example, to the universal redness that
is not present on every red-coloured thing, but that is an abstraction from the
several tokens of redness present in red-coloured objects, the categorial form ‘∧’
is not present in every logical conjunction as a token but in itself, is the same
identical object ‘∧’ that is present in every concrete logical conjunction. Like the
logical conjunction, the form ‘and so on’ does not become something different
in each choice sequences; it is numerically the same object that is present in
every choice sequence. And if we assume (as van Atten proposes) that the
categorial form ‘and so on’ is the substrate for individual choice sequences,
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then we are forced to admit that it is the same numerically identical substrate
that is present in any choice sequence. This is also a reason why it cannot stand
as the substrate of individual choice sequences: different individual objects
must have different substrates.
The intuition of a categorial object presents the intendend object as a formal
entity, a scheme that is identically the same in each particluar unity of sense in
which it is present. The categorial form ‘∧’ is identically the same object in A∧B
and in C∧D. In itself the categorial form ‘∧’ does not differenciate neither A∧B
nor C∧D since it is present as the same in every logical conjunction. Therefore,
the categorial intuition of ‘∧’, although implied by it, does not determine the
individual apprehension of A∧B in itself or as being different from C∧D since it
is the same categorial object (‘∧’) that is present in the two distinct propositions.
We will argue below that the categorial form ‘and so on’ behaves in the same
way the categorial form ‘∧’ does. The categorial intuition of the form ‘and so
on’ (although implied by it) does not determine the individual apprehension
of a lawless sequence α in itself, nor as being different from another lawless
sequence β.
Assuming the categorial nature of the form ‘and so on’, how can its appre-
hension concur to the apprehension of individual choice sequences? How can
an individual choice sequence be given to consciousness through the appre-
hension of its form ‘and so on’? Notice that neither the initial segment nor the
form ‘and so on’ are the substrate of the intended choice sequence (although
for different reasons). So, how can the substrate be aprehended through their
mutual aprehension? The kind of apprehension proper to categorial objects is
the categorial intuition. The aprehension of a categorial object (a state-of-affairs,
crystalized in a judgement) is not performed at the pre-predicative level but
at a higher level of consciousness activity: the predicative activity. (EJ, section
58.) For this reason the categorial entities cannot be given or apprehended in
the same way, or at the same level, an individual simple object is aprehended.
Notwithstanding this difference between the apprehension of a simple object
and of a categorial object, a categorial object is founded or presupposes the indi-
vidual objects apprehended in the pre-predicative consciousness. (EJ, section
59.) This means, for example, that the apprehension of the logical conjunc-
tion ‘∧’ in the proposition A ∧ B presupposes the apprehension of A and B
in themselves (not necessarily as actual or already performed apprehensions,
but as possible ones). In other words, the constitution of categorial objectivi-
ties presupposes the constitution of the non-categorial substrates taking place
(through a specific type of compositionality) at the categorial act. What this
entails, concerning van Atten’s claim, is that the apprehension of the categorial
form ‘and so on’ does not concur for the constitution of the substrates of choice
sequences. It is precisely the other way around: they are presupposed to be al-
ready constituted (or constituable) as substrates to make possible the intuition
of a categorial object.
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4.6 What should count as the noema for choice se-
quences?
In discussing the temporal modes of giveness of choice sequences we proposed
en passant that Husserl would dismiss choice sequences as mathematical objects
not because of their temporal mode of intratemporality but by the fact that they
do not have a definite noema or, more precisely, a definite mathematical noema.
(See p. 11 of this chapter, section 4: ‘Omnitemporality versus Intratemporality’.)
Let’s now turn the attention to this question and analyze what it means and
which consequences it entails.
The (in)adequate giveness of choice sequences. A claim advanced by van
Atten concerning the intuition of choice sequences is that the form ‘and so on’
“adequately indicates the ever present possibility to construct additional ele-
ments of the sequence”, meaning that “the absence of such further elements
from an intuition of the sequence at a given moment does not render that intu-
ition inadequate, because they do not yet even exist.” (CCM, ibidem.) Choice
sequences are given to consciousness necessarily as permanently growing ob-
jects and, as such, they cannot be given otherwise than the way they are. For
van Atten, this means that they are adequately apprehended in virtue of they
own unfinished nature. Moreover, the fact that in any moment of time there
are parts of the sequence that are not necessarily apprehended because they
do not exist yet is not a prejudice to their adequate apprehension since choice
sequences are originarily given as incomplete objects.
For Husserl, an object is inadequately given when it is presented in such a
way that:
(...) the sense-correlate of «what properly appears» fashions a non-
selfsufficient part which can only have unity and selfsufficiency of
sense in a whole which necessarily includes in itself empty com-
ponents and indeterminate components.” (Ideas I, section 138, p.
331.)17
The apprehension of an individual object is inadequate if its particular sense
is per se insufficient to guarantee a complete intuition of the object it refers to.
And this is the case when the sense includes indeterminate or incomplete com-
ponents. In other words, the apprehension of an individual object is inadequate
if the respective sense leaves room to the «determination otherwise» of the in-
tended substrate, that is, if it is left open by its sense that the substrate of
determinations was capable of having other properties different from the ones
it really has. (Ideas I, section 138, p. 332.) Another way Husserl describes the
adequate/inadequate apprehension of an object is the follwing:
Every such evidence – understanding the term in our broadend
sense – is either adequate evidence, of essential necessity incapable of
being further «strengthened» or «weakened», thus without degrees of
17in the original: (...) Es bildet sein SInneskorrelat im vollen Dingsinne einen unselbständingen
Teil, welcher Sinneseinheit und -selbständigkeit nur haben kann in einem Ganzen, das notwendig
Leerkomponenten und Unbestimmtheitskomponenten in sich birgt. Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu
einer reinen Phänomenologie, Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einfürung in die reine Phänomenologie, p. 319;
Husserliana III/1 und V, 1992.
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weight; or the evidence is inadequate and thus capable of being increased
and decreased. (Ideas I, section 138, p. 333.)18
Given Husserl’s description, the apprehension of an object is adequate if
the evidence we have for it is not capable of degrees of weight, i.e., if its
apprehension as an individual object is fully guaranteed or determinated by
the intentional content of its respective noema; and thus, not able to be increased
(or decreased) in its intuitive power by further possible determinations that are
not already explicitly given in the noema’s content. If the evidence for an object
does not conform to these prescriptions, then it is inadequate. Let’s see how is
constituted the noema of a choice sequence, and then analyse if it fits Husserl’s
prescriptions for an adequate evidence.
The noema is the ideal correlate of the intentional acts or noesis. In the
noema the intentional characteristics of the real intentional act, or multiplicity
of acts, are crystallized in a permanent way. To each act or multiplicity of acts
corresponds a noema, and each noema is correlated to an act or multiplicity of
intentional acts. This mutual correlation between the noesis and the noema is
the so-called correlation between intentional act and intentional sense. Moere-
over, the primitive intentionality of the consciousness acts, i.e., the fact that the
consciousness is consciousness of something and, for that reason, refers to some-
thing in an intentive way, turns possible the distinction concerning the noesis
between the intentional act itself and the ‘something’ the act is about. In other
words, the distinction between the intentive act and the intended object. But this
distinction also has a parallel within the noema. Which Husserl expresses as
follows:
Each noema has a «content», that is to say, its «sense», and is related
through it to «its» object. (...) As soon as we go into it more precisely
we are immediately cognitively aware that indeed the distinction
between «content» and «object» is to be made not only for the «con-
sciousness», for the intentive mental process, but also for the noema
taken in itself. Thus the noema too is related to an object and pos-
sesses a «content» by «means» of which it relates to the object; in
which case the object is the same as that of the noesis; as then the
“parallelism” again completely confirms itself. (Ideas I, section 129,
pp. 309 and 311, respectively.)19
Due to the paralelism between noesis and noema, the noema provides both
the sense and, through this sense, the reference. A noema with a full sense can
18In the original: Eine jede solche Evidenz – das Wort in unseren erweiterten SInne verstanden
– ist entweder adäquate, prinzipiell nicht mehr zu, “bekräftingende” oder zu “entkräftende”, also
ohne Gradualität eines Gewichts; oder sie ist inadäquate und damit steigerungs- und minderungss-
fähige. Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie, Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einfürung in
die reine Phänomenologie, p. 321.
19In the original: Jedes Noema hat einen “Inhalt”, nämlich seinen “Sinn”, und bezieht sich durch
ihn auf “seinen” Gegenstand. (...) Sowie wir darauf genauer eingehen, werden wir dessen inne,
daß in der Tat nicht nur für das “Bewuß tsein”, für das intentionale Erlebnis, sondern auch für
das Noema in sich genommen der Unterschied zwischen “Inhalt” und “Gegenstand” zu machen
ist. Also auch das Noema bezieht sich auf einen Gegenstand und besitzt einen “Inhalt”, “mittels”
dessen es sich auf den Gegenstand bezieht: wobei der Gegenstand derselbe ist wie der der Noese;
wie denn der “Parallelismus” wieder durchgängig sich bewährt. Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu einer
reinen Phänomenologie, Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einfürung in die reine Phänomenologie, p. 299.
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be structured into several layers of senses. First of all, there are the properties
of the object: its predicates, relations, etc. (Ideas I, section 129.) Then, there is
the layer of sense referring to the object in the how of its modes of giveness. To this
layer of sense corresponds the way the object is intended through its predicates:
remembered, imagined, clearly or obscurely seen, adequately or inadequately
given, etc. (Ideas I, section 130.) There is however a central nucleous around
which all layers of sense are grouped:
This nucleous or objective sense is the element in the noema in
which the object of reference is meant as distinct from its various
senses or predicates which are meant as belonging to this object of
reference. This nucleous performs the role which was carried by the
objectivating act in the Investigations. By virtue of it, an intention is
referred to a definite object.20
In this central nucleous, the object of reference is meant as the bearer of the
predicates, or as the pure substrate distinguishable from its predicates. Husserl
also calls to the object in this sense the “the pure determinable X in abstraction
from all predicates”. (Ideas I, section 131, p. 313.) Moreover, the noema,
the complete noema has no validity without its object of reference, without
the central nucleous in which the object is intended as itself, through its own
individual sense. In Husserl’s own words:
In no noema, however, can it or its necessary center, the point of
unity, the pure determinable X, be missing. No «sense» without
the «something» and, again, without «determining content». (Ideas I,
section 131, p. 315.)21
Given Husserl’s conception of the noema, we now ask: what should count as
the noema of a particular choice sequence? Suppose we have a choice sequence
α, then how is to be constituted the noema of α? In principle, we should have
at least (1) the possible predicates of α: A1(α),A2(α), ...; (2) the possible modes
of giveness of α: as clearly intuited, as remembered, as adequately given, etc.;
and (3) the noematic nucleous of α: the intended object of reference in the core
sense. Of course the problematic component of the noema of a choice sequence
is the last one, its alleged object of reference or substrate given by the particular
sense of the central nucleous. What should count as the noematic nucleous of
α?
Towards the noema of a lawlike sequence. If a is a lawlike sequence,
then what should count as the noematic nucleous is its particular law, which
we express as ‘ fa’. It is the determinate intensional generation process of its
values that presents the object of reference. It is through fa that a is presented
as an object, and as a mathematical object since the law is a mathematical
law. Therefore, for lawlike sequences, it is the sense expressed in the law that
makes the reference to its substrate possible. Moreover, this law is presented
20Robert Sokolowski, The Formation of Husserl’s Concept of Constitution, Martinus Nijhoff, The
Hague, 1970, p. 144.
21In the original: In keinen Noema kann er fehlen und kann sein notwendiges Zentrum, der
Einheitspunkt, das pure bestimmbare X fehlen. Kein “Sinn” ohne das “etwas” und wieder ohne “
bestimmenden Inhalt”. Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie, Erstes Buch: Allge-
meine Einfürung in die reine Phänomenologie, p. 299.
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as continually generating new values of the sequence. However, the sequence
itself, albeit its growing character, is contained as a unity, as a single object, in the
law. Again, it is through the law that the reference to the sequence in different
contexts is made, no matter the predicates the sequence has. In one context
we may present the sequence a as having the predicates: A1(a),A2(a),A3(a), ...
and in another context as having the predicates: B1(a),B2(a),B3(a), .... But it is
always the same object, namely a, that is presented in both contexts, no matter
the predicates it has. This univocal reference to the object is only possible by
virtue of its particular sense expressed in the law. Moreover, we do not have to
stipulate in advance that two lawlike sequences are the same (or are different
ones) in order to have identity (or non-identity). Their noemas will determine
if they are the same sequence or not, i.e., if the laws attached to each of them
are equivalent laws or not.
A consequence due to the type of sense attached to a lawlike sequence is
that the initial segment of a lawlike sequence is not apprehended separately
from the sequence itself. The law through which we apprehend a lawlike
sequence turns the aprehension of its initial segment possible but un-necessary,
meaning that we do not have to apprehend the initial segment as a detached
part of the whole sequence because, in some sense, the sequence in its entirety is
intuitively encapsulated in the law: any value of the sequence is determinated
by the law, therefore we have access to any element of the sequence. Contrary
to lawless sequences, the initial segment of a lawlike sequence is implicit in
the law. Thus it is not necessary to make an essential differentiation between
the sequence and its initial segment. This is the reason why WC-N need not
hold for a restricted domain that contain the lawlike sequences. With respect
to the class of lawlike sequences, because the initial segment is not necessary or
sufficient to determine the predicates of the sequence, we may have extensional
properties that do not depend on the extensional information of the sequence
(viz. its initial segment) but on the intensional information of the sequence, viz.
on the law that generate its values.
Towards the noema of a lawless sequence. For the noema of a lawless
sequenceα, however, it is not clear what should count as the noematic nucleous.
By definition there is no law through which the values of α are generated, i.e.,
there is no fα. Therefore, there is no determinate core sense that refers back to
the substrate of α. In other words, there is not an expressed sense in the noema
univocally attached to α and through which we are able to refer to α in each
possible context. Notice that neither the inital segment nor the form ‘and so on’
can play this role. An initial segment can be presented as the initial segment of
several distinct lawless sequences, therefore it should count as a determination
of the object of reference (a fragment) and not as the object of reference itself.
The form ‘and so on’ is also an essential determination of any choice se-
quence, and by itself it does not determine univocally the object of reference.
Instead, it should count as an essential characteristic pertaining to the layer of
sense to which corresponds the property that α possesses of being a dynamic
object. In other words, the form ‘and so on’ refers to the object of reference as
permanently growing, it does not refers simpliciter to the object that is growing.
Contrary to lawlike sequences, the form ‘and so on’ does not iterate a math-
ematically well defined process (it does not iterates the process ‘n + 1’, or the
process ‘n × 2’, etc.). Instead, for lawless sequences, the character ‘and so on’
iterates the more or less intuitive mental act of ‘choosing a natural number’,
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whose mathematical nature is debatable. Besides the uncertain mathematical
character of the iterated process of ‘choosing a natural number’, it is not also
clear how such a process univocally determines an individual object, and a
mathematical individual object.
A possible candidate to stand as the noematic nucleous, in order to deter-
mine univocally the object of reference, would be the precise moment in which
α was started (as van Atten proposes). The concrete moment in time in which
we start to generate the values of α is not, however, part of the noema. Instead,
it is a real moment of the noesis, and not an ideal component of the noema.
The temporal moment in which α was started is a property of the noesis: it
is a property of the act by which we generate the first value of α and then go
on, it is not a property of the intentional correlate of such act, viz. the noema.
Therefore, the particular moment in which α was started has no place in the
noema and, in particular, it cannot stand as the noematic nucleous.
Another possible candidate (closely related to the last one) to stand as the
noematic nucleous of a lawless sequence would be the ideal correlate of the
intuition of time. This hypothesis seems to be explicitly made when van Atten
says (concerning the noesis) that “The intuition obtained in these [objectifying]
acts is closely related to the awareness of inner time.” (CCM, p. 63.) But again,
it is not clear how the correlate of the intuition of inner time would allow us
to apprehend the object of reference of a lawless sequence (viz., the sequence)
in itself, or to refer univocally to it. The flow of time (or ‘form of time’ as
van Atten calls it, ibidem) and the substrate of a lawless sequence are different
things, despite the fact that both are given as growing objects. It seems to be
counter-intuitive to conceive that the substrate of a lawless sequence is the flow
of time by the same reason it is counter-intuitive to conceive that the substrate
of a lawless sequence is the form ‘and so on’, namely because the form ‘and
so on’ (and the flow of time) cannot be a numerically different component in
every noema of a lawless sequence. Moreover, it seems that there is no way to
distinguish between the flow of time and the form ‘and so on’ since, as the form
‘and so on’, “the form of time constrains the purely categorial formations”
(ibidem) and hence performs the same role that the form ‘and so on’ does.
But if this identification is to be made, then the flow of time cannot stand as
the noematic nucleous of a lawless noema precisely because we have already
dismissed the form ‘and so on’ as a possible candidate.
Given the situation above, we think that we cannot assume the existence of
a plausible noematic nucleous in the noema of a lawless sequence, since we are
not able to determine what should count as a sense for the object of reference
of a lawless sequence. Therefore, given Husserl’s claim that there is no noema
without the nuclear sense referring to the «something», the search for the proper
noema of a lawless sequence is an open question. In particular, it is an open
question to determine in which way an alleged noema of a lawless sequence
would be a mathematical noema and in which sense is a lawless sequence a
mathematical object. Another consequence of this state of affairs is that, without
the core sense pointing to the object of reference, it is meaningless to ask whether
such an object is adequately or inadequately given to consciousness because it
is not given at all.
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Chapter 5
On the elimination of lawless
sequences
This chapter is the final one. We will advance a view on choice sequences of
our own and present arguments in its favour. Such a view is not intended to
be exhaustive or our last word on the matter, but rather a possible direction
of work. In the first section, we discuss some aspects of the Elimination theo-
rem, with particular emphasis on van Atten’s arguments presented against the
eliminitivist interpretation. In the second section, we develop a specific inter-
pretation of Weyl’s account of choice sequences, with the objective of bringing
some clarification on the problematic claims he advocates. With this specific
interpretation of Weyl’s work on choice sequences we do not intend to defend
the claims he proposed, but only to make a point: that they represent an unsur-
passable difficulty posed by choice sequences taken as mathematical objects.
In the third section, we develop and argue in favour of an interpretation of
existential quantification over lawless sequences close to Weyl’s view: there is
in fact a sense in which existential quantification over lawless sequences can
be interpreted as quantification over unproblematic mathematical objects and
there is also a sense in which universal quantification can be interpreted as
referring to choice sequences en masse.
5.1 Some aspects of the Elimination theorem
The question ‘in what sense is the operation «sucessive free choices» a mathe-
matical operation?’ is not formulated nor answered by van Atten. And it would
be interesting to show in what sense such operation is to be considered a math-
ematical operation. The way van Atten argues for the mathematical character
of choice sequences is an indirect way: he argues for “the coherence of choice
sequence as a mathematical concept.” (BmH, p. 95.) The goal is to show that
the mathematical speech about choice sequences is not meaningless; and, for
him, to do this is equivalent to show that statements involving choice sequences
have mathematical content, i.e., express genuine mathematical properties.
Consider the lawless sequences, in fact the strongest case of time-
dependent, subject dependent objects (...) For this class we have the
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Kreisel-Troelstra translation, which shows that sentences quantify-
ing over lawless sequences are equivalent to other sentences that
do not, and whose mathematical nature goes unquestioned (...) But
then the sentences that are translated must also be mathematical.
Translations suffice to show that the concept of choice sequence,
and specifically, the concept of lawless sequence, is mathematically
coherent. (BmH, p. 96.)
For van Atten, the τ-translations guarantee the mathematical coherence and
meaningfulness of speech about lawless sequences. Moreover the equivalences
in the Elimination theorem hold in both directions, so the translations induces
no ontological preference. The translations, after all, are equivalences between
sentences A, with quantified lawless variables, and τ(A), not containing law-
less variables at all. Suppose an opponent of choice sequences as mathematical
objects argues that they do not have mathematical semantic content, i.e., that
sentences involving lawless variables, albeit non-contradictory, do not express
mathematical properties. Then the translations would stand for as counterex-
amples to that claim. In reality, semantical properties of lawless sequences,
due to the translations, can be analyzed in terms of the semantical properties
of unquestioned mathematical concepts (viz., the concepts of ‘finite sequence’
and ‘constructive function’).
The translations take the form of equivalences, i.e., the form A ↔ τ(A),
where A has occurrences of lawless variables and τ(A) has not such occurrences.
Van Atten’s argument is that equivalence statements go both ways. There is one
side of the equivalence A → τ(A), meaning that sentences involving lawless
sequences imply sentences not involving them. When we are talking about
lawless sequences we are also talking about other mathematical objects (e.g.,
finite sequences, constructive functions) whose mathematical character is not
questioned. There is the other side of the equivalence τ(A)→ A, meaning that
the speech about those mathematical unquestioned objects also imply speech
about lawless sequences. Given this state of affairs, we cannot regard lawless
sequences as eliminated from the mathematical discourse since they imply and
are implied by unquestioned genuine mathematical statements. For this reason,
and following a proposal of Kreisel, van Atten accepts that “such translations
should not be understood (as they usually are) as ‘elimination theorems’, but
as giving ‘a complete analysis of lawless sequences’. (BmH, p. 41.)
Due to the translations, lawless sequences are coherent and meaningfull in
the context of mathematical formulas. But now we ask: is coherence and mean-
ingfulness of lawless sequences in mathematical formulas the only implication
of the Elimination theorem? Notice that for any formula A involving lawless
sequences we can substitute it and use its translation counterpart τ(A) with no
lawless variables involved. Isn’t this stronger than just coherence and mean-
ingfulness? Is there any reason to take the elimination of lawless sequences
literally? After all, what is the point of using lawless sequences if we can use
unproblematic mathematical objects instead, viz. initial segments and lawlike
sequences, with equivalent results? Should not the principle of Occam’s razor
prevail in this context, eliminating unnecessary elements in the process of con-
structing a theory? There is an argument which leads van Atten to answer ‘No!’
to these questions. In his words:
To speak of ‘elimination’ falsely suggests that the intuitive con-
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tinuum can be regarded as a discrete point set after all. Even if
statements quantifying over lawless sequences are equivalent to
statements that do not, the fact remains that we should think of
the intuitive continuum as analysable into, among others, such se-
quences and not into elements of a set. (...) Only the notion of
lawless sequence fully reflects both the inexhaustibility and non-
discreteness of the intuitive continuum. (BmH, p. 42.)1
The strongest motivation for introducing lawless sequence into mathematics
is that the continuum constructed on the basis of them has specific properties
(e.g., inexhaustibility and non-discreteness) that the intuitionist takes as being
essential to it. The intuitionist conception of the continuum is directed against
the classic view of the continuum as a collection of discrete points and the notion
of lawless sequence guarantees that. There are not, however, conclusive reasons
to believe that the intuitionist conception of the continuum is the right one, or
that it is better that the classical one. More relevant, even if we accept that the
intuitionistic conception of the continuum is the right one, nothing ensures that
the notion of lawless sequence is the best, or the only possible notion upon
which it can be mathematically based.
The idea we want to stress here is that the motivation for lawless sequences
does not force us to accept that they are legitimate mathematical objects. The
motivation for considering that a determinate notion is mathematically useful,
or advantageous and the legitimacy of applying it as a mathematical notion are
not the same. They are independent of each other and, concerning discussions
about the foundations of mathematics, the arguments for accepting such a
notion as a legitimate mathematical notion are prior to the motivation for
introducing them into mathematical theories. First we have to show that such
notion is mathematically valid, then we have to show that we have good reasons
to use them in our mathematical theories, i.e., that they have the intended
mathematical properties we want to be inherited by the structures we use them
to construct.
Does not such claim constitute a petitio principii? Van Atten assumes pre-
cisely what is in question: choice sequences are to be viewed as genuine math-
ematical objects and, hence, not eliminated since they are used to build up
intuitionistic mathematical structures. Therefore, an eliminativist interpreta-
tion of the Elimination theorem is blocked in advance since they are necessary
to build, e.g., the intuitionistic continuum. Notice, however, that at this point of
the philosophical discussion the mathematical character of lawless sequences
is not clearly established. Therefore, we think, such an argument is not yet
available to be asserted. The Elimination theorem cannot be, in the first place,
interpreted considering the (posterior) applications of lawless sequences. The
significance of the Elimination theorem has to be settled before any application
of lawless sequences.
In LS, lawless sequences are treated as objects per se, not as elements of the
intuitonistic continuum. Any tension between the proof-theoretic implications
of the Elimination theorem and posterior applications of the notion of lawless
sequence is something we have to deal with by further investigation on both,
the axiomatisation and on the applications of lawless sequences. It cannot be
1Dummett argues the same in EI, p. 222.
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simply assumed that the applications are correct (or, cannot be wrong) and,
therefore, that any proof-theoretic result which is incompatible with the appli-
cations is to be viewed with suspicion. In our understanding, the Elimination
theorem is of interest precisely because of its intuitive ‘incompatibility’ with
the need of lawless sequences in constructing the intuitionistic continuum. Can
this tension the resolved? How to decide which of the readings (eliminativist
or non-eliminativist) have conceptual predominance? These questions are very
interesting ones, but they can only be properly answered in case we start to
consider the Elimination theorem and similar (negative) proof-theoretic results
with other eyes.2 For this reason, we conclude that van Atten’s argument,
based on the motivation for lawless sequences, does not block in advance an
eliminativist interpretation of the Elimination theorem.
Another argument is advanced by van Atten to support the non-eliminati-
vist interpretation of the Elimination theorem. This argument is based on the
negative view of the siginificance of formal theories, particularly advocated
by Brouwer. For Brouwer, formal theories do not provide a complete grasp
of mathematical objects precisely because mathematics is seen by him as a
languageless activity whose objects (e.g., choice sequences) are freely gener-
ated by the mind. And because formal/axiomatic theories involve particular
symbolisms, they are not faithful representations of mathematical knowledge.
Inspired on Brouwer’s view of mathematical resoning, van Atten states the
following:
[The] translations occur in the context of axiomatisations of choice
sequences. These systems should not be confused with the se-
quences themselves. Axiomatisations are a way to present math-
ematical content, but they are not identical with it. Lawless se-
quences have been axiomatised in different, not always equivalent
ways (e.g., Kreisel, Myhill, Troelstra); nevertheless something re-
mains the same, namely, these axiomatisations are all about lawless
sequences. (...) Clearly it is not the case that we were first in the dark
about this and then learned it from finding mappings between the
formalisms. These sequences (or any other mathematical object)
cannot be identified with any particular axiomatisation (let alone
formalisation). Moreover, doing so would force us to accept the
implausible view that Brouwer’s theorising before the introduction
of axiomatic theories was, in fact, about nothing. (BmH, p. 42.)
Formal theories have limitations that are well known. It is a fact that, in
general, formal theories are not complete in the sense that, assuming they are
consistent, not all truths about the intuitive notion are provable within the par-
ticular formal theory in question; or that their consistency cannot be proved
only by the means provided by the formalised theory in question (Gödel’s In-
completeness theorems). However, the objective of formal/axiomatic theories
is precisely to make as clear as possible the properties of intuitive notions. So, it
is not clear what van Atten wants to stress in the quote above when he says that
the axiomatic ‘systems should not be confused with the sequences themselves’.
2See, for example, the fact that the universe of lawless sequences is not closed under any
continuous operation except for the identity operation (CinM II vol, p. 650).
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On one hand, this claim is trivially true (by Gödel’s first Incompleteness the-
orem). On the other hand, if he wants to say that, somehow, what is proved
in LS is not to be regarded as genuine knowledge about lawless sequences,
then something is wrong with this claim. That LS possibly does not express all
properties of lawless sequences, is acceptable. Another thing is to suggest that
(some of) the properties expressed in LS are not genuine properties of lawless
sequences, which is much harder to accept. And, if we regard the Elimination
theorem with suspicion, why would we do not the same, e.g., in relation to
WC-N; notice that both are proved in LS.
Of course, the Elimination theorem can be seen as a surprising (and unex-
pected?) formal result, but this fact does not mean that it should be regarded as
being suspicious. In fact, it is the other way around. The Elimination theorem
sould be regarded, we think, as a symptom of our lack of intuitive knowl-
edge about lawless sequences since, in principle, they should not be eliminated
precisely because they were introduced as original and fundamental objects.
What is wrong after all with this notion? What we have just said does not force
us to accept that ‘Brouwer’s theorising before the introduction of axiomatic
theories was, in fact, about nothing’, but leaves us to think that Brouwer’s
intuitive conception of lawless sequences was, of course, about something, but
about something whose our (or his) undertanding was not completely accu-
rate. For example, Brouwer’s original notion of a lawless sequence, viz. the
proto-lawless sequences, is a clear example of a notion with severe mathemat-
ical limitations. The axiomatisation of lawless sequences is a way to refine the
notion of lawless sequence, a way of make it more accurate. And we have to
deal with the negative results as well as we deal with the positive (or desired)
ones. For this reason, we also conclude that van Atten’s argument, based on
the incompleteness of the axiomatisations of lawless sequences, does not block
an eliminativist interpretation of the Elimination theorem. More arguments
are needed to support the non-eliminativist interpretation of the Elimination
theorem.
5.2 Weyl on mathematical existence
In chapter two (section 2.5) we advanced the hypothesis that the eliminativist
interpretation of the τ-translations partially vindicates Weyl’s account of choice
sequences. But the proposed Weylian-type interpretation of the τ-translations
is not easily accepted. For van Atten
Weyl’s effort to avail himself of the use of the concept of lawless
sequence without allowing them into his mathematical ontology
suffers from (...) a faulty premisse (after all, lawless sequences
cannot be stipulated to follow lawlike sequences), (...) [which]
requires an unnatural (asymmetrical) interpretation of the quanti-
fiers.” (‘Brouwer and Weyl’, p. 16.) At first glance it might seem
that the justification for Weyl’s postulate is to be founded in another
principle advocated by him: that it is an essential property of all
mathematical objects that they can be coded into natural numbers.
But, as van Atten argues, “in phenomenology, one needs a consti-
tution analysis to justify such claim [and], unless that is done, it is
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only a pressuposition. (‘Brouwer and Weyl’, p. 16.)
We want now to present a new perspective on Weyl’s account of choice
sequences, based on his own conception of mathematical existence. With the
purpose alone of introducing our personal view on choice sequences (which is
inspired but not based on Weyl’s account) we will here try to show the implicit
reasons that lead Weyl to propose such a (untenable) principle on quantifica-
tion over choice sequences. What we call here Weyl’s postulate is essentially
dependant on the way Weyl conceives existential statements of mathematics:
An existential statement – say, “there is an even number” – is not at all
a judgment in the strict sense, which claims a state of affairs. Existential
states of affairs are empty inventions of logicians. “2 is an even
number”: This is an actual judgment expressing a state of affairs;
“there is an even number” is merely a judgment abstract [Ursteil-
abstrakt] gained from this judgment. If knowledge is a precious
treasure, then the judgment abstract is a piece of paper indicating
the presence of a treasure, yet without revealing at which place. Its
only value can be to drive me on to look for the treasure. The piece
of paper is worthless as long as it is not realized by an underly-
ing actual judgment like “2 is an even number.” (‘New Crisis’, pp.
97-98.)
It is clear from the quote above that, for Weyl, statements of the form
‘∃xA(x)’ are not at the same epistemological level that statements of the form
‘A(a)’. We think that it would not be wrong to assert that, for Weyl, there are
not mathematical states of affairs originally corresponding to judgments of the
form ‘∃xA(x)’. The genuine (strict) mathematical states of affairs correspond
to judgments of the form ‘A(a)’ and thus the genuine mathematical existence
claims are of this form. It is an act of logical abstraction to go from A(a)
to ∃xA(x). But we cannot confuse the two and assume that both have the
same epistemological status: quantified existential claims are justified by their
respective individual instances. We are allowed to assert ∃xA(x) if, and only
if, we have the construction of a proof of A(a) in advance, not the reverse.
Therefore, the statement ∃xA(x) is worthless (i.e., express no genuine state of
affairs) if it is not instantiated (realized) by the proper judgment A(a), since from
the mere assertion that ∃xA(x) we are not able to indicate which individual
object is in such conditions. In other words, from ∃xA(x) we cannot extract
a construction such that a proof of A(a) is achieved for a particular a. (‘New
Crisis’, p. 95.)
It seems that there is a strong resemblance between the way Weyl conceives
existential mathematical judgments and the way Husserl does. Namely, that
they are not directly about individual objects. Judgments of the form ‘∃xA(x)’
represent only (abstract) judgments about possible states of affairs about in-
dividual objects. And these possibilities are only realized when an actual or
genuine mathematical judgment is achieved, i.e., when a judgment of the form
‘A(a)’ is proved. Another way to bring closer this resemblance is by conceiving
judgments of the form ‘∃xA(x)’ as unfulfilled intentions, whose fulfillment is only
achieved when we are able to construct a particular instantiation of it (when
we are able to find the treasure form whose it is only an indication), viz. a
proof of A(a). Notice that, within Weyl’s conception of mathematical existence,
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is implicit the Husserlian distinction between formal and material mathematics3.
Statements of the form ‘∃xA(x)’ belong to formal mathematics, while statements
of the form ‘A(a)’ belong to the material mathematics, i.e., belong to the tradi-
tional mathematical disciplines (Euclidean geometry, theory of numbers, etc.).
Thus the judgments expressing genuine mathematical content or knowledge
are the ones that are directly about the individual objects of the material branch
of mathematics and whose reference is guaranteed by individuation criteria
already belonging to that material disciplines (material ontology). For Weyl,
statements of the form ‘∃xA(x)’ do not belong to the traditional material disci-
plines of mathematics, but to the formal ones (formal ontology) and, for that
reason, they are not about determinate individual objects, but about possible
objects. Therefore, they do not express actual states of affairs, but just possible
states of affairs.
Applying this framework to lawless sequences, we have that a statement
like ∃αA(α), where α is a lawless variable, would only have a mathematical
justification if, in advance, we had achieved a construction of the intended
proof of A(α). But now a new element enter into the equation: the non-lawlike
dynamic character of lawless sequences. Notice that now the difficulty does
not lie in the level of the judgments abstracts but on the level of the genuine
mathematical states of affairs. The difficulty is no longer to go from A(α)
to ∃αA(α) (or vice-versa), but lies on the ontological status of the judgments
of the form A(α). The problem is that lawless sequences, because of their
non-lawlike character, cannot be mathematically individuated. For lawlike
sequences, individuation is guaranteed by the above enunciated criterion: they
can be coded into natural numbers since any law can be replaced by a natural
number. Given that lawlike sequences can be coded into natural numbers,
judgments of the form A(a), where a is a lawlike sequence, do express genuine
mathematical states of affairs. Therefore, if we have a proof of a judgement
A(a), then we are able infer ∃aA(a).
Lawless sequences, on the other hand, cannot be submitted to such a cri-
terion. And, more generally, there is no a definite mathematical criterion to
individuate them. For this reason judgments of the form A(α), where α is an
individual lawless variable, seem to not express genuine mathematical states
of affairs. As consequence, we don’t know what is in general to be accepted
as a (constructivist) proof of a statement as ∃αA(α). How do we fulfill the
intention of ∃αA(α)? Suppose A(α) := ∀nα(n) > 100. In Weyl’s framework,
in order to assert ∃αA(α) we have to find first an individual α such that for
any n, α(n) > 100. But it is an essential character of lawless sequences that
they are unfinished, free developing objects; therefore, we cannot have access
to all values of α. Because A depends on the entire lawless sequence α and not
just on its initial segment, the values of the initial segment are not sufficient
to prove A(α) (but they can suffice to prove ¬A(α) if, at least, one value of the
3For a more detailed discusion about formal and material mathematics see Richard Tieszen’s
‘Husserl’s Logic’ in Handbook of History of Logic vol. III, North-holland, Amsterdam, 2008, pp.
285-291. Besides the resemblance with Husserl in the way Weyl conceives genuine/abstract math-
ematical statements, there is also, we think, a strong resemblance with Hilbert distinction between
finitistic and infinitary mathematics. The crucial difference, of course, is that for both Hilbert and
Husserl this fact have not the negative connotation Weyl attributes to it. For Hilbert and Husserl,
both branchs of mathematics are mathematics, with the only difference being that they are in dif-
ferent ‘levels’ of generality. For Hilbert, infinitary mathematics needed to be reducted to finitary
mathematics; for Husserl, it only needed to be explained.
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initial segment is smaller than 100). The consequence is that we might be able
to prove that ¬A(α), but (in the case we don’t have evidence for ¬A(α)) we are
never in position to prove A(α) and, consequently, we are never in position to
assert ∃αA(α). In other words, we are in a position such that we are not able
to fulfill the intention of ∃αA(α). Generally, we cannot deal with propoerties
that depend on the entire lawless sequence, we must restrict to the properties
depending only on the initial segment (WC-N).
It is clear, we think, that the problem is not in Weyl’s criterion of individ-
uation for mathematical objects. The problem lies on the fact that, for lawless
sequences, there is not a mathematical way of referring to them individually.
Because lawlike sequences are never in the same position of lawless ones, i.e.,
because we virtually have acess to any value of a lawlike sequence a, we have
the possibility to determine whether A(a) is the case or not. In order to surpass
this difficulty with lawless sequences Weyl proposes his postulate:
It is one of the fundamental insights of Brouwer that number se-
quences, developing through free acts of choice, are possible objects
of mathematical concept formation. The individual real number is
represented by a lawϕ that determines a sequence in infinitum, while
the continuum is represented by the choice sequence unrestricted by
any law in the freedom of its development. (‘New Crisis’, p. 94.)
Notice that this principle is proposed for dealing with a problem arising
within real analysis. In the context of real analysis, we are working within a
regional branch of mathematics, i.e., we are working within a material disci-
pline of mathematics. By this reason, the ontology pertaining to this particular
branch of mathematics is well established: we are dealing with infinite se-
quences of natural (or rational) numbers. And because we need to deal, not
just with the whole continuum of real numbers (represented by the collection
of infinite sequences), but with individual real numbers given by individual
infinite sequences we must have a way to individualize them in order to refer
to them. However, it is a fact that lawless sequences cannot be individualized
mathematically. Therefore, the only way we have to refer to them is to stipulate
that individual choice sequences are given through a law, since “an individual
determined sequence (...) can only be defined by a law.” (‘New Crisis’, p. 94.)
For Weyl, the individual real numbers are represented by lawlike sequences
while the indifferentiated continuum of the reals is represented by the lawless
ones. In particular, they allow us to correctly form the concept of the mathemat-
ical continuum. Lawless sequences, given that they cannot be defined by a law,
can only be admitted as possible objects of mathematical concept formation,
i.e., we can only deal with the whole collection of choice sequences at once.
In other words, we can only deal with the notion of choice sequence, by inter-
preting universally quantified statements over lawless sequences as judgments
about the notion of choice sequence.
Weyl’s justification for this interpretation of universal quantification over
choice sequences is to be found in one of his most important tenets about math-
ematical objects, which says that we “cannot get general [universal] judgments
about [sequences of] numbers by looking at the individual [sequences of] num-
bers, but only looking at the essence of number [sequence].” (‘New Crisis’, p.
97.) For example, the justification of the statement ∀αA(α), where α is a choice
105
sequence variable, cannot be concluded by looking to all lawless sequences and
confirm if they have the property A, since “a complete run through an infinite
[number] of sequence[s] is nonsensical.” (Ibidem) The only way we have to
determine the truth of such a property for the domain of choice sequences is
to investigate if the property A “is part of the essence of number [choice se-
quence].” (Ibidem) Therefore, universal statements about choice sequences are
paraphrased into judgments about the notion of choice sequence. Here en-
ters Weyl’s asymmetrical interpretation of the quantifiers: we can universally
quantify over lawless sequence, since when we do that we are not refferring to
any individual choice sequence but making general statements about the con-
tinuum. But existential quantification is allowed only over lawlike sequences
since only they can be individualized.
We can see Weyl’s proposal as untenable, but now we understand better
why he has proposed it. Indeed, as van Atten argues, we cannot stipulate
lawless sequences to follow lawlike ones. But the failure of Weyl’s postulate is
quite instructive and it touches on a sensitive aspect of lawless sequences: we
are not able to deal mathematically with individual lawless sequences. On the
other hand, we cannot either substitue lawless sequences by lawlike ones if we
want to idividualize them. So, how should we accomodate this situation?
In the next section we try to make plausible Weyl’s insights on the in-
dividuation of choice sequences. Our proposal is the following: existential
quantification over lawless sequences is to be interpreted as speech about ini-
tial segments only. Therefore, mathematical speech about lawless sequences
is never about single individuals but about sequences en masse. This claim is
based on a specific result obtained within LS, which is independent from the
Elimination theorem. The proposed interpretation of existential quantification
over lawless sequences is also based on the phenomenological discussion about
lawless sequences presented in the previous chapter; but the emphasis on the
phenomenological aspects of initial segments is developed further. We will see
in what follows that Weyl was wrong in some technical aspects of his treatment
of choice sequences, but that his overal insights about choice sequences point
to the right direction.
5.3 Initial segments: a dilemma?
Both the concept and the categorical form ‘and so on’ were dismissed as the
possible invariant substrate for choice sequences. The reason is the same: they
are not the substrate that grows in the development of a choice sequence. What
does grows in the process of dvelopment of a choice sequence, after all? The
only remaining candidate to answer to this question is: the initial segment.
However, it was regarded by van Atten as the wrong candidate. Let’s see why.
First, because different choice sequences may have the same initial segment,
entailing that the same substrate would be the substrate of different growing
objects. Second, in considering initial segments as the substrate invariant for
choice sequences, the horizon ‘and so on’ is not thematized and, consequently,
the unfinished character of choice sequences is not thematized as the essential
feature it is.
In general, initial segments are the only assured information about choice
sequences that we have, i.e., any choice sequence is given through a process
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of generation and an initial segment; in the case of lawlike sequences we have
the additional information of the law by which their values are generated, but
in the case of lawless sequences (the general case, with no law nor restriction
assigned to them) initial segments are the only information we have. So,
generally, initial segments are the only information we can count with when
talking about choice sequences. This implies that all the information we can
have and need to establish (mathematical) properties about them is given by
initial segments. And, in fact, we don’t need the ‘entire’ choice sequence nor the
intensional information to establish relations among them, the initial segments
suffice. This is precisely what the general principle of open data states.
Given the extensional nature of initial segments, we propose the following:
the initial segment of lawless sequences is what remains identical through
their process of development. We can always bring to the mind the same
initial segment, the initial segment that is identical at any stage of growth of
the choice sequence. Also, if we ask: what is the growing substrate in the
development of a lawless sequence?, the natural answer is: its initial segment,
for we can always extend an initial segment by making a further choice (in fact,
this is a necessary condition). In this sense, initial segments can be seen as the
invariant substrate for individual lawless sequences. In fact, it seems that there
is no other possibility: to talk of an identical substrate for individual lawless
sequences is to talk about their particular initial segments, because they are the
only available answer to the question ‘what grows?’.
However, if we accept initial segments as the invariant substrates for indi-
vidual lawless sequences, unsurpassable problems will arise. How to deal with
van Atten’s criticism? In fact, due to the finite character of initial segments they
do not encapsulate in themselves the potential or dynamic character of lawless
sequences. This means that, being static and finished objects, initial segments
lack the principal characteristic that makes lawless sequences be what they are.
Notice that initial segments and lawless sequences are different objects. We
could say, against this, that, albeit finite objects, initial segments are always ex-
tendable by making a further choice, or an infinity of further choices. Yes, but
they remain always finite objects no matter how many further choices are made.
And, besides, the extendable character of initial segments is a consequence of
the ‘and so on’ character of choice sequences, which is not present in an initial
segment as such. Another problem is that different choice sequences may share
the same initial segment. In this case, it is the same substrate that grows in dif-
ferent lawless sequences? Can the same substrate originate different objects?
How to accommodate this situation?
If we accept that the initial segment of a sequence and the sequence itself
are different objects, we can argue that what grows is the ‘sequence’, not the
initial segment. It is the sequence that is always being extended (by the creating
subject), while the initial segments remain finite and the same. But what is ‘the
sequence’? In a determinate sense, the sequence is never ‘there’; meaning that
the sequence is never completed. What we have at any moment is a finite initial
segment of the sequence. The sequence itself is not a finished object, in fact it is
the outcome of the process, something never finished. Therefore, in the process
of growth of the sequence what we have is a sucession of initial segments. At
any stage what we have is a finite sequence.
At this point of the discussion, we have reached a dilemma: initial seg-
ments seem to be the only natural answer to the question ‘what is the growing
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substrate of individual lawless sequences?’, but accepting them as such would
force the proponent of choice sequences to admit that the substrate of indi-
vidual lawless sequences is something essentially classic. In conclusion, initial
segments seem to be the only available candidates to stand as the substrate for
individual lawless sequences, but they are inappropriate candidates. Surpris-
ingly, there is, however, a technical aspect of the axiomatic theory of lawless
sequences (LS) that seems to meet the perspective presented above and we will
now turn to it. We will see that initial segments cannot stand as substrate for
individual lawless sequence because they are not also able to individuate them.
However, we will see also that existential quantification may be paraphrased
as existential quantification over initil segments.
We present now a proof-theoretic result due to Troelstra which is not di-
rectly related to the Elimination theorem but encapsulates the general idea of
elimination of existential quantifiers for lawless sequences. (CinM II, p. 654).
In combining LS1 and LS3, the following statement is true:
LS ` ∃αA(α)↔ ∃n∀α ∈ nA(α).4
The sentence above states that existential quantification over a lawless se-
quence α is equivalent to existential quantification over an initial segment n of
α. More precisely, to state that there is an individual lawless sequence α with
property A, is equivalent to state that there is an initial segment n such that any
lawless sequences with initial segment n have the property A. This result has
the particular consequence of making possible the factual substitution of exis-
tential quantification over lawless sequences for existential quantification over
their initial segments. In particular, says Troelstra, in formulas of elementary
analysis all existential lawless quantifiers can be removed. (Ibidem.) Given this
state of affairs, we ask: if we are allowed to substitute existential quantification
over lawless sequences for existential quantification over their initial segments,
over what are we quantifiying after all? The intuitive meaning of this propo-
sition is that particular instantiations of lawless sequences are not mandatory to
make the discourse about them intelligible. As consequence, we never have
to deal directly with particular lawless sequences in theories involving speech
about lawless sequences.
In fact, a stronger interpretation of the above result is possible. The lawless
variables in the equivalence are not all eliminated, but they appear only as uni-
versal quantified variables. In this case, we are referring to a subclass of lawless
sequences, namely to the subclass consisting of those lawless sequences shar-
ing the initial segment n. Therefore, we advance that reference to individual
lawless sequence is not necessary, but also the stronger claim that it is not pos-
sible. Initial segments themselves do not individuate lawless sequences at all,
since several lawless sequences may share the same initial segment. This is the
reason why the lawless variable appears in the range of a universal quantifier
4We shall present now a sketchy proof of this proposition. (→) Assume (1) LS3 and (2) ∃αA(α) as
premisses. By∃-elimination from (2) we have (3) A(α); by∀-elimination from (1) and→-elimination
from (2,3) we get (4) ∃n(α ∈ n∧∀β(β ∈ n→ A(β))). By ∃-elimination and ∧-elimination from (4) we
get (5) ∀β(β ∈ n → A(β)); and substituting the variable β by α in (5) we get (6) ∀α(α ∈ n → A(α)).
Simplifying (6) we get (7) ∀α ∈ nA(α). Then, from (6), and applying ∃-introduction we get the
conclusion ∃n∀α ∈ nA(α). (←) Assume (1’) ∃n∀α ∈ nA(α) as premiss. Take n0 in such conditions,
then we get (2’) ∀α ∈ n0A(α). Applying LS1 to (2’), exists α0 such that α0 ∈ n0; then we can infer
(3’) A(α0). Finally, by ∃-introduction on (3’) we get the conclusion ∃αA(α).
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in the right side of the equivalence. Initial segments do not individuate lawless
sequences because any initial segment n determines, not just an individual,
but a multiplicity (potentially infinite) of lawless sequences, viz. the collection
(or species) of lawless sequences sharing the initial segment n. Moreover, the
individual lawless sequences that are determined by an initial segment are
indiscernible from each other on the basis solely of the initial segment.
This fact is the final argument in favour of the thesis that there is no math-
ematical way of individuating lawless sequences. It does not only show that
initial segments do not individuate lawless sequences, but, more generally, that
there is not a way of individuating them. We have reached the conclusion that
the initial segment was the last possible candidate for a substrate which could
individualize lawless sequences. The form ‘and so on’ does not individuate
choice sequences by the same reason: it determines the full class of choice
sequuences. Any choice sequence possesses the property ‘and so on’ as an
essential property. The particular moment in time in which a choice sequence
is started also does not individuate choice sequences: there is no mathematical
property to which it corresponds. Moreover, it is conceivable that different
choice sequences (e.g., with different initial segments) may start at the same
specific moment (except, of course, if we stipulate that at any moment of time
only a unique choice sequence is started by the creating subject, which is clearly
an ad hoc stipuation). Therefore, there is no conceivable mathematical way to
determine a unique individual lawless sequence. This state of affairs leaves us
with the only possibility that we can only refer to lawless sequences en masse,
i.e., as a whole.
If we take into consideration Weyl’s interpretation of quantifiers for law-
less sequences, the idea that they are only needed when we refer to them as a
collection, i.e., as a notion and not as individuals is reinforced. And, vindicat-
ing Weyl’s account of choice sequences, existential quantification over lawless
sequences can be interpreted as existential quantification over unquestioned
(lawlike) mathematical objects: over initial segments (and not over lawlike
sequences as he has proposed). But also, contrary to Weyl, the individuation
of lawless sequences is not just unnecessary, but impossible in mathematical
grounds. The only choice sequences that can be individuated are the lawlike
ones.
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Conclusion
Given the material presented above, we conclude that the arguments for the
legitimacy of introducing choice sequences into the mathematical ontology are
far from being conclusive. When reading van Atten’s attempt of constitution
of choice sequences, there is a persistent tension. What is it to be constituted?
Choice sequences as individual mathematical objects or choice sequence as a
mathematical notion? It is obvious that van Atten’s aim is to constitute them
as individual mathematical objects. However, we can ask if this task was
really achieved. In our understanding, the constitution of choice sequences
as individual mathematical objects is not successfully achieved for the reasons
presented in last two chapters. But, if we ask for a constitution of the general
sense ‘choice sequence’ (by eidetic variation), i.e., as the way we can attribute
a sense to what means to be a choice sequence, then there is a broad sense in
which we can assume the notion as a valid one. Namely (as Weyl proposes)
as a legitimate notion pertaining to the pre-theoretical sphere of constructing
mathematical theories. Whether this notion is not an empty notion (i.e., is
inhabited with individual objects) is dependent on evidence for considering
choice sequences as individual mathematical objects. As we have seen, the
phenomenological attempt to do this is not free from flaws. So, again, until a
suitable account of choice sequences as mathematical objects is achieved, there
is no reason to admit choice sequences as genuine, legitimate mathematical
objects.
In order to achieve a suitable account of choice sequences as mathematical
objects, one must justify the assumption that a ‘free choice’ is to be considered
a legitimate mathematical operation. That a free choice is a possible mental
operation and that it can constitute an acceptable mental process is not ques-
tioned. What is to be decided is if such a mental operation is also a genuine
mathematical operation, like, for example, the mental act of adding a unity to a
number is also a mathematical operation. In fact this is one of the main reasons
for the general reluctance in accepting lawless sequences as genuine mathemat-
ical objects. How to make sense of this idea that arbitrarily choices of numbers
constitute a mathematical operation to which corresponds genuine mathemat-
ical objects? Certainly, the fact that natural numbers are the chosen objects is
not the required justification. Then, in what sense is a succession of free choices a
mathematical operation?
The discussion presented until now gives rise to a tension between the in-
trinsic intensional properties that make choice sequences the intensional objects
they are and the fact that such intensional properties have to be abstracted from
the mathematical treatment they are subjected. This necessity is motivated by
the impossibility of adequately incorporating such intensional properties into
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a mathematical framework. It is irrelevant for mathematical purposes which is
the precise moment a choice sequence is started or the fact of having a bearer
to individuate a choice sequence. Mathematically, choice sequences are not
individuated nor characterized by such features. In fact, (lawless) choice se-
quences are not mathematically individualized at all. And this is so, because
we cannot define mathematically the role that such features play in the way a
choice sequence behaves within a mathematical theory. Troelstra, discussing
the problem of individuation for lawless sequences (in the context of presenting
the motivation for LS2), had to settle a new condition: that lawless sequences
initially given as different sequences have to be mantained as different (even if
they share the same initial segment or, possibly, have the same restrictions). The
same goes for identity: lawless sequences initially given as identical, i.e., given
by the same generation process, have to be treated as the same sequence, de-
spite the fact that we have not access to the process of generation itself. Notice
that no considerations about the relation to time nor about the subject carrying
them plays a part in such ‘criterion’ of individuation. Troelstra’s criterion had
to be introduced in an ad hoc manner, for making intelligible the mathematical
treatment of choice sequences.
Given the actual state of affairs, doesn’t this tension constitutes an antinomy,
i.e., an unsolvable philosophical problem? On one hand we have the fact
that choice sequences are intrinsically intensional objects, in the sense that
they can be individuated by the particular moment they start to grow or by
considering the particular subject that started them, or both. On the other
hand, we have the restriction that such features have to be abstracted from
mathematical practice, in other words, they have to be considered irrelevant for
mathematical treatment of choice sequences. Is this situation philosophically
acceptable? A we have argued, however, in the actual state of affairs there is
not a plausible solution to such a dichotomy.
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